

# U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

( Established : 1870 )



## PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

Defence Needs of India	<i>V. Shankar, I.C.S. (Retd.)</i>
The Yom Kippur war October 1973	<i>Major Edgar O'Ballance</i>
Military Renaissance of Japan	<i>Maharaj K. Chopra</i>
Changing Times	<i>Brig. H.S. Sodhi</i>
Appraisal System—The MBO Concept	<i>Brig. N.B. Grant, AVSM</i>
Towards A National Army	<i>Lieut. Col. S.C. Sirdeshpande</i>
Insurgency and Counter— Insurgency	<i>Maj. B.S. Sirohi</i>
The Psychological Aspects of Battle Casualties	<i>Surgeon, Captain T.B. D'Netto IN Shri R. Kishore Kum. R.K. Ruggu.</i>

JANUARY-MARCH 1974

# INDIA'S NUCLEAR SPIN-OFF

by Commander RAVI KAUL

**I**N this book the author examines in depth the spin-offs India could reap from the historic event of 18th May 1974 when she exploded her nuclear device. He delves into the nuances of the nuclear domain analysing the psychological fallout that will force countries to treat India as a nuclear weapons power from now on. The history of the last quarter of a century has proved the nuclear weapon a stabilizing factor, whereas regions not covered by the nuclear deterrent have been the most unstable areas of the globe. He suggests that we must stop dragging ourselves down to the level of a minor power like Pakistan, and evolves a doctrine superior to the Kissinger doctrine to compel the United States, which has become India's most dangerous adversary, to withdraw from Diego Garcia, which is a unidirectional permanent threat to India. By proliferating nuclear weapons to some minor powers the hegemony of the superpowers will be broken and gunboat diplomacy banished, while undermining the U.S. position in the western hemisphere, which is the only method of bringing to boot country which has since the early 1950s constantly undermined India's position in the Indian Ocean. The author's previous books include *India's Strategic Spectrum* which has been widely accepted as an authoritative work on India's strategic problems. Illustrated. Price Rs. 28/- £ 3.00 \$ 7.00

Order your copy immediately. Advance payment Postal Order postage and packing free. Essential add Rs 3/- for cheques. Publication end August 74.

## THE CHANAKYA DEFENCE ANNUAL

★ Every issue is for permanent reference. As valuable today as on the day of publication.

★ The Annual contains authoritative information and views on national and international security problems by Indian and foreign experts. It high-lights developments in doctrine and military technology influencing the field of tactical and strategic employment of land, sea and air forces in the future. Fully illustrated. Completely new material every year.

★ **Reviews :** 'A great gain for the country'—Indian Express.

'...articles in this inaugural issue cover a wider range of political, military and naval matters...'—United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Price—Rs. 36.00 £3.50 \$9.00

### ★ LIFE SUBSCRIPTION (only in India)

Units and Messes—Rs. 400 for thirty years (saves Rs. 550)

Individuals—Rs. 300 for life (saves Rs. 650 to 1,000)

★ **Special offer while stocks last :** The first four issues of the Annual, 1969 to 1973, will be forwarded on receiving subscription to enable you to commence your collection from the inaugural issue.

### ★ Contents of CHANAKYA DEFENCE ANNUAL 1973-74

A Chief of Defence Staff?—*General J.N. Chaudhuri.*

European Security Dilemmas—*Brig William R. Greene.*

Strategy and Weapons Systems—*Ravi Kaul.*

Hovercraft and Hydrofoils—*Dr. K. Vikram.*

United States Strategic Doctrine *Kautilya.*

Iran and the Game of Nations—*Mussarat Ahmad.*

Britain's Strategic Reserve—*Richard Blake.*

Also available : **INDIA'S STRATEGIC SPECTRUM** by Ravi Kaul. Essential for study of threats to India's security. Recommended by NDC, New Delhi. Pages 225 Price Rs. 20.00. £2 \$6.00

Chanakya Publishing House, 3, Thornhill Road, Allahabad, India.

The  
**JOURNAL**  
of the  
**United Service Institution**  
of  
**INDIA**

*Published by Authority of the Council*



(Established : 1870)

**Postal Address :**  
**KASHMIR HOUSE KING GEORGE'S AVENUE NEW DELHI-110011**  
**Telephone No : 375828**

**Vol. CIV**

**JANUARY - MARCH 1974**

**No. 434**

**USI Journal** is published quarterly in April, July, October and January.  
**Subscription :** Rs. 20 per annum. **Single Copy :** Rs. 5, Foreign (Sea Mail) \$ 2.00 or Sh 12.50. Subscription should be sent to the Secretary. **It is supplied free to members of the Institution. Articles, Correspondence and Books for Review** should be sent to the Editor. **Advertisement enquiries concerning space** should be sent to the Secretary.

# UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

for  
the furtherance of  
interest and know-  
ledge in the art,  
science and litera-  
ture of the Defence  
Services

## Patron

The President of India

## Vice Patrons

Governor of Andhra Pradesh  
Governor of Assam & of Nagaland, of Manipur, of Tripura  
and of Meghalaya  
Governor of Bihar  
Governor of Gujarat  
Governor of Haryana  
Governor of Himachal Pradesh  
Governor of Jammu & Kashmir  
Governor of Kerala  
Governor of Madhya Pradesh  
Governor of Maharashtra  
Governor of Mysore  
Governor of Orissa  
Governor of Punjab  
Governor of Rajasthan  
Governor of Tamil Nadu  
Governor of Uttar Pradesh  
Governor of West Bengal  
Lt Governor of Delhi  
Lt Governor of Goa, Daman and Diu  
Lt Governor of Mizoram  
Shri Jagjivan Ram, *Minister of Defence*  
General G.G. Bewoor, PVSM *Chief of the Army Staff*  
Admiral S.N. Kohli, PVSM, *Chief of the Naval Staff*  
Air Chief Marshal O.P. Mehra, PVSM *Chief of the Air Staff*

## President

Vice Admiral V. A. Kamath, PVSM, *Vice Chief of the Naval Staff*

## Vice Presidents

Lieut General M. L. Thapan, PVSM *Vice Chief of the Army Staff*  
Air Marshal H. C. Dewan, PVSM, *Vice Chief of the Air Staff*

## Elected Members of the Council

Lt Gen I.S. Gill PVSM, MC  
Brig N.B. Grant AVSM (Retd.)  
Maj Gen S.P. Malhotra, PVSM  
Wing Comdr A. Mazumdar, IAF  
Cdr S.M. Misra, IN  
Lt Gen Moti Sagar, PVSM (Retd.)  
Lt Gen N S. Nair, PVSM  
Lt Gen R.S. Noronha, PVSM, MC (Retd.)  
Maj Gen M.R. Rajwade, PVSM, VSM, MC  
Lt Gen Sartaj Singh, GM  
Air Commodor K.D. Singh, AVSM, IAF  
Lt Gen M.L. Thapan, PVSM

## Representative Members

Major General WAG Pinto, PVSM, *Director of Military Training*  
Captain A.P.S. Bindra, AVSM. IN, *Director of Naval Training*  
Air Cdre H.R. Chitnis, AVSM, VM, *Director of Training*  
(Air HQ)

## Ex-Officio Members

Shri Govind Narayan, ICS, *Secretary, Ministry of Defence*  
Shri G.K. Abhyankar, *Financial Advisor, Ministry of Defence*  
Lt Gen. M.N. Batra, PVSM

Major General SP Malhotra, PVSM  
*Commandant, National Defence College*  
*Commandant, Defence Services Staff College*

## Executive Committee

Major General WAG Pinto. PVSM  
Shri P.Krishnamurti  
Captain A.P.S. Bindra, AVSM. IN  
Air Cdre H.R. Chitnis, AVSM, VM  
Lieut General Moti Sagar, PVSM (Retd.)  
Shri S.A. Chari

Secretary and Editor  
Colonel Pyara Lal,  
AVSM



# CONTENTS

JANUARY—MARCH 1974



DEFENCE NEEDS OF INDIA	V. Shankar, I.C.S. (Retd.)	1
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR—OCTOBER 1973	Major Edgar O'Ballance	7
MILITARY RENAISSANCE OF JAPAN	Maharaj K. Chopra	17
CHANGING TIMES	Brigadier H.S. Sodhi	26
APPRAISAL SYSTEM—THE MBO CONCEPT	Brigadier N.B. Grant, AVSM	45
TOWARDS A NATIONAL ARMY	Liut. Col. S.C. Sirdeshpande	51
INSURGENCY AND COUNTER— INSURGENCY	Maj. B.S. Sirohi	62
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF BATTLE CASUALTIES	Surg. Captain and T.B. D' Netto IN, Shri R. Kishore and Kum. R.K. Ruggu.	78
INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE GREAT POWERS	P.K. Mishra	87
ARMS AND STRATEGY : AN INTERNA- TIONAL SURVEY OF MODERN DEFENCE	Maj. Gen. T.N.R. Nayar, PVSM	92
BOOK REVIEWS		
NELSON THE COMMANDER ( <i>Geoffrey Bennet</i> ) ; ROBERT BLAKE : GENERAL-AT-SEA ( <i>J.R. Powell</i> ) ; THEORIES OF PEACE AND SECURITY ( <i>John Garnet</i> ) ; PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR ( <i>Sydney D. Bailey</i> ) ; THE DEADLY STROKE ( <i>Warren Tute</i> ) ; GUERRILLA WARFARE ( <i>Che Guevara</i> ) ; THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHINESE EARTH ( <i>Keith Buchanan</i> ) ; INDIAN ARMED FORCES YEARBOOK ( <i>Jaswant Singh</i> ) ; AN ASSEMBLAGE OF INDIAN ARMY SOLDIERS AND UNIFORM ( <i>Michael Glover</i> ) ; JUDO AND SELF-DEFENCE FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS ( <i>Pat Butler and Karen Butler</i> ).		
SECRETARY'S NOTES		
ADDITIONS TO THE USI LIBRARY		

## NOTE

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official and the opinion of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

*For*

## CHILDREN PARK EQUIPMENT



## GYMNASTIC APPARATUS

**Please visit or write to :**

**M/s INDIAN ARMY MUSKETARY STORES**

MODEL BASTI,  
NEW DELHI-5.

Phone : 519148

# DEFENCE NEEDS OF INDIA

V. SHANKAR I.C.S. (RETD.)

IT is an irony of fate that a country like India which has throughout history followed a policy of peace and contentment within its own borders should be subjected, ever since Independence, to threats of war and danger to its security. Even after Independence, India has been in the vanguard of every effort for world peace and it has made no mean contribution to the maintenance of peace wherever it was threatened. Both from the ideological and practical point of view, it has studiously avoided getting involved with power blocs even at the cost of being misunderstood. The main threats to its security have however come from two of its neighbours, one namely Pakistan, a brother in a joint family who insisted and secured partition in the family property, and the other a brother in neighbourhood which hailed India as such but later found an outlet for its territorial ambitions in hostility, which has not ceased even after grabbing the territory it desired but has continued unabated ; that hostility is finding full expression in open and substantial assistance to the 'other brother' for equipping itself for a knock-out role in the next outbreak of hostilities whenever that may be.

Geographically, India is situated virtually in the middle of the littoral States around the Indian Ocean with African countries including South Africa, Arab countries, the Gulf States, Iran and Pakistan on one side, and Burma, South-East Asian countries, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand on the other. Of this entire geographical region, South Africa and other African countries could be left out of account from the point of view of India's security though they are certainly relevant for the security of the Indian Ocean. The Arab countries which practically ceased to count as relevant factors in the security of this region nearly two centuries ago appear now to be waking up and some of them are being armed to the teeth by both U.S.S.R., and U.S.A., Egypt, Iraq and Syria being the beneficiaries of U.S.S.R. assistance, while Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan have their links in military preparations with U.S.A., U.K. and France; Iran, a non-Arab country is different from Arab countries in certain aspects of religion, outlook and external interests as well as in internal politics of the Middle Eastern countries. All of them, however, have bonds of friendship with Pakistan and consequently their military preparations are matters of more than ordinary concern to India from its security point of view.

Whatever may be the reasons for these countries arming themselves to the teeth and being supplied with sophisticated weaponry by the inte-

rested Powers, the fact remains that their affinity with Pakistan does make it possible that in the event of any fresh conflict between India and Pakistan, they will not remain passive spectators and that, except probably in the case of Iran, which has lately shown an attitude of cordiality and understanding towards us, they will give monetary and material assistance to Pakistan both in the preparatory stage and in actual warfare. Added to this, Chinese open and massive aid and U.S.A.'s indirect and clandestine assistance to Pakistan's war potential would in a future conflict pose a much greater danger to our security than its hostilities of 1947-49, of 1965 and of 1971 did. As regards China, it seems quite plain that at least under the present dispensation there is no chance of our dismissing it as of little consequence from the security angle. Its attitude has been hostile despite attempts on our part to seek normal and peaceful relationship. It has always encouraged Pakistan to continue in its hostility. It is quite clear from its pronouncements and avowed policies that it will keep the flame of hate in Pakistan active (not that it needs any such inspiration or stimulus). It is also equally clear that given the opportunity, it will not hesitate to create difficulties for us within our own borders through encouragement and support to insurgency or through supporting financially and otherwise subversive elements in our own country.

There is some relief however that on the eastern flank we have no country which harbours any hostile intentions towards us. On the other hand, barring a brief and erratic interlude in the case of Indonesia, all these countries have been maintaining friendly relations with us and none of them seems disposed to have any direct or indirect interest against us in any conflict with Pakistan. As regards the politics of the Indian Ocean, it is a game in which major Powers are disposed to indulge, presumably not so much from the point of view of their specific interest in the region as from the point of view of their global strategy. It is not unlikely that recent manifestation of their attention in the Indian Ocean has been occasioned by the nearness of opening up of the Suez Canal which consequently enhances the importance of keeping up the sealanes secure from their respective points of view and protecting their respective friends or allies in the region from any possibility of coercion by the opposite side. It is also likely that so far as global strategy is concerned, the Indian Ocean has required some importance from the point of view of meeting each others's nuclear threats.

Taking this overall view, it seems now quite clear that India does not have to think of security danger merely from Pakistan or China but has to cast its mind well beyond, and the glance of that mind has to be swift, steady and deep. This is particularly necessary in view of the fact that unwittingly its treaty of friendship with U.S.S.R. is even now being interpreted by many countries, that matter, as a dilution of its non-align-

ment and its dependence on U.S.S.R. supply of arms is construed as imparting emphasis to that interpretation.

Whatever view one may take about the possibilities of conflict (near or remote) between India and Pakistan or India and China, it should be clear even to Macaulay's school-boy that India cannot neglect being ready to deal with eventualities whenever these may materialise. Consequently, we have to consider our own defence preparations in the light of known facts about Pakistan's re-armament including the availability of the prisoners of war after their repatriation, Iranian re-armament programme, U.S.A. supply of arms to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, pronounced U.S. partiality towards Pakistan, U.S.A./Pakistan/China axis of friendship, the recent emergence of Arab unity and Islamic brotherhood (it is quite clear that Arabs having tasted the fruit of such unity are not going to Jeopardise it), the mentality of *jehad* in most of the Arab World and Pakistan, U.S.A./U.S.S.R. rivalry in the Indian Ocean, Chinese hostility towards us, the present strained relationship between U.S.S.R. and China, Chinese nuclear build-up and our virtual heavy dependence on U.S.S.R. for supply of arms. Recent conferences of Muslim powers show clearly that Pakistan is not without influence in their counsels and in that brotherhood. Islam is not a dormant but an active and dynamic concept.

So far as the last but one factor is concerned, the West Asian war has clearly shown that U.S.S.R.'s supply to Egypt was mostly, if not wholly, of a defensive pattern. Those who know its general attitude in regard to supply of arms and equipment to India will perhaps agree that this is their slant in our case. On the other hand, such susceptibilities do not bind U.S.A. and China as their respective assurances to Israel and Pakistan have shown or, for that matter, France and U.K., the latter two countries in their attitude to the sale of arms to the Arab countries and Iran or even Pakistan. We have to learn two other lessons from the West Asian war, namely, that a country's dependence on major Powers for the supply of arms or support to its defence efforts places it at the discretion of the country which aids and assists; it is that country, whether it is eastern or western, which would determine how long and to what extent a conflict could be allowed to develop and consequently there is little chance of carrying the war to its logical conclusion. Such dependence, therefore, places the receiving country at a disadvantage in that it cannot eliminate for all time a threat to its security. A conflict in such circumstances results only in periods of truce or stalemate and not in lasting peace. It is unavoidable in such a situation that the countries in conflict should treat the period of truce as an opportunity for preparing for the next round and not for securing halt to arms.

If the need for vigilance and adequate preparations to safeguard our security and defend our territorial integrity is accepted (to me it seems

axiomatic), it is clear that our strategy cannot be merely defensive particularly since the initiative for an attack rests with the other side. What handicap such a position involves is clear from the manner in which for political reasons Israel could not deliver on this occasion a pre-emptive attack and consequently had to face substantial reverses in the initial stages. It was only its own indigenous defence production, massive supply of arms by U.S.A. and the initiative of field commanders that enabled Israel to retrieve some of the damage and to carry the war to the Egyptian and Syrian territories. The most important lesson that we have to learn from this example is that offensive preparations even with a defensive posture are a dire necessity. The scale of such preparations must be such that after the initial attack by the enemy we can retaliate in order to cripple any efforts on his part to enlarge whatever initial success he may obtain by being the first to attack. The second lesson that we have to learn is that we have to combine with adequate numbers sophistication and quality of our equipment. The arms which U.S.S.R. supplied to Egypt were definitely better in quality than those which it has supplied to us. Similarly, some of the items of equipment procured by Israel from U.S.A. and western countries or developed and manufactured by itself, were superior to what U.S.S.R. supplied to Egypt and consequently Israel eventually got the better of Syrian and Egyptian forces, particularly in the Air, in the Navy and in armour.

If we turn now to the existing state of affairs, it would hardly be revealing any secrets if one made the statement that while Pakistan has forged ahead of its position after the end of hostilities in December 1971 in many sectors of armed strength and has more than retrieved its losses in numbers, we have not been able for more reasons than one including scarcity of free foreign exchange and the dilatoriness of decision-making to exploit fully the lessons thrown up by the 1971 conflict. We need a long-range strike aircraft for penetrating deep into enemy territory both in counter-attack and for destruction of its war potential but we seem still to be groping even in broad day-light. We must not only get effective missiles of different types which have proved themselves in the West Asian war but also make them in India. Considering that some of the needs raised six or seven years ago are still in the process of cogitation or consideration, it is a moot point as to how long it will take. On the next occasion we may have to meet much heavier air attacks particularly to the west of a line from Agra to Bombay and tip-and-run naval attacks on the western coast from Kandla to Cochin; this means that our anti-aircraft defences in this area must be quite effective and well-distributed. The West Asian war as well as Vietnam war have demonstrated the military value of helicopters; their anti-submarine reconnaissance and combat role has also been demonstrated. We have to apply that lesson to our own forces and increase helicopter strength from both these points

of view. We have to increase our armour both in numbers and quality; ours are those which are back numbers in the forces of the countries from which we obtain or obtained them. Our Navy requires particular attention; most of the fleet and its equipment is twenty years old. Even the latest ones barring some we acquired from abroad have not been equipped with the latest systems. We need badly fast, well-armed and manoeuvrable Frigates, Corvettes and even smaller boats. Here again, either there is no progress or if at all it is there, it is painfully and in some cases even tragically slow. Our shore defences need modernisation and expansion. In the field of electronics we are a long way from modern standards in design, production or purchases.

Let us not be deluded into accepting that our indigenous production is matching up to requirements. Our imports even now must be at least thrice the value of our indigenous production. It is true that in some lines we are self-sufficient but in aviation (notwithstanding our Mig, H.F. 24 and Alouette programme) we have still many gaps to fill; there is no such thing as a real aviation industry. Our tank and artillery production needs also to be stepped up if we are to be self-reliant. Even in the field of ammunition there are some critical gaps. In electronics we are lagging behind many western countries let alone countries of very advanced technology. We have to develop competent design-teams, acquire sophisticated know-how and technology and evolve suitable systems and designs. It is wrong to assume that the large investment that would be required for these multiple efforts would stand in the way of economic growth. In fact, such an investment would generate an economy which could easily work out to many times the amount of investment. It would also create an infra-structure in the country which from the point of view of modernisation and sophistication would be an asset to it and would provide a very sound foundation for future progress.

I am convinced that taking both a short-term and long-term view of recent developments and our position in this region with the threats from our neighbours next-door, what has been outlined above as imperatives of our defence has to be achieved. Since Independence our attitude towards our defence forces has passed through many vicissitudes. Reduction of our forces and demobilisation was the policy in the earlier years notwithstanding the fact that we spent two years in active hostilities and had to keep our border with Pakistan manned with troops in order to meet any untoward development from across the frontier. The U.S.A.—Pakistan military pact did not awaken us to the dangerous possibilities of U.S. aid to Pakistan. Even when the Chinese threat loomed large, we did very little to strengthen our defence forces. We paid the penalty for both these acts of omission in 1962 when we suffered the humiliation of a defeat and in 1965 when we could not make the impression on Pakistan

which we should have done in order to prevent further outbreaks of hostilities. Fortunately, however, we did profit from the lessons of both these wars and in 1971 we were able to give a better account of ourselves. Even then we could not go very far in the west and cannot therefore claim that Pakistan's real military strength and equipment suffered any serious losses as a result of that conflict. In the light of this history, if we are now complacent about our defence needs or indifferent to the requirements in terms of modern weaponry in the conventional field, we shall be guilty of a neglect for which we may have to pay dearly and incur the odium from future generations. We therefore owe these efforts not only to our country and the contemporary generation but also to future generations of our countrymen.

However the acquisition of modern arms and modernisation and expansion of indigenous equipment are not the only means required to reach the end of safeguarding our security. We have to back these efforts with the necessary exertions in the domain of our external relations. There is no such thing in modern political relationship as permanent love or hate. In fact a realisation of this principle is the sine qua non of success of non-alignment. In matters of national security neither ideology nor prejudice has a decisive role; the trump card is national interest and not ideological preference or bias. The recent detente between USA and USSR and USA and China or the success of Dr Kissinger in his commendable efforts to secure improved relationship between Israel and Egypt and Syria shows that love can be forged among the hostiles of yesterday and the hostiles of yesterday can be good neighbours today. In international relations, in which national emotions rather than restraints and reasons project disturbed situations, expediency rather than one track addiction to formulae ensure success. We have also to cultivate the habit of speaking when we must but keeping silent when speech is not essential, the guiding factor in expression in one case and restraint in the other being the interest of our own country.



# THE YOM KIPPUR WAR-OCTOBER 1973

MAJOR EDGAR O'BALLANCE

IT will not be possible for some time to write an accurate and comprehensive account of the 19-day war fought in the Middle East by Egypt and Syria against Israel in October 1973, as so many facts have yet to be discovered and verified : a heavy security veil still conceals so many vital details. However, a certain amount of information has been made available by war communiques, press reports and interviews with various personalities, and tentatively with reservations that many details have yet to be double checked, and an admission that there are gaps in the story, I will briefly set out the salient facts as they appear to be at the moment, so we can have at least a rough, if not definite, picture of what happened.

At 1400-hours (local time), Egyptian and Syrian troops advanced into Israeli-held territory, catching the Israelis offguard, and initially driving them back. The 6th of October was Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, a holy day in the Jewish Year, when there was no television, radio or newspapers, or places of entertainment open, it being the day Israelis spent with their families at home, the religious visiting synagogues. If this was, as is frequently alleged, considered to be an additional factor in the Arab plan to take the Israelis by surprise, it had the slightly converse effect, as on this day of all days, the Israeli authorities, when they realised belatedly what was happening, hastily set their mobilisation processes into motion, knew exactly where to find the reservists, and those on leave : on practically any other day, the reservists would have been spread over the country and would have taken longer to find.

## RIVAL FORCES

"President Sadat of Egypt had been planning this campaign for many months, and in seriousness since November 1972, but the Israelis did not really expect him to attack them, and moreover they doubted his ability to persuade Syria, or any other Arab country, to attack in concert, let alone at precisely the same moment."

Since the disastrous Six-day War of June 1967, the Egyptians had been rearmed by the Soviet Union, and during President Nasser's War of Attrition across the Suez Canal from 1968 until August 1970, the soldiers were retrained, toughened and their morale restored. Strengths

of forces tend to vary slightly depending upon the source, but those I quote are a consensus of the various estimates. With a population of over 35 million, and a three-year period of conscription in force, Egypt had little trouble in maintaining a regular army of about 260,000 men, and army reserves of about 500,000. It possessed about 2,000 Soviet tanks. mainly T-54s, T-55s and T-62s, and about another 2,000 Soviet armoured vehicles, such as armoured personnel carriers of the Soviet BTR series, used in varying roles, and about 3,800 guns.

The combat element of the army was formed into three armoured, three mechanised-infantry and five infantry divisions, two paratroop and 16 artillery brigades and 28 commando battalions, A SAM (surface-to-air missile) Box, consisting mainly of SAM-2s and SAM-3s, had been established on the West Bank of the Suez Canal, which gave "slant" overhead cover against aircraft up to 25 miles over the Israeli-held East Bank. Additionally, Egypt had the newer SAM-6 and the SAM-7, both effective against low-flying aircraft, the latter being carried by a soldier and fired individually from his shoulder, and also the Soviet Snapper and Sagger anti-tank missiles, also fired by the individual soldier.

The Egyptian air force had about 620 combat aircraft, mainly MiGs and SU-7s, and about 90 helicopters, but had a shortage of pilots to fly them. The navy possessed about 95 ships of various types, including 12 Osa and six Komar Class missile boats, each armed with the Soviet Styx missile, which had a range of 16 miles. Practically all this formidable array of weaponry was new Soviet material; Egyptian morale had never been higher.

Syria, likewise had been armed by the Soviet Union, and possessed about 1,300 tanks, 1,000 other armoured vehicles, and just over 2,000 guns. With a population of about 6.5 million, and a 30-month period of conscription, it maintained a regular army of 120,000 men, and had 200,000 reservists. These, on mobilisation, were formed basically into two armoured, one mechanised and two infantry divisions, seven artillery regiments and five commando and one paratroop battalion. The air force had about 325 combat aircraft and 50 helicopters, again a shortage of pilots being the problem. The navy had about 25 ships, including six Komar Class missile boats, with Styx missiles. Syrian morale was higher than it had been before.

### ISRAELI STRENGTH

For its size, Israel possessed disproportionate military strength. With a population of just over 3-million, it had a regular army element of 11,500 with 50,000 conscripts in training (including 12,000 women), and could mobilise an additional 210,000 reservists. On full mobilisation the

army was formed into 10 armoured, 9 mechanised-infantry and 5 paratroop brigades. Weapons were miscellaneous, Israel having to obtain them from whatever source was available. The army possessed about 1,900 tanks and 1,500 other armoured vehicles, and some 3,500 guns. They included British Centurions, American Pattons and captured Soviet tanks and guns. A certain amount of military equipment was manufactured in Israel, but all sophisticated weapons and vehicles, such as aircraft, tanks, and guns had to be obtained from abroad. The Israeli air force had about 480 combat aircraft and 75 helicopters, with ample skilled pilots to fly them, while the navy had about 50 small craft, some armed with the Israeli missile, the Gabriel, which had a range of 12 miles.

Being small in size and narrow in shape, Israel did not have space for defence in depth, and its three successful wars against the Arabs had been won by offensive action, especially those of 1956 and 1967, when mobile armoured columns, bursting through conventional defences, operated in a deep penetration role. This basic principle of offence remained. On the Golan Plateau, for example, there were no trench-like defences, but only a string of Nahal villages, manned by soldier-workers, near the cease-fire line and scattered over the plateau, with small mobile forces. (of only about 90 tanks on Oct. 6) ready to hit at any invader, the concept being to rush into the attack in the event of any hostile Syrian action.

On the Egyptian Front this principle had been modified, as the cease-fire dividing line was the Suez Canal, itself an excellent anti-tank ditch, along which the Israelis had constructed the Bar Lev Line. This consisted of about 30 fortified positions on the East Bank, right on the water's edge, the intervening space between them being covered by patrols, while the bank of the Canal had been built up to about 60-feet in height with sand in a steep slope, which came to be regarded as a defence work in itself. Reports had boosted it into an impregnable Maginot Line, giving a false idea of its defensive capabilities, as only one under-strength infantry brigade was manning it on the 6th.

The Yom Kippur War can be conveniently divided into four phases, some overlapping, the first, lasting about four days, being the initial attacks by Egypt and Syria which drove the Israelis back; the second being the Israeli counter-attacks against the Syrians and their allies, which lasted until the ceasefire on the 24th; the third being the Egyptian second attack, which began on the 14th; while the fourth phase, which began on the 15th, was the Israeli penetration across to the West Bank, which was reinforced until at the time of the second cease-fire it had enveloped the Egyptian 3rd Army, marooned in the southern sector.

## INITIAL ARAB ATTACKS

The war, code-named by the Egyptians "Badr", after one of the Prophet Mohammed's early victories, began with a joint, co-ordinated attack by both Egypt and Syria on Israel. Dealing with the Egyptian Front first, beginning at 1400-hours, preceded by a heavy artillery barrage from about 2,000 guns, about 8,000 Egyptian soldiers crossed the Canal in assault craft, five small bridgeheads having been secured by Egyptian commandos minutes before. This first attacking wave, supported by 200 aircraft firing rockets and dropping bombs, ignored the Bar Lev Line forts, which were dealt with by the second wave of infantry, and moved directly forward into the desert along the 100-mile front. The forward Egyptian infantry were equipped with Soviet Sagger anti-tank missiles, carried in suitcase-like containers, and when the Israeli tanks, lying back a few miles, moved forward expecting the Egyptian infantry to melt away, they were decimated by these one-man weapons, as the Egyptian soldiers stood fast and fired at the Israeli armour. As Israeli Phantoms and Skyhawks came into action to support its ground troops, they were countered by the SAM-6s and SAM-7s, and deterred by the SAM Box on the West Bank.

The Egyptians soon had pontoon bridges across the waterway, and by dusk, about 2000-hours, practically all the Bar Lev Line positions had been overrun, the defenders mostly being taken prisoner, although one at the southern end held out until the 13th, before it too surrendered. By dusk the Egyptian infantry had advanced up to about five miles from the Canal, where it halted for the night. All forward Israeli intercommunication had ceased, and the light screen of tanks had withdrawn, leaving behind many burning in the sand. Expecting, if anything, an armoured attack, the Israeli tanks had loaded up with 'armour-piercing' ammunition, and were very short of High Explosive rounds, which would have broken up the exposed infantry. The Egyptians claim that in the first six hours they only suffered 200 casualties.

As dusk fell, the first of about 400 Egyptian tanks began trundling across the pontoon bridges, that were increased to at least 12 in number during the night and although in the following days they were occasionally bombed by Israeli aircraft, they were seldom out of action for long, being the latest Soviet model, in which new intersections could be quickly and easily inserted when one was damaged. Generally, Egyptian aircraft kept in the background after the first attacks, the Egyptians relying with some success upon their SAM defences.


The next day, the 7th, the Egyptian infantry, with the tanks trailing behind, moved forward along the whole front. The Israelis had only one armoured brigade lying back along the Bir Gifgafa Ridge, which was

between 20 and 30 miles east of the Canal, and in the morning a reinforced battalion, of about 190 Pattons, was sent out to drive the Egyptians back in the centre. Overconfident, it fell into the ambush of infantry-manned Sappers, the battalion commander was captured, and the battalion hastily withdrew leaving about 100 destroyed or abandoned tanks on the field. Clearly, an Egyptian victory. The Israelis now had less than 150 tanks on the East Bank left to block the Egyptians should they advance towards the Bir Gifgafa Ridge, morale drooped and differences arose between Israeli generals. On the 8th, the Egyptians announced that the whole of the East Bank was in their hands. On the 9th, the Egyptians gradually moved forward until they were about 10 miles east of the Canal all along the front; and there they stayed under the SAM umbrella on the West Bank, a gap of about three miles of "no man's land" separating them the Israeli forward watching patrols. That day Port Said was shelled by the Israelis.

On the Syrian Front at the same hour (1400-hours on the 6th) about 1,000 Syrian tanks moved over the cease-fire line, preceded by a moving artillery barrage, advancing on three main axes. The main one was down the road from Damascus towards Kuneitra, the second one crossed near Rafid to its south and split into three prongs as it sought to batter its way across the Golan Plateau, while the third, a smaller one crossed at Hushmiyar, *farther south still, and was aimed at El Al*. This attack, with tanks moving almost line-abreast with the infantry following in armoured personnel carriers, was an armoured advance, as opposed to that of the Egyptians' which had been an infantry one. For over 24-hours the momentum of this huge armoured force was maintained, and as it swept forward the Israelis had to give way before it. Israeli aircraft intervened to help, but suffered losses due to SAM activity. The Syrian advance continued on the second day, but at a slower pace, and by the end of the third day, it ground to a halt, having reached at its extreme penetration a point about 15 miles from the cease-fire line inside Israeli-held territory.


Generally, Israeli aircraft did better against the Syrians, whose accuracy with the SAMs fell off, and as the Syrians did not bother to dig-in their tanks, many fell easy prey to Israeli Phantoms and Skyhawks, the Israelis claiming the Syrians lost 400 tanks and 650 killed in the first two days of the war. But the Israelis themselves were suffering, losing about 60 aircraft in the first week of the fighting on both fronts, the majority to SAM-7s. By the 9th, Israeli mobilisation was taking effect, and reserve formations were reaching the two fronts, which enabled them to hold the enemy on the Syrian Front: the Egyptians had not attempted to move any further forward. Realising the danger of having to fight on two fronts, the Israelis decided to concentrate upon Syrians first, and accordingly tanks, guns and troops crossed the Jordan

## EGYPTIAN FRONT



— ROADS —

## SYRIAN FRONT



— ROADS —

- - - - - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES.

Valley and toiled up the Golan Heights, enabling the Israelis, who had got their second wind, to take the offensive.

## THE SYRIAN FRONT

On the 9th, Israeli aircraft bombed Damascus and other places in Syria, in retaliation for Palestinian commandos in the Lebanon firing FROG-7 missiles, having a range of about 45 miles and a 1,000-lb warhead, across the border into Israeli settlements. The same day Israeli aircraft destroyed a Lebanese radar station on the Barouk Range, which was capable of scanning aircraft movement over Israel and right down to the Suez Canal. The real Israeli counter-offensive began on the 10th, and Syrian forces were slowly pushed backwards, the first Israeli soldiers penetrating Syrian territory on the 11th. By the 13th, the Israelis had stabilised the Syrian Front to such an extent that Israeli tanks, men and supplies were able to be diverted south to the Egyptian Front.

Meanwhile, on the 10th, Iraqi forces amounting to some 18,000 troops, with 250 tanks and other armoured vehicles, supported by 200 aircraft, moved up to the Syrian Front, and the next day were in action against the Israelis. There was already a brigade of Moroccan troops on the slopes of Mount Hermon, which had been in Syria since July. By the 12th, the Syrians had been largely driven back into their own territory, and the Israelis, who claimed they left 960 tanks behind, intact or destroyed, had reached a point on the road to Damascus about six miles over the cease-fire line. In this sector, on the 13th, the Syrians and Israelis soon became locked in battle as they fought for the village of Sasa, only 24 miles from Damascus, and the struggle continued for days, little ground being positively gained. Sasa was briefly taken by the Israelis, and then retaken by the Syrians.

Also on the 13th, a Jordanian armoured brigade was sent to Syria as King Hussein entered the struggle, as was the small Saudi Arabian brigade that had been stationed in the south of Jordan. On the 15th, there was a major armoured clash between the Israelis and Iraqis on the southern flank, the Iraqis being pressed back slightly. The following day, the 16th, a combined Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian force, of over 250 tanks attacked the Israelis at dawn, but there was lack of co-ordination between the Arab contingents, and the assault had to be called off after about six Jordanian tanks had been knocked out by Iraqi artillery fire. Although in the succeeding days slight Israeli advances were made, especially on the flanks, this front bogged down in stalemate by the 21st, with tanks and guns bull-dozed into the ground for protection. On the 21st, Jordan sent another armoured brigade into Syria.

Two or three positions on the slopes of Mount Hermon on the northern edge of the battlefield, which had been seized by the Syrians on the first day of the war, remained in Arab hands, and it was not until hours before the cease-fire, which the Syrians would not accept until the 24th, that Israeli paratroops in helicopter recaptured them. The Israelis had gained an additional 300 square miles of Syrian territory by the time the shooting stopped. Iraqi troops were withdrawn because the Iraqi Government had not been consulted about the cease-fire, and later both Jordanian and Saudi Arabian troops also left Syria.

## SECOND EGYPTIAN ATTACK

Turning back to the Egyptian Front, having moved some 100,000 troops and about 1,000 tanks to the East Bank, the Egyptian were ready for a gigantic push to the three passes in the Bir Gifgafa Ridge, some 15-25 miles from where their forward troops had halted on the 9th. By this time the Israelis had also brought up reinforcements, and had perhaps 1,000 tanks along the Ridge. On the 14th, the Egyptian advance began and their tanks moved forward almost line-abreast to be met by the Israeli armour. So began a confused tank battle which raged for nearly six days, involving over 2,000 tanks and many other armoured vehicles (figures are as yet still conflicting), which is claimed by the Israelis to be the biggest armoured clash in military history (1).

The main Egyptian thrust was towards the Mitla Pass, the southernmost of the three passes that cut through the Ridge into the open desert of Sinai. From the 17th, the battle began to turn in favour of the Israelis, Israeli aircraft had come into the picture as the Egyptians had advanced beyond the shelter of their SAM Box, and so were more vulnerable in the open. Egyptian aircraft did not participate in any numbers. By the 19th, the ferocity of this armoured battle was running down through sheer exhaustion, lack of fuel and ammunition, and heavy casualties on both sides: neither men nor machines could keep up such a pace for much longer. At the most the Egyptians had been pushed back only a few miles, and they still held on to a narrow strip along the whole length of the Canal on the East Bank, except for a narrow gap in the centre, near Ishmailia.

## THE ISRAELIS CROSS THE SUEZ CANAL

While the gigantic tank battle was raging, mainly in the central sector on the East Bank, a small Israeli group, on the night of the 15th,

1 Although at the Battle of Alamein, which began on the 23rd October, 1943, there were only 1,029 Allied tanks and 1,219 guns, and 489 Axis tanks and 1,219 guns, at the Battle of Kursk which began on the 12th July 1943, some 6,300 tanks and self-propelled guns were involved, there being 2,700 German and 3,600 Soviet ones: so this claim may not be correct.



managed to slip across the Canal to the West Bank near Deversoir, at the north end of the Great Bitter Lake, which also happened to be the junction between the two Egyptian armies, to establish a bridgehead, which it retained, and which was reinforced the next day with tanks and troops. This force, although at first something in the nature of a fighting patrol, whose task was to destroy SAM batteries on the West Bank, saw the opportunity to exploit further, and it probed to the north until it was stopped short of the Ishmailia-Cairo road. It then turned about and moved southwards along the West Bank and the shores of the Great Bitter Lake, making for Suez town at the southern end of the Canal, thus in fact moving behind the Egyptian 3rd Army, which was fighting on the East Bank.

A cease-fire between Egypt and Israel was arranged to come into effect on the evening of the 22nd, and while the fighting stopped in the northern sector, that is north of Ishmailia, it continued between the Israeli force on the West Bank pushing southwards, and Egyptian forces that had been brought up to try and stop it. The Israelis forced their way to the Suez-Cairo road, which they blocked, before continuing on to Suez town, held by the Egyptians. Failing to seize the town, the Israelis moved to take the small port of Abadiya, about eight miles further south. A last Israeli attempt to break into Suez town failed just before the second cease-fire was enforced on the evening of the 24th.

When the fighting ended on the Egyptian Front, there were two large Egyptian groups still on the East Bank, separated by a narrow strip of Israeli-held territory, the Egyptian 2nd Army was in the north, and the Egyptian 3rd Army, being virtually surrounded by the Israelis, was in the south. The Israelis had gained about 500 square miles of Egyptian territory, and the Egyptians had gained about 300 square miles of formerly Israeli-held territory in the Sinai.

### NAVAL OPERATIONS

Being small, and slow as compared with aircraft speeds, the navies of the three countries were overshadowed by air and land activities in this war, but nevertheless the Israeli navy did well, shelling Egyptian ports and shipping from the first day, and in its several clashes with Arab warships. On the 10th and 11th, Israeli ships shelled the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus, hitting and sinking a Greek freighter, and also setting the oil storage tanks on fire at Baniyas. On the 12th, it sank a Soviet freighter near Tartus with a Gabriel missile, and on the 13th, there were clashes between Egyptian and Israeli naval craft, after which there was hardly any Arab offensive naval activity. The Israelis claim they sank 14 Arab missile boats, for only one Israeli craft damaged. It is also alleged that Israeli frogmen cut the telephone and telex under-

water cables outside Beirut harbour, thus severing Lebanese communications with the outside world for some days.

### COMMENTS

In this brief war, after being caught offguard, the Israelis quickly recovered themselves and by the time the fighting ended were well on the way to pushing the Egyptians back into Egypt proper, although they had stalemated on the Syrian Front before Sasa, after driving six miles into Syrian territory. The cost had been heavy. On the 6th November 1973, the Israelis stated they had lost 1,854 killed, that another 1,850 were still in hospital, and 450 were believed to be prisoners-of-war, and it was also estimated they had lost at least 100 aircraft, but only 50 pilots. The Arabs are still silent as to their losses. American estimates, gained no doubt from information gleaned from their satellite which monitored the battlefields during this war, were that the Israelis had lost 780 tanks, the Syrians 860, the Egyptians 580, the Iraqis 125, and the Jordanians 20-30, while the Egyptian casualties were assessed at about 13,000, and those of the other Arab countries as being "several hundred." The Israelis claim to have brought down 550 Arab aircraft, with the loss of 350 pilots, and to have destroyed 30 SAM batteries, 1,000 Egyptian and 1,000 Syrian tanks, and to hold over 7,000 prisoners. Quite a substantial claim.

The Yom Kippur War was a technological one in which sophisticated equipment such as SAMs and electronic counter-measures, were used on both sides, and the Israelis were clearly surprised at the effectiveness of the new SAM-6s and SAM-7s and the anti-tank missiles. The rate of destruction of this sophisticated equipment was high, but sources of re-supply were available...Already, on the 11th, the Soviet Union had begun its airlift, flying in planeloads of replacements, ammunition and spares to both Syria and Egypt. After some hesitation, when it became obvious how large the Russian airlift was, to save Israelis from defeat, the Americans began re-supplying the Israelis, who apart from battle losses, were desperately short of ammunition, it being thought that on the 7th, they had only two day's supply left—they had not planned for a long war.

The Egyptians made several commando raids, the men being lifted by helicopter into Israeli-held territory, and the two or three of these which came to grief, were publicised by the Israelis, but it is suspected more were made, and were successful in disrupting Israeli communications in the Sinai, about which the Israelis remain silent. Tactical lessons as to the value of the new missiles and their effect on the battlefield, are still being evaluated and it will be some time before sufficient information is made available to discuss them—but we await that day with interest. The main Israeli disappointment of the war was that they could not persuade the encircled Egyptian 3rd Army to surrender en masse, which would have been a supreme accolade.

# MILITARY RENAISSANCE OF JAPAN

MAHARAJ K. CHOPRA

ON my visit to Japan a year ago, a Japanese told me he belonged to a generation which woke up one morning and found that his country had an army. There is a good deal of truth in this experience, and for two reasons. For one quarter of a century, since the end of the Second World War, the Japanese have been preoccupied out and out with economic pursuits, so much so that they have earned descriptions such as "economic animals". This of course has paid them dividends hands down. From conditions of utter ruin, Japan has managed to catapult itself to the third rank among nations, after the United States and the Soviet Union. In the dazzle of this miracle every other national endeavour faded, including reconstruction of defence.

And, secondly, so shattering was the aftermath of the war that not only was the military machine in a shambles, but also there was no will to recreate it. And the Japanese of whom I have spoken, stunned as he was by his country's defeat, had found himself in the maelstrom of the successor generation to which he was a stranger.

## POST-WAR SITUATION

It may not be necessary in our present discussion to look back upon the various forces which propelled Japan on the road of military reconstruction but for the fact that some of these are still operative. Among them were the objectives of the United States, the occupying Power, to bring about democratisation and demilitarisation of Japan.

Japan has become a democracy, perhaps with a vengeance, if you observe the sheer freedom of opinion, violence of debate, and proliferation of opposition, under a political regime as democratic as anywhere in the world. Where Japan even surpasses other democracies is in its profession of pacifism. That profession is enshrined in the Constitution itself, Article 9 of which lays down the following :

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as a means of settling disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential will never be maintained."

This Article is very much live still, for in late 1972 a Japanese court ruled, on an application filed by the people of a district whose land was being requisitioned on military grounds, that the armed forces were illegally constituted.

And yet a military machine has come into being, signifying failure of the demilitarisation objective. Post-war events were not propitious in this respect. The Allies fell out, the Chinese civil war generated its own dynamics, and a new pattern of forces began to be woven. Japan, with its strategic location and great potential, could not be left militarily prostrate. When the Korean War broke out in 1950 the field was clear for Japan to develop a new posture or national security.

Paradoxically, it was the USA, the protagonist of demilitarisation, who now wanted Japan to turn another leaf. The outbreak of the Korean War caused all four American divisions stationed on its islands to be moved to Korea, and to fill the gap General Mac Arthur ordered the Japanese Government to establish a National Police Reserve Force of 75,000 men. Here was the first step towards rearmament without the Japanese realising it.

The goading continued as Japan inched towards a peace treaty. Japan's rearmament was in fact the central issue of the treaty, which Mr. Dulles was intent on achieving and which Prime Minister Yoshida was equally determined to resist. The compromise was that in the mutual security treaty signed, the USA undertook to maintain forces in and around Japan, "in the expectation" that Japan would itself increasingly assume responsibility for self-defence. Having come into being two decades ago, this arrangement has still some of its modalities in action, although in a different environment. Meanwhile Japan has travelled fast on the road of military reconstruction.

#### DEFENCE BUILD-UP

Milestones on that road are easy to locate. In 1953 it was decided to have a ground force of 180,000—a strength, incidentally, which is still about the same. The Police Reserve Force was converted into Self-Defence Force, with maritime and air components, under an organisational cell called Japan Defence Agency. A National Defence Council was established, and when a bulk of American ground combat forces was withdrawn, defence began to be built on a definitive basis. Thus were launched the Defence Plans.

The First Defence Plan, for 1958-61 and involving an expenditure of 1,300 million dollars, was mainly devoted to augmenting the ground forces to fill the gap created by American withdrawal. The Second Plan, 1962-66 with an outlay of 3,900 million dollars, laid stress on modernising

equipment by introducing T-61 tanks, *Nike* and Hawk, SAMs and F-104J Starfighters. In the Third Plan, for 1967-71 with an outlay of 7,200 million dollars, there was all round augmentation and modernisation, the emphasis being on maritime forces with particular attention to anti-submarine capabilities. The Fourth Plan is presently underway, for 1972-76 with an outlay of 15,000 million dollars.

#### FOURTH DEFENCE PLAN

Approved in October 1972 the Fourth Five-Year Defence Plan is composed of three documents. The first provides the keynote of national defence, the second contains assessment of the environment and defence concept, and the third embodies the major programmes. The programmes are as follows :

#### Major Items of Equipment

##### GROUND SELF-DEFENCE FORCES

	Third Defence Plan	Fourth Defence Plan
Tanks	660	820
Armoured Personnel Carriers	650	650
Self-Propelled Guns	60	140
Tactical Aircraft	310	350
Helicopters	280	320
HAWK	5 Groups	8 Groups

##### MERITIME SELF-DEFENCE FORCE

Total Vessels	210 174000 tons	170 214000 tons
Destroyers	48	54
Submarines	15	15
Tactical Aircraft	170	200
Anti-Submarine Aircraft	160	190

##### AIR SELF-DEFENCE FORCE

Total Aircraft	880	770
F-4EJ	80	120
RF-4E	—	14
T-2	4	60
FS-T2 modified	—	60
C-1	4	30
NIKE	4 Groups	6 Groups

## DEFENCE PRODUCTION

Japan is reputed to have a remarkable capacity to turn out arms, as borne out by the self-created armouries with which it fought the Second World War. In the wake of its defeat however its weapon-producing installations were dismantled and the manufacturing firms were immobilised. The Far Eastern situation changed this, particularly the Korean War in the course of which the firms were revived and enabled to roll out of their factories a great variety of weapons. Since then there has been no let-up in their activities, and so we hear today of such giant manufacturers as Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, Fuji, Shin Meiwa, and Mitsui engaged in building hardware for the army, navy and air force. Japan is fully self-sufficient in small and medium arms.

In regard to major items, it manufactures its own T-61 tanks. These however are to be superseded by the type STB-I, much faster and fitted both with missiles and conventional cannon. It also builds anti-tank missiles, of which KAM-9 is the latest version.

In the naval field, Japanese shipyards are turning out submarines both of medium and large size, the latter including the latest Uzushie class, 1850 tons. The largest construction so far is the guided missile armed Amatsukaze destroyer, 3050 tons, which is only one of the many types being built in anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, and attack roles, but even bigger, a Mitsubishi 4700 tons, is underway. Other ships include frigates, patrol boats and torpedo boats, minelayers, minesweepers, and underwater research craft. In the commercial field Japan has built its first nuclear-powered ship, Mutsu (8350 tons).

Aircraft manufactures include F-86 and F-104 J, but these are being phased out. F-4EJ is built under licence with USA. Kawasaki and Shin Meiwa are engaged in developing anti-submarine aircraft P-2 J and anti-submarine flying boat, which are considered of major importance. A training-cum-attack aircraft, XT-2, is under way. Besides, production schedules include many kinds of helicopters and medium-sized passenger liners.

As part of its advances in rocketry and electronics, Japan launched its first satellite in 1970, and presently it has four satellites circling the earth. Satellites upto 135 kg weight are planned by 1975. An ambitious nuclear programme has been undertaken, which would raise generation of atomic power from 1320 megawatts in 1970 to 6000 megawatts in 1980.

## LIMITED OBJECTIVES

This picture of defence is fitted into the frame of objective as defined in the plan document. The objective is "to prevent direct and

indirect aggression and once invaded to repel such aggression". And, further, it is "to provide an efficient defence force capable of dealing effectively with aggression on a scale not greater than a localised war in which conventional weapons are used".

Thus the role of the army is to deal with internal insurgency and to hold out against conventional attack for a short period. The navy is to have defence capabilities in the sea areas around Japan. And the air force is meant for the defence of vital urban and industrial areas with the help of fighter-interceptor plane and anti-aircraft guns and missiles.

As for "external aggression", as the document puts it, including no doubt nuclear threat, Japan would depend upon its security treaty with the United States.

Obviously Japan's objective is very limited, orientated almost exclusively to the security of the state, and one notices, it has been evolved thoughtfully after considerable national debate. A former Director General of Defence Agency, Yosuhire Nakasone, whose brilliant ideas have largely gone into the defence build-up, was once asked what Japan would do for its security interests on the high seas. There is a limit, he said, and "beyond the limit we should cross our fingers and pray for God." From Nakasone to the present Director General Sadanori Yamanaka, limit is the watchword. Limit, indeed, with a vengeance, for it has been argued that in the event of attack, if the United States fails to respond in time, the Japanese army would rather capitulate than risk a slaughter of civilians.


#### FACTORS OF RESTRAINT

When the Japanese judge declared that the Self-Defence Forces were unconstitutional, the Government disagreed, of course, and overruled the judgement by declaring that Article 9 prohibited "war potential", that it banned the capacity to wage war but not the capacity to organise defence. This savours of semantics, and yet the fact is that in handling military affairs the Japanese authorities are invariably cautious, if not apologetic. For a watchful opposition is ever on the tip-toe, ready to voice its dissent to any measure that savours of militarisation. The opposition includes socialist and communist parties who, in the election of 1972, improved their positions in Parliament vis-a-vis the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The Japanese leftists are actively on the side of pacifism. The student community is not particularly given to military service which is voluntary, and, in fact, there are complaints about poor response to recruitment. Anti-military rallies erupt now and again, and not only by "ban the bomb's zealots. On questions such as

setting up test sites movement of American arms, and prowling of nuclear submarines in home waters, the general public can be vehemently hostile.

A glance at the high command shows that defence organisation is on the parliamentary model :

### Japanese High Command



This is very much like the Indian structure, although there are additions such as the National Defence Council. The principle of the military being subordinate to the civil is thus securely guarded. In one respect, viz. parliamentary control, Japan seems to have struck a path of its own. While the Liberal Democratic Party has a clear majority in Parliament, when it comes to high policy it does not function as a steam roller. When the opposition puts its foot down on a specific proposition concerning defence, the Government takes it back to the National Defence Council or the Cabinet with a view to accommodating the opposition. This indeed was one of the reasons why the Fourth Defence Plan was finally adopted one year after the expiry of the Third, there having been differences in developing common ground. Now that it is in action, one might presume it enjoys a high degree of national consensus.

Under such impulses and aims Japan, no wonder, has a low-profile military posture. The strength of the forces, less than three hundred thousand, is just one-half of either of the two rather small neighbours, South Korea and Taiwan. During the period of the current plan the average annual defence expenditure would be \$3,000 million, which is around one-half of Britain's or West Germany's.



The seven hundred odd tanks of the army are less than what Syria lost in the Middle East war in two weeks, The supporting missiles and aircraft of the army are of a defensive character. The submarines do have an offensive role, but enjoy little support organisation for long-range operations, and the total tonnage of the Japanese navy is less than that of the size of one of the present day big tankers. The air force has no strike aircraft, and its most modern combat plane, the Phantom, is envisaged mainly in a support or interceptor role. In the aeronautical field, the anti-submarine aircraft is often mentioned as a prized Japanese production, but obviously it is no more than a defensive weapon.

#### THE ICEBERG

A low-profile military posture, indeed, and yet a question is likely to be asked whether this could be taken for granted in future. Some times Japan is likened to an iceberg, which has a visible part and an invisible part, and the latter hides within itself the power for mighty changes under stress of circumstances. May not the invisible in Japan erupt ?

A Categorical answer is not possible, especially in the case of Japan at present ; for Japan is living through a great cultural transformation—a historical change that ranks in importance with the upheaval that marked the nation's emergence from feudal isolation more than a hundred years ago. But one must take note of some trends in this connection.

First and foremost, Japan is seeking with great effort to hold on to its unique national character. Ingenuity, adaptability, courage and lofty ambitions are known to be a part of that character, which, as is well known, impinged forcefully on the Japanese environment in the first four and a half decades of the present century. During this period the Nippon built up one of the most powerful military machines, fought some of the biggest wars of Asia, demolished empires and presided over an empire of its own. The quarter century that has passed has amply demonstrated that none of its traditional qualities have been eclipsed, but this time they have been directed to economic advance.

Many intellectuals of Japan, some of whom I met in the course of my visit to that country, are at pains to argue that big economic stature is compatible with small military stature. And yet historical experience as well as prevailing realities would challenge this thesis. Economic and military chores get enmeshed, howsoever pacifist a country may be, and no formula has yet been devised that could insulate the economist from the soldier.

Implicit in the very miracle of Japan are certain vital security considerations. A major part of Japanese industry for instance, depends,

upon imported raw materials, requiring links with the sources of supply and demanding reliable communication lines. Oil is one of them, more than three-fourths of which comes from the Middle East, passing through two oceans in a long haul and through a very sensitive part of the world. In this part also lie four of its one dozen suppliers of raw material—Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia. Besides, Japanese trade, investment and enterprise command a global network. All these aspects of post-war Japan cannot be completely divested from broad strategic interests.

A redefinition of these interests is inevitable in the new environment of power balance in the Far East. Rapport with China and search for closer cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union are part of detente. And the Soviet Union has not yet signed a peace treaty with Japan and shows no inclination to return the island territory of Japan occupied in World War II. In the wake of detente has also come the realisation that the United States has turned a new leaf in regard to its interests in East Asia with pronounced accent on disengagement. The upshot is that the USA-Japan Security Treaty, while it is unchanged on paper has altered in practice, diluting the credibility of American presence and support. The changed environment demands self-reliance and affixation of a new position in the midst of the three giants, USSR, USA and China. Japanese strategists are not likely to be convinced that an appropriate niche can be found and sustained purely in economic terms.

So one comes across what is sometimes described as the "rightists" of Japan. These include certain extremists who propagate revival of "kigonosotsu", adulating ancient heroism and conquests. A couple of years ago a brilliant Japanese intellectual committed suicide because the urbane culture of modern Japan had lost the spirit of the samurai. And one notices how Sgt Shoichi Yokoi who had chosen to hide in the Jungles of Guam for 28 years rather than surrender became a hero the other day on home-coming.

Even if these incidents are freak aberrations, one cannot fail to take note of the growing Japanese sentiment against the self-imposed curbs which are not in consentience with the realities of the time. To amend the Constitution is a recurring theme in the country, with its Article 9 as special target. At the official level, a former Prime Minister Mr. Sato, said that in the seventies Japan must face the "problem of national power, the aggregate of country's political stability, economic strength, military might, its sway over national opinion, its cultural heritage and so forth." The hard-headed among the Japanese leaders promote attempts to enhance national power through correlationship of economic and military efforts. The Industrial military complex is powerful in Japan, out of which there emerge voices to upgrade the entire military apparatus of self-defence.

History and tradition, national pride, economic imperatives, metamorphoses of environment, loosening of old alliances, accent on self-reliance, and growing demands of national security are some of the more important factors behind Japan seeking to build an enhanced military status. That Japan has abundant resources in this connection goes without saying.

For instance Japan's defence expenditure of \$ 3,000 million yearly is relatively very low, being less than one per cent of its Gross National Product of about \$350,000 million. As against this, to give one comparison, Britain puts more than 4.5 per cent of its GNP into the defence kitty. Suppose Japan follows suit, its defence outlay would be more than \$12,000 million. This is about double that of Britain, one of the world's Great Powers. Consider the immediate future. By a projection of Japan's Economic Research Centre, Japan's GNP is likely to be doubled by 1980. By the same percentage of GNP for military spending, Japan could funnel something like \$30,000 annually into the defence field, an amount which all the NATO countries, except the USA, provide for their defence budgets today.

Japan's growing technical-military sophistication is illustrated by its nuclear advances. It has signed but not yet ratified the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and much national debate has been incited by the pros and cons of the subject. According to Prime Minister Tanaka, the ratification might come, after which presumably it would enter into a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. But it would make sure, after the manner of the European Economic Energy Community, that there are no "discriminatory inspections" and nuclear technology grows unhampered.

At the same time Japan is keeping its options open, for although it would "not build, not acquire, not keep" nuclear arms, as the leaders say, the inhibition, it is also explained, is only in regard to offensive weapons and not tactical weapons—yet another bit of semantics. With its copious nuclear power programme, it may be expected to have reasonable stocks of plutonium for low-yield weapons. Enriched uranium, for the more powerful types, is presently imported from the USA, but Japan's Atomic Energy Commission has launched a project for uranium enrichment plant by centrifugal separation, to be followed probably by one with gaseous diffusion. Further elements of nuclear infrastructure include rockets used in satellites, the Thor-Delta rocket system used in ICBM, and the delivery systems of F-4 Phantoms and Nike-Hercules SAMs. By one estimate the cost of a preliminary nuclear deterrence would be around \$20,000 million, which is no problem for Japan.

It is against this background of present restraints and future possibilities that Japan enters the new environment of power balance in the Far East. What place it carves out for itself is for the future to tell, but the important point is that it is an open question.

# CHANGING TIMES

BRIGADIER H. S SODHI

## INTRODUCTION

**C**HANGING times, educational and economic changes require a corresponding change in the mores that govern any society. The past 25 years have seen vast changes in our country which have affected all walks and aspects of our life.

The Army, drawing its personnel from all strata of our society, is obviously affected by this. But like other armies, we are conservative and atavistic by nature and resist changes, especially towards liberalisation.

In this paper it is proposed to discuss the changes and see how they affect the Army.

## SOCIAL CHANGES

Education, roads and the radio have reached nearly all villages. Ease of movement, inter-communications, literacy and the radio/newspaper have made everybody more aware of events outside their immediate ken ; this process of awareness is heightened by our democratic processes of elections, trade unionism and raising of personal expectations. Electricity is reaching ever increasing areas and the cinema is within easy reach of all. Certain far reaching social legislation has had traumatic effect on the minds of all our people, breaking old privileged orders and creating new opportunities and mores.

These changes have had the effect of a general loosening of the previous social prejudices, controls and hierarchial standings. Position and authority is no longer unquestioned and nor are the privileges of hithertofore considered sacrosanct. There is a general air to question and suspect any privileges. Effective methods of persuasion are more by personal example (and very little of this exists) than by force or right. All authority is resented, and equality, may be without responsibility, is the aim of all. Iconoclasm is widespread.

Ideas on food, dress and recreation have undergone equally radical changes. People are no longer content to sit at home and create their own

recreation by way of song and dance but prefer to go to be entertained. There is more restlessness. Dress has become more colourful and unorthodox, as a combined effect of displaying individuality and yet copying the outside fashionable trends.

Inevitably these changes in the country are at play within the Army also. Their effect, however, is, so far, muted by our inherent discipline which is a continuing factor faced by all new entrants in an existing organised establishment. Over a period of time, forces within the Army will come into play to effect some changes. The aspects of Army life where changes, may be of nuance only, are likely to emerge are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

## EFFECTS ON THE ARMY

### DISCIPLINE

In practice the exercise of discipline has been based on some principles. First, the endeavour is to keep the men (not officers) away from temptation. This is a negative attitude which led to the restrictions on movement, activities and dress after parade hours. The rules regarding issue of rum and its consumption are an outcome of this principle. Men were treated as children to be shielded and guided and as a corollary the parents (seniors) got all the blame. This was true earlier but is not so now. If anything the "generation gap" has narrowed and neither the men consider themselves as children and nor do officers behave as parents.

Secondly, the punishment for a misdemeanour is always individual, involving physical or financial penalties. These punishments are to be speedy and a deterrent to others also. These take no cognisance of the influence of the extent conditions, pressures or attitude of the group within which this misdemeanour is committed. This neither reforms nor creates repentance among the individual or group concerned.

Thirdly, that the discipline of a unit/sub-unit is the sum total of the discipline of each individual comprising the unit/sub-unit. This, in practice, has become the most important principle in the eyes of seniors and hence also for units/sub-units. This militates against the first two principles and leads to playing down/hushing up cases.

These principles were perfectly suited to the older conditions of a self-contained/contented man. With the present restlessness / iconoclastic tendencies, these need a re-appraisal and change. In the present circumstance the over-riding importance of avoidance of temptation by isolation is no longer unchallenged. Existing rules like mufti dress and others, are already being broken in spite of the lip service paid to them. The un-

official and nearly spontaneous flouting can be bad in the long run if not made official and only goes to emphasise that our rules are often not in tune with reality.

Under the present and foreseeable conditions, discipline can best be maintained according to the following principles :—

- (a) Making the internal rules more in consonance with the present conditions, taking into account the special requirements of our profession. (Some changes are suggested later).
- (b) Educating the men (another form of brainwashing) to the correctness of such rules and need to obey them and above all, that onus of discipline is not only the senior but on each individual.
- (c) Attitudes of seniors and rules must be such that units/sub-units are not encouraged to hide the misdemeanours of their men.
- (d) The pressure of the entire group, in which the errant individual exists, must be brought to bear on him.
- (e) And lastly, that all misdemeanours ends in some form of retribution.

#### EDUCATION

This term is not being used in the accepted sense, No formal syllabus, cadre of teachers are required. This education must form part of the normal training and unit routines and every effort/opportunity must be exploited to this end. In the ultimate analysis it is the creation of a certain state of mind to accept norms other and higher than the ones obtaining in civil society, to the extent of facing danger/hardship when ordered.

The measures that should be taken are firstly to explain the rationale behind each action. This needs to be repeated as often as possible by instructors and leaders even at the risk of repetition. To cite one example. The importance of patrolling and its weakness in actual execution are unquestioned. During training there is little effort to drive home repeatedly the importance in simple enough terms and motivate men to outwit the enemy. Similar, and repeated, explanations are needed for most of our drills that appear infructuous in training when actual bullets are missing. This applies equally to our interior economy drills like kit layout, dress, roll call and the like.

Reasoning with a man may not necessarily convince him or make him act as required. The second measure, therefore, is the acceptance of a statement by repetition by the man himself. This is a form of brainwashing and our war cries are in this category ; or some units make their

personnel sing the National Anthem and/or bhajan after Roll Call daily ; some units have a good system of a unit song and pledge at every Sunday Mandir Service.

The basic essential duties should be reduced to a few short and simple sentences which are repeated by the individual often as a litany. "A good soldier obeys orders implicitly", repeated often enough by the man is eventually most likely to make him accept this willingly. Two basic litanies are all that are needed ; one for the qualities of a good soldier and the second, for the duties of various commanders/appointments. These should be learnt by heart, all ranks made to say them out aloud often as a routine and at any time asked by a senior.

Every individual must be made responsible for his behaviour and consequences. Efforts to treat him as an irresponsible sibling should cease.

#### HIDING OF MISDEMEANOURS

The correction of misdemeanours and their minimisation in others is only possible if the individual concerned is not shielded but openly faced with his fault and the consequences. The mistake is normally committed by an individual who, logically, must bear responsibility for it entirely ; if repeated often enough, it would, of course, reflect on the unit also.

In practice, however, more often than not, efforts are made to hide such misdemeanours like malaria/VD cases and MT accidents and others. Units do this to avoid a bad name in view of the importance given to such cases. The individual, instead of being punished, is shielded and feels neither responsibility nor remorse for his actions, knowing fully well that officers will do the needful for their own sake.

The effect of this on discipline in general is bad and needs to be remedied. The aim of achieving perfection is a noble one but hardly practical. All types are found in any unit and some are the recalcitrant types. Further, our standards of discipline, hygiene and the like are obviously influenced by conditions obtained locally or in the country as a whole. Complete and permanent isolation from civil life and conditions is neither desirable nor possible. Army discipline can improve our standards way above those prevalent in civil life but cannot make them perfect. An epidemic of any disease, locally or otherwise, must effect our men, even though to a lesser degree.

Misdemeanours will occur and must be accepted within reason without reflection on the unit (which means a Commanding Officer who is already ACR conscious like all officers). Our rates of MT accidents,

malaria, VD and the like are well below the national levels. Efforts at further improvements are laudable but only upto a point. Our emphasis on figures reflecting unit standards has become counter-productive and is harming discipline as units now tend to hide such cases. A re-appraisal by seniors is essential so that Commanding Officers are encouraged to blame the errant individual concerned openly and deal with him ; in fact a commanding officer doing so should be appreciated.

#### GROUP PRESSURE

The present system is entirely based upon an errant individual being dealt with by his superior : while this method is sound, it has one major drawback. The division between the culprit and his superior is so distinct that the culprit's comrades sympathise with him and therefore, minimise the effect of the superior's punishment ; the culprit is unrepentant as his comrades are with him.

Group pressure of comrades can be brought to bear on a culprit and keep potential culprits under control, if the group as a whole stands to lose something due to the individual's fault. Then each one will be interested in seeing that the others also behave and responsibility for control/punishment in practice is shared by the superior and the group.

A group can stand to lose in two manners which would have to be used in a judiciously complementary manner. First, loss of "face/respect" in the eyes of other groups. This is done by publicising a misdemeanour. (This is touched upon subsequently also).

Secondly, by depriving the group of some tangible privileges. This will succeed only if the privileges tangible and its loss is openly tied to the misdemeanour. Such privileges cannot be basic entitlements like leave and pay but something within a unit. (Some suggestions are made subsequently).

#### SAINIK SAMMELAN

This is an old institution to enable direct contact between the commanding officer and men where problems of a general nature not pertaining to discipline, can be brought to the notice of the commanding officer. With the increase in the various scales and provision of basic amenities, this has lost much of its rationale. This, however, is not the only mode of maintaining contact with the men. There is ever greater need today for officers to mix with the men informally during food, games and the like to get at the real pulse of the unit. Officers must so win the confidence of the men that all problems/grievances are put up without fear and dealt with without victimisation/rancour.

The second purpose of this is the opportunity for the commanding



officer to project his points and this becoming increasingly more important. This needs a slight extension in scope. It would be moot for the commanding officer to bring forward individuals who have brought a good name to the unit in any activity or who have shown extreme devotion/dedication to duty ; read out their "citation" and compliment them. Similarly, those who have let the unit down, committed misdemeanours should be brought forward with their "citations" including curtailment of group privileges, if any ; for this purpose normally a section or platoon should be the basic group which may extend to a company in very rare cases.

### DRINKING

Drinking may be bad but it cannot be effectively abolished ; its control and proper usage, hence becomes important. Drinks have become an institution with us so much so that reward to a sports team etc. is normally in terms of bottles.

The present system of control is as old as the Army. Rum is issued on payment once/twice a week. The man queues up and, when his turn comes, is supposed to gulp his peg in front of the JCO ; in actuality some laxity has taken place in the system unofficially.

This is a degrading method with no enjoyment. It teaches the man to drink fast, subscribing to the typical village mentality of drinking for the sake of being knocked out. And possibly leading to obvious corollaries like breaking bounds. Above all, the individual is distrusted and expected to misbehave if not supervised.

Times now demand that a man be given full responsibility for his actions and made to face the consequences if he misbehaves. The following steps are suggested :—

- (a) Drinking habits should gradually be reformed from hard liquor like rum to beer. This can be done by making cheap beer available in abundance.
- (b) Atmosphere for drinking should be made more relaxed and congenial taking the emphasis off mere gulping of drinks to enjoying it. A big enough institute should be provided with comfortable seating arrangements. Liquor (beer and rum) and snacks should be available on cash payment. Indoor games should be available and encouraged.
- (c) Drinking should only be permitted in this place and served in pegs/open beer bottles.
- (d) Drinks should be opened at least thrice a week for a period of about two hours each.

- (e) Max limit on drinks per session can be laid. The main constraint, however, must be judging the individual's ability to behave, play, and not let his work suffer.
- (f) A committee of JCO/NCO/OR under the Subedar Major should administer this and act as disciplinary watchdogs.

This system will throw more positive responsibility on each individual, change the concepts of hard drinking, place a major onus on JCO/NCO/OR.....and above all be a tangible privilege which can be withdrawn for an individual or a group. Initially, there are bound to be incidents, but the men will mature very fast and settle down.

#### DRESS AND OUTPASSES

The official rules regarding outpasses and walking outdress remain the same as hitherto, though laxity is creeping in, reflecting the changed times and attitudes. It is time these changes are recognised and, in fact, liberalised.

Outpasses in an organised body under a JCO/NCO is carrying regimentation too far. Men want to go out individually or in groups of their own preference which will be small. Officialdom in the form of a JCO/NCO is resented, and in actuality groups soon break up. Official mufti dress was introduced to make for uniformity, ease of distinguishing and to cater for the lack of Westernised clothes with soldiers coming basically from villages. Today men have better clothes and want to wear them.

The system needs changing to permit men to go out in any dress as long as it is neat and clean. Outpass system should be liberalised and made easier, at least thrice weekly. Men should be permitted to go alone (unless conditions peculiar to that area temporarily suggest otherwise) during fixed timings.

In this, too, initially there will be incidents but soon the men will settle down. Responsibility would be on the men and this is a privilege that could be withdrawn.

Officers' dress also needs some re-thought. Winter Mess kit is outmoded and expansive. Carrying of swords for ceremonial purposes or wearing Sam Brown belt are again, archaic and unnecessary expense. All these should be abolished and dress made functional, neat and smart.

#### FAMILY LIFE

Sex, a basic urge coming ever more into prominence in the increasingly permissive society being evolved and titilled by the entertainment media, books and dress, is a subject that is never recognised offici-

ally. The days of the coloured tent with unit are over. Once a man joins the Army, he is considered to have become a Saint.....or is to be kept repressed by physical fatigue. Under the extant conditions this problem has no answer.

Some measures are, however, possible to minimise the effects and enable more family life. It is a strange paradox that we have field/operation areas within our own borders where civilian life carries on normally but the Army lives alone.

There are some places, of course, where families cannot live, like on a picquet. Suitable cantonments should come up near/at field areas with medical and education facilities. The policy is no doubt already on these lines but progress is understandably slow due to financial reasons. lack of area or lack of decision on KLP. The need, however, is for accommodation now. This can best be overcome by permitting units to put up centrally designed bashas which are handed over to relieving units at depreciated cost. Rules should be suitably modified to permit MES water and electric supply, where already available, to these bashas. In some areas there is reluctance to permit bashas on the fear that these will develop into slums; with proper supervision and guide lines, this can be avoided.

Priorities and concept for construction of family accommodation also need re-thought. Basic facilities like medical, education and marketing must come up simultaneously with family accommodation. The present trend of having officers, JCOs and OR married accommodation in separate groups, divorced from unit areas is not proving practical. Distances increase and security becomes a problem. Composite unit lines consisting of single and married accommodation of all types, as in the older cantonments, are the best.

There would still remain areas where accommodation does not come up. It is advisable that personnel from such areas are able to go home at least once a quarter even if for a few days only. Officers normally manage this but JCOs/OR cannot. The problems involved in this suggestion are fully realised but some thought towards this is essential. If a man cannot go home, he should at least be able to visit some civilised place where full amenities are available and he gets a change. Suitable camps should be organised, based may be on the existing transit camps but with minimum officialdom.

With the break up of the joint family system, there is ever increasing demand for separated family accommodation. Siting of this and the facilities provided need re-thought. Requirements of security, medical cover, transport, rations and the like must be provided in Situ. This needs more organisation within the existing resources. Such families should have everything provided at the door.

## WELFARE

Our welfare measures continue to be confined to aspects like food, leave, canteens and living conditions. These are no doubt very important but, with the general advancement in all spheres, they are now basic and taken for granted. From the previous and existing inward looking view of welfare, within units, our scope must widen outwards.

With the Army deployed along our farflung and often inhospitable frontiers, travel is one big aspect requiring attention. Men have to travel from the forward areas to railheads which are often more than a day's journey. Roads are narrow requiring control of traffic and hence take more time; typical of the army there are long halts involved.

Arrangements for transport, hot food and basic amenities enroute are sadly inadequate (except, may be, to some extent in the well established J & K theatre). Men hitchhike, sit uncomfortably in loadcarrying vehicles, carry pack food which is uninviting and manage as best as they can at longish halts, even in bad weather. Halts at transit camps can also be lengthy where the men are kept "busy" working. All this is hardly a fitting start or end of leave.

The train journey is quite a nightmare. It is a normal sight to see Army personnel crammed into compartments and oozing out of the windows; scrambling and fighting their way into compartments and getting into altercations; lying scattered on platforms in various stages of undress, and scruffiness. These conditions teach and force the men to lower their standards even in uniform.

Proper transportation is needed for carrying men. This can be done by having folding and removable seats/benches for the existing 3 ton vehicles. Such transport should be specially allotted for troop carrying according to despatch of personnel on leave/temporary duty.

Where the normal run is long, suitable arrangements for hot-meal should be made; this is possible from within the authorisations. Tea, snacks, cigarettes and the like should be available in authorised canteens. There should be proper facilities of sitting and toilets where longish halts are involved. All this is well within the vast resources available to the Army provided the planning is done.

Similarly, arrangements for railway journeys must improve. Special facilities should exist for staying at the more frequented stations. Adequate accommodation on trains must be ensured and extra bogies should be attached where needed, at the RTO/Station Master level. The organisation for this already exists in the MC groups; there is, however, the need for better planning and a lot more co-ordination with the railways.

The functioning of the 'family welfare centre' needs reexamination. Even though knitting and embroidery have already reached all homes, Welfare Centres continue to have these as their show items. Welfare Centres are today functioning more out of discipline than desire. Activities as Welfare centres need to be more attractive, consist of things not already well known to families and, above all, enable the family to raise the standard of living/save money. This will vary with the type of troops. More attention needs to be paid to children.

It is a sad fact that officers' wives are not keen on such activities and their view is fast being tainted with pecuniary considerations. Running a nursery school, for children of JCOs/OR for instance does not attract officers' wives to teach even for some honorarium. The IMA motto teaches us that welfare of officers is last but in practice it is now foremost.

#### BULL AND WORKINGS

The Army continues to subscribe to the old Sargeant Major dictum "When you see anything move, salute it; if it is stationary, move it; and if it is immovable, paint it". Bull requiring a lot of continuous effort, remains unabated. It is fascinating to see a new camp come up. It starts off being functional, neat and clean. The OG gets a special coat of paint ornamental gates and other trimings. The officers' mess is not far behind. Given six months at the most, tree trunks are painted white and stones/bricks laid and painted. All this, and a host of other such measures require manpower and continual attention. Such work is infructuous, during spare time of the men and certainly not liked. A visit by a senior officer inspires more such efforts. Every visit means a fresh coat of paint. This is not authorised and hence Regimental or other funds are used. If it is considered correct that a fresh coat of paint is required for every visit, it should be so authorised.

Our lines certainly must be neat, clean and in a good state of repair which itself involves work. Artificial cleaning or brightening up is mostly by use of paint. This is neither required nor economical and should be stopped. A stage has been reached where units by themselves will not stop this as they feel naked without these and presume that seniors like this. This wasteful system will only stop if senior officers make it a point to curb this during their visits. A tree is beautiful naturally, why try and improve it with a coat of paint on its lower trunk? The Army must get back to essentials by cutting out the eyewash, which only leads to more infructuous work and dubious methods to find the wherewithall for the Bull.

Officers' Mess parties are another big occasion for Bull, paint and coloured lights. All this is done by the men, some of whom remain on

duty during the party for contingencies. This only gives an opportunity to the men to grumble, find faults and compare the differences. Our Mess functions must get back to dignified simplicity. Extra effort to lay on a show/comfort for officers is no longer accepted as an unquestioned prerogative of rank.

#### BATMEN

Batmen are authorised for official duties to officers/JCOs serving in field formations. To save manpower there has been a cut in the scale whereby one batman is to be shared between two officers/JCOs upto certain ranks. These rules and the actuality are vastly different.

By and large, every officer/JCO has a batman, not only in a field formation but static also. These are obviously at the expense of unit fighting strengths. Batmen do all kinds of chores in the house. As times passes, batmen duties are becoming more disliked.

It is unfortunate that reduction in batmen coincides with the lowered ability of officers/JCOs to afford private servants. Unauthorised use of batmen can only be stopped if the lead is given by senior officers, who can then afford to have the orders obeyed. Separated families are not authorised batmen but these too continue. The need here is mainly one of security. The least that can be done is to provide security facilities for such families/areas in the way of fencing and chowkidars.

The batmen problem is further aggravated by the location of married quarters (Officers/JCOs), at a distance from units. Batmen, hence, stay out of unit lines and their administration and discipline suffers.

#### TRANSPORT

Individually the country is at the cycle/scooter state and collective at the bus/taxi stage, in modes of road transportation. This automatically introduces an enhanced requirement of transport in the Army for personal use. Militating against this is the need for economy in the use of transport and also the need to minimise accidents.

Our rules for use of transport are fairly old and strict. In practice a lot of laxity has crept in and use is more liberal. Efforts at tightening up are generally unsuccessful and ways are always found to circumvent them. This is due entirely to the officers not subscribing to the outdated rules mainly for reasons of a false sense of dignity and prestige.

It is taken for granted by authorities that officers will misuse transport and be generally to blame (till proved otherwise) and our rules are framed accordingly. An officer is permitted to drive under exceptional circumstances only, he may not drive while wearing mufti ; ladies are

not permitted to sit on the front seat—and a host of similar ones. In short, the officer is guilty before the offence.

Officers are keen to drive and they are expected to know driving, which needs practice. The propensity to misuse transport will be just as much whether officers are permitted to drive or not. Officers, with better education and quicker reflexes, should make better drivers than OR.

It is generally feared that officers, driving after drinks, will lead to accidents; and there is a lot of truth in this at present. An officer who takes the wheel after drinks is doing so because his inhibitions of fear-consequences are less and such occasions are normally by night when detection is more difficult; the exhilaration of drinks, the comparatively open road and the clandestine action all combine to make him reckless. Because the officer drives, unauthorisedly, his Commanding Officer and others are then out to help themselves by helping him. A strange system which, in trying to avoid, incites and then compels to cover up.

There is no reason why officers should not be permitted to drive during duty trips or when using transport on payment amenity; similarly there is no rationale behind the rules regarding dress while driving or taking of families. In fact there is every reason to encourage all this to stop the furtive habits, and subterfuges generated by the present embargoes. It is best to permit and legalise what cannot be enforced/stopped.

There is another important aspect that needs consideration. Under the present rules, while an officer relaxes and enjoys, say at a party, the ubiquitous driver, in his spare time, is most uncomfortable outside. At such time inherent resentments of differences are apt to be accentuated in the minds of the men who are then prone to huddle together and grouse. At functions where officers are not on duty, taking of drivers should be the exception rather than the rule. (Imagine the plight of a driver while the officer is celebrating the New Year).

It will be contended by some that this will increase the misuse and the number of accidents. The misuse is taking place even today and the answers are a realistic revision of rules and their stricter enforcement. Officers must be made directly responsible for damage/losses. A large number of officers use private cars for attending parties, consume drinks but resultant accidents are very few. The same will apply to Government Transport, once the officers realise their liability for compensation and that there will be no effort at hiding the fact of their driving or culpability. Officers must be made to pay for the damages and such instances freely published as a warning to others. After an initial spurt, the rate of accidents will go down, even below the existing levels. And if a stop is to be put to the use of transport, senior officers must give the lead.

## SECURITY

Our rules, pertaining to individuals, are archaic, generally meaningless and act as minor irritants that create infructuous work at the expense of real security. Modern communications, news coverage and ease/pro propensity to travel make certain facts impossible to hide. Further, not everything of a matter can or is required to be hidden. "The art of secrecy is to be so open about 95 percent of a matter that the really secret 5 percent is undetectable" (Liddle Hart).

It is beyond my scope to suggest any detailed changes; the need for such re-examination to assess the really secret 5 percent is certainly called for. A few examples will suffice here.

The fact that troops are located at a place cannot be hidden. This is more so at places where civilian population also lives. Unit identities are revealed in daily transactions in the civil market, private letters to relations who want to visit, NRS sent to Depots and a host of other dealings. Yet we insist on a APO address which only gives away the general theatre, and mention of any place names warrants an explanation for bad security. Hiding of locations in peace time is impossible and meaningless.

Letters home are normally a good escape valve to let off steam at service conditions, seniors and such other problems beyond ones control. These reflect a state of mind which can be of use to higher authorities to gauge morale and reactions but such letters, however, are not a security risk which permit action against the individual.

Our security rules presume and fully accept that the Army is full of simple-minded, gullible imbeciles who are just itching to give away secrets. If we come in contact with foreigners, we will surely give away but not pick up information. This suspicion is unwarranted in the majority of officers; in any case the bulk of officers either know nothing much of real value to foreigners or have no opportunity to meet them. And those susceptible to wining, dining and gifting remain so irrespective of the restrictions. The need is not for avoidance of contact but proper education towards negative and positive security with culprits being severely dealt with and publicised.

It should be realised that a lot of information which we try to hide is already known to countries that are interested. Our restrictions and petty regulations only make us look and feel ridiculous. A reassessment of the entire security outlook is needed to evaluate what must be hidden, keeping in view the practicability of keeping in secret.



## CONCEPT OF RULES

The Army is a collective body and rules are framed for it as a whole. Violations of these are normally on an individual basis and hence should be treated as such. Changes in rules should only occur when the majority are acting in violation ; this generally should suggest that the rule is not in consonance with the times.

Our existing rules and regulations are based mainly on Westernised outlooks which were accepted and valid for that type of officer and background. These conditions no longer obtain and the personnel are more Indianised. Some of our rules and regulations, hence, need revision keeping our characteristics in view. To cite only one example, the batmen are today considered essential, not given up in spite of instructions to the contrary, made to do household chores ; this is in keeping with our conditions and character. There are many other such cases.

But it must be also realised that a mere change in rules will not avoid malfeasance. Up to about 1950, TA claims of officers were sent without any certificate that the journey was by first class. There must have been a few cases of officers claiming first class fare while actually travelling by a lower class and hence now the certificate to avoid malfeasance ; the earlier claim without a certificate but signed by the officer was as valid for dealing with an officer as any certificate. To cite a more recent example, power of permitting officers to stay in the MES Inspection Bungalow for more than 10 days has been taken away from Officer Commanding Stations and vested in higher headquarters just because two senior officers misused this privilege.

This shows scant respect for rules, equates the law-abiding majority with the errant minority and, above all, shows total bankruptcy in being able to deal severely with individuals. Action against individuals concerned and wide publicity would achieve better results.

As already discussed, our rules tend to take individuals for granted and treat them as irresponsible children who must be kept away from temptation. This is a moralistic attitude which is no longer in tune with reality.

## FUNDS

Units have a mania for building up funds. Each successive Commanding Officer increases the total as a visible yardstick of his successful tenure. These regimental funds are mostly dead money benefiting nobody. Its income from fixed deposits and the like is frittered away, mainly on BULL and Show. The large sums available are a tempting source of indiscriminate expenditure and may be malfeasance.

There is a need to stop the un-necessary accumulation of funds. Everything that a man or unit needs is already authorised or in the process of being so ; more can be got sanctioned depending upon the merit of the cases. A very large majority of units are utilising regimental funds for :—

- (a) Festivals and regimental days.
- (b) Sports.
- (c) BULL and Show.

The first two expenditures are valid within reasonable limits. Funds and income must, therefore, cater for these only. These needs can be assessed and adequate subscriptions/income be permitted to only cover these with no accumulation. It is also prudent that expenditure is not lavish. At present a maximum of Rs 5000 per year is needed. This should come from the following sources :—

- (a) Subscriptions from personnel. A limit on these already exists.
- (b) Canteen profits. These vary with units and stations.
- (c) Profit on rum. Maximum income is from this source, as the profits authorised are not laid down and range upto Rs 2/- per bottle. Control of selling price is essential, with a profit of not more than 5 percent.
- (d) Garden produce, but this is generally marginal.
- (e) Income from fixed deposits, securities and the like. Units with existing large funds get fairly big incomes. The size of such income should determine the other incomes to be tapped, as given above and where possible, completely eliminate the rest.

Each unit's funds/income state should be assessed and its income/profits/subscriptions rates determined. Initially this should be done by the Colonels of the Regiments and later formation commanders may be brought in to ensure the correct implementation. Further, a limit should be laid on the following :—

- (a) Maximum expenditure per year.
- (b) Maximum increase in funds per year.

The ATG is another fund that needs control and re-thought. The system of purchases at lower levels is out of tune with the principles of economy, lessening administration burden of units and avoiding tempta-

tions. Everything needed and authorised must be provided by the already existing and overbloated services, which are meant only for provisioning. Their functioning needs reshaping to ensure availability of all items in the required quantity/quality, at the required time. Difficulties of procurement are often cited as the main hurdle. It is strange that a fully established and geared organisation is unable to procure say paper/mosquito nets/and the like, while units then get them in the open market but at higher prices. Same applies to specialist vehicles. All this is wasteful in money and effort. If our Defence factories are incapable of coping with the demand, civil industry should be made use of.

Given an assured supply of articles required, ATG would only be required for payment of compensation. Abolition of ATG would plug a large source of BULL and Show. All items today authorised out of ATG should become part of the WET/PET ; these should include steel furniture, sand model sets, talc, paper of all types and anything else required for training. Comprehensive lists/scales can be made and reviewed periodically.

It is felt that these measures will go a long way in avoiding BULL, Show and unnecessary expenditure and will also avoid malfeasance. Further, the practice of giving presents might also be reduced.

#### OFFICERS MESS

This institution has been under fire earlier and seems to be so again. This is considered an unnecessary luxury in our egalitarian society and superficially there is a lot of truth in this. This institution, however, is very vital to the Army.

Basically this is the place of integration of our officers from varied backgrounds, religions and cultures. It can be truly said that the only totally integrated organisation in the country are its armed forces. This is so mainly because eating is common ; take this away and we fall apart.

A mess, with its customs, makes officers eat together and live together. This is possible by each individual member developing a spirit of tolerance, understanding others and living in harmony. The mess customs are designed to this end. Dinner nights make sure that officers eat together, coming at least half an hour before dinner and not being allowed to read, make officers mix and get to know each other.

Changing times have already brought in changes that should be recognised. Dress restrictions are no longer that rigid, ignoring dictates of climate and comfort. Dinner nights are now fewer. There is, however, need to make our parties less ostentatious.

The idea of station messes has often been mooted. These, apart from the problem of distances, will be more impersonal. Discipline necessary to make officers mix will be lacking and unity of units will suffer. This is particularly so in the teeth arms. Messes are needed for field areas. Combining of messes in peace stations will neither make for economy nor efficiency/better food ; in fact all this will deteriorate.

No matter how egalitarian our society, given the present conditions in the country and considering the battle needs of units, messes should continue.

#### SOCIAL GAP

Government policy is to bridge the social gap as far as possible and within reason this affects the Army also. Even conceding the requirements of discipline and the inherent differences of rank privileges, certain measures can be adopted now. Ration scales should be the same for officers and men. Our uniforms must become similar by cutting out the extra ceremonial dress/trappings of officers.

#### FORMATION SIGNS

Some of our formation signs, based on animals considered wise/ferocious by the British, need changing as our concept of them is quite different. The Owl, Cat and Cock are some of them ; the owl is considered stupid, the cat, frightened and the cock only fit for a feast.

#### CMP

This Corps is much maligned...and rightly so...with the wrong type of personnel, unsuitable duties and improper functioning. Basically, proper functioning by such a Corps is against our character. This Corps needs mature, understanding, dedicated and honest men. But all Indians in power are bullies and this increases inversely with the rank. The parallel in our civil police is not inappropriate. Travelling in a flag car in uniform, I have come across more cases of sloppiness, avoidance of saluting, infringement of orders and telling of brazen lies among CMP personnel than any other

The Corps is at present used in a purely subjective/negative manner. Its main task, in practice, is to catch others. The outlook should change to a more positive one where crime is not only detected but even more so, prevented. Main task should be to help and not harass.

While the mental outlook/teaching of the Corps is partly to blame, a major share must fall on those who employ this Corps. The two main tasks the CMP are made to perform is traffic control (especially for functions) and to establish TCPs for checking documents. While the first one is valid, the second one is harassment.

Establishment of TCPs, check of documents and issue of TCP for use of transport in no way avoid or minimise misuse of transport. Malicious delight is taken by all in circumventing all these. And because of all these checks, no Commanding Officer can be caught for exceeding mileage restrictions. The same end can be achieved by holding the Commanding Officer entirely responsible to ensure that mileage restrictions are not exceeded. The only checks needed are surprise ones by combined CMP/EME teams for mechanical fitness of vehicles.

Further, the place of CMP is the system of maintaining discipline is being violated. CMP are only a checking and reporting agency with no other powers. Action taken on such reports is entirely the prerogative of the Commanding Officer who has to handle and lead the men; this should not be questioned. We must presume that a commanding officer, who has been trained by the Army and been passed fit to hold that rank, is fully conscious and desirous of having his unit at a high pitch of discipline; if he is not trusted, he is not fit for the appointment.

The crux of the CMP's proper functioning lies in proper selection and training of their personnel. And, even more so, on the way they are employed by the Commanders/staff and kept in their proper place. Wrong type of personnel, the unchecked ease of movement, isolated location of TCPs, lack of disciplinary powers of local commanders over CMP and implicit acceptance of word of CMPs, all make for an ill-disciplined force which is a bad example to others.

#### MATERIAL AVAILABLE

At the time of Independence, the Army continued as an existing organisation with its traditions, rules and outlook moulded on Western ideas and standards. The past 25 years have brought in the post-Independence generation in the lower echelons of men and officers. These are more Indian in their outlook and therefore different from what the Army (seniors) has been used to.

The often heard moan of the material not being of the same standard as before is true and yet not valid. The difference is there and it must be accepted as a way of our life. We must utilise this material and mould it to get the best out of it. Our concepts, rules and outlooks must change accordingly. Instead of harking back with mistaken nostalgia, we must look forward with confidence and assurance based on correct assessments and measures. Cliches like "developing dedicated men" must be turned into concrete measures to gain such laudable and necessary ends.

## CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made to discuss some of the changes needed. These are by no means exhaustive or in depth.

It is, however, evident that changes are inevitable and needed. These are best made from within the Army in an organised manner. For this we must be bold enough and in touch with reality, to keep abreast, if not ahead, of the implications of the social changes.

Rules should be more in consonance with the present times and should be enforced strictly. Individuals must be made to fully accept responsibilities and consequences. There should be no efforts to hide or minimise.

Changes should and can only start from the top where realistic policies need to be framed and correct examples set. The "Bhaichara" mentality should be avoided. Some mistakes must be accepted as inevitable and an event/task without mistake/mishap must be suspected.

Finally, the onus for recognising the need, the scope and the lead lies on seniors.

**JOIN****UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION  
OF INDIA**

(Founded : 1870)

*For the fuatherance of***INTEREST AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE ART, SCIENCE  
AND LITERATURE OF THE DEFENCE SERVICE***For paaticulars, write to***Secretary, U.S.I.  
'KASHMIR HOUSE'  
KING GEORGE'S AVENUE  
NEW DELHI-110011**

# APPRAISAL SYSTEM—THE MBO CONCEPT

(“DUTIES CONSTRAIN MANAGERS, OBJECTIVES LIBERATE THEM”)

BRIGADIER NB GRANT, AVSM

“I am not interested in your past achievements, I will only judge you by your future capabilities—a standard answer from a CO to an objection on an ACR.

**T**HE problem that faces every commanding officer once a year, is to correctly appraise his subordinates through their ACRs. This is a complex task, and has evaded a clear-cut ‘formula’ notwithstanding vast research by experts in behavioural science. The existing appraisal system as followed in our armed forces goes back to the early 1940s, and although since then it has been the subject of a considerable number of research publications on its application, it is interesting that even today there is no one accepted system. The aim of this paper is not to analyse the existing system, but to discuss a new concept, which is now rapidly replacing all other appraisal systems in the field of industrial management. The concept is based on the style of management known as ‘Management by Objectives’, or MBO as it is commonly known. How far this can be made applicable to the armed forces, is left to the readers to decide.

## THE MBO STYLE

Before discussing the different types of appraisal systems, it is necessary to understand the basic concept of the MBO style of management. It can be generally defined as, a dynamic system which seeks to integrate the organisation’s need to clarify and achieve its profit and growth goals with the executive’s need to contribute and develop himself. In this respect, the main difference between MBO and other management systems is, that the former is not only a planning and control system, but it also is a means of motivating executives. More precisely, it provides a means for the executive to motivate himself towards the goals which he himself has identified with his boss. In this respect, MBO can be said to be management by self-control, as the executive will not be asked to achieve more than what he himself thinks he is capable of doing, and thus he cannot give any excuse if he fails.

The following are the characteristic steps of Management by Objectives—

- (a) Top management define the objectives of the organisation

together with an outline of the steps required to achieve them. This information is disseminated to the entire management team.

- (b) Each executive analyses his job in order to identify the important areas of it, and he expresses these in terms of the results which he has to achieve. He gets his boss to agree to this analysis and, in addition, they both agree to a plan of action with target dates to achieve improvements.
- (c) The executive runs his job using control information (daily, weekly, or monthly, as appropriate) to determine whether he is achieving his results.
- (d) The executive will have normal contact with his boss but at regular intervals (eg every three or four months). Time is set aside for the executive to meet his boss formally in order to report on progress. Difficulties are discussed, new targets agreed, and training needs identified. The session (usually one to three hours) ends with the drawing up of a fresh plan of action for the next period.

From the above it will be apparent, that the fundamental difference between MBO and other management systems is the emphasis and meaning it gives to managerial effectiveness. There is only one realistic and unambiguous definition of managerial effectiveness, and that is, the extent to which the executive achieves the output requirement of his position. It is the executive's job to be effective; in fact, it is his only job. However the idea of managerial effectiveness can only be clearly understood when we learn to distinguish sharply between three distinct types of effectiveness, namely—

- (a) real effectiveness,
- (b) apparent effectiveness, and
- (c) personal effectiveness.

## EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY—THE DIFFERENCE

One of the main difference between the conventional appraisal system and that advocated by MBO, is the difference between the term "Effectiveness" and "Efficiency"—the two are not necessarily synonymous.

### REAL EFFECTIVENESS

Real effectiveness is not an aspect of personality. It is not something an executive has. To see it this way, is nothing more or less than a return



to the now discarded trait theory of leadership, which suggested that more effective leaders had special qualities not possessed by less effective leaders. Effectiveness is best seen as something an executive produces from a situation by managing it appropriately. It represents output and not input. The executive must think in terms of performance, and not leadership quality or personality. It is not so much what an executive does but what he achieves.

Rightly or wrongly, effectiveness based on the trait theory of leadership is still prevalent in the armed forces, where while assessing an officer, a lot of importance is given to his personality and leadership like qualities. Even in his annual confidential reports, his potential for higher ranks is judged more on personality factors such as drive, initiative and devotion to work etc. rather than to what he has actually achieved. In this connection one must have come across several cases where, the performance of the officer in terms of tasks completed and objectives achieved in the time given may run into several pages, and yet that officer would not still be recommended for promotion if in the opinion of his CO, he lacks the personality traits to which the Services are wedded. This then is the fundamental difference between an appraisal system as recommended by the MBO and that which is prevalent in the armed forces. Whereas one system bases its opinion on what the officer is capable of achieving due to his inherent personality trait, the other system focusses on what the executive will achieve based on what he has actually performed irrespective of his personality qualities.

#### APPARENT EFFECTIVENESS

Thus it is difficult, if not impossible, to judge real effectiveness by observation of behaviour alone. The behaviour must be evaluated in terms of whether or not it is appropriate to the output requirements of the job. For example, the following qualities, important as they are, may be irrelevant to effectiveness.

- (a) Makes quick decisions
- (b) Is very dynamic
- (c) Answers promptly
- (d) Has initiative

These qualities give an air of apparent effectiveness in no matter what context they appear. However apparent effectiveness may or may not lead to real effectiveness. In this connection, conventional job descriptions, whether in industry or the military, often lead to an emphasis on what could result in "efficiency"—the ratio of output to input. The problem with this, however, is that even if both input and output are low, efficiency could still be 100%. In fact, an executive in an industry,

or for that matter an officer in the army, could easily be 100% efficient and yet be 0% effective. To give an example; the efficient manager or officer will prefer to—

*The Efficient Officer*

Do things right  
Solve problems

rather than  
rather than

Safeguard resources

rather than

Discharge duties

rather than

*The Effective Officer*

Do right things

Produce creative  
alternatives

Optimize resource  
utilisation

Obtain results

The conventional appraisal descriptions lead to the kind of thinking on the left. Job effectiveness on the other hand leads to that shown on the right.

The above is further illustrated when a stream-roller type executive brings what appears to be chaos to an organisation; but which nevertheless clearly starts improvement. Unless outputs are the focus of attention, serious distortion can result. Taking a chapter from the last war, Lord Tedder wrote "With Prejudice" in part to complain about Lord Beaverbrook. About this a Canadian newspaper editor writes—

"Lord Tedder says the late Lord Beaverbrook ruled the Air Ministry through force and fear and that this department, vital to aircraft production, was chaotic during the Second World War gravely threatening RAF efficiency. He adds that teamwork among the technicians was being undermined; junior officials received instructions without their immediate superiors knowing about the new orders; conflicting instructions were flowing in from various sources; decisions were sometimes impossible to get and the work seemed to bog down amid friction, confusion and mistrust. History will however accept the verdict of Winston Churchill that, without Lord Beaverbrook, Britain would have lost the war in the air to Hitler."

Thus whereas Lord Beaverbrook produced the desired result by being 100% effective, Lord Tedder saw the situation as being chaotic and 0% efficient.

#### PERSONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Lastly, poorly defined job inputs also lead to what might be called personal effectiveness, i.e. the satisfying of personal objectives rather than the objectives of the organisation. Meetings with these men are riddled with hidden agendas which operate below the surface and lead to poor decision making.

## THE CONVENTIONAL AND MBO APPRAISAL SYSTEMS

The conventional appraisal system as followed in the armed forces has at least some of the following attributes—

- (a) A form for each subordinate is issued from a central source, namely the MS. The form requires information about the subordinates, usually by means of question and answer. The free essay style can also be used in some columns.
- (b) The questions may cover—
  - (i) personality traits,
  - (ii) job knowledge and skills,
  - (iii) job performance,
  - (iv) promotability,
  - (v) training needs.
- (c) The process of filling in the form is followed by a face-to-face interview with the object of—
  - (i) telling the subordinate where he stands,
  - (ii) discussing with him any changes needed in his behaviour or attitudes,
  - (iii) counselling him and analysing his training needs,
  - (iv) taking over promotional prospects.

The following table contrasts the conventional appraisal system described above with the MBO Performance Review.

<i>Conventional Appraisal System</i>	<i>MBO Performance Review</i>
Backward looking	Forward looking
Service centred	Concerned with both the executive's and the organisation's needs
Unilateral	Bilateral
Judgements made by boss	Performance judged by the job holder himself and reviewed with his boss
Appraisal is open ended	Performance judged against achievement of pre-agreed objectives and projected target dates

Criticism and praise employed by boss	An account of stewardship rendered by job holder himself
Personality traits included	No mention of personality, unless it directly affects achievement of objectives
Appraisal report filled in	Fresh objectives and plan of action to be undertaken by both job holder and boss agreed and written down in a Management Guide
Report made to central authority	Verbal report to boss's boss only
Future promotion prospects included	Future promotion prospects excluded from discussion

---

## CONCLUSION

One of the biggest blockages between superiors and sub-ordinates in any organisation, whether it be industry or the army, is often concerned with the appraisal method used. The worst method of appraisal—still widely used in the Services—is based on personality leadership traits such as dynamism, initiative, diligence, and industry etc, which, although may make the man appear more efficient, is no guarantee that he will also be more effective. If anything, most subordinates find such appraisals insulting and, in any case, they are of little value in assessing effectiveness or improving it. Behavioural studies have discovered that, telling a subordinate about personality faults is a sure way to inhibit any change in them. Most of us know very well what kind of people we are ; at least our wives and children tell us so. We know we have faults, and we try to work from our strengths. However what we want our superior to talk to us about is performance, not personality. We will draw our own inferences about our personality. This is where the MBO appraisal system can help.

We hope that in future the CO will be able to say

"I am not interested in what you are capable of doing, I will only judge you on what you have achieved".

# TOWARDS A NATIONAL ARMY

LIUT. COLONEL S.C. SIRDESEPANDE

".....The nature and purpose of the State's armed forces reflect its social character and policy".

—A Russian strategist.

"It is the peasants who are the source of the Chinese army. The soldiers are peasants in military uniform, the mortal enemies of the.....aggressors".

—Chairman Mao

**I**N the above pronouncements one finds the shape of an army and its driving force within. Like a people getting the leadership they deserve, an army only reflects its national discipline, social harmony, political awakening and moral fibre. Without for a moment attempting to belittle other professions, it could be said army service is perhaps the best mirror reflecting national traits and trends. By its mere inescapable coexistence with violence, death and destruction, the worst afflictions of mankind, soldiering brings out the best and the noblest in a people both in triumph and tribulation, particularly in the latter. On the dual strength of moral and physical force, synonymous with discipline and armed forces, a people guard their liberty, evolve their society, exert their will and transact befittingly with the international forum, all in the manner inspired by their genius, heritage and thoughts. It therefore follows that the armed forces, to be what their nation is or aspires to be, must draw on the soil and spirit of the nation, breathe its nascent breath and provide a polished reflective surface, bright in itself, to its corporate social, spiritual and political life. Similarly it is obligatory on the part of the nation to sustain and nourish its upholders, defenders and propagators with equal zeal and thoughtfulness, lest they permit kipling to once again point at them and say

"Nations have passed away and left no traces,  
And history gives the naked cause of it—  
One single, simple reason in all cases ;  
They fell because their peoples were not fit".

The title of the article need not evoke a feeling that our army is not a national army. It will be unnecessarily underrating ourselves. But after a quarter century of national freedom it may now be prudent to pause for a self-search to ascertain areas of darkness and avenues of betterment. Since the army enshrines the best of the nation's discipline, sense of devotion, sacrifice, will to work and spirit of venture and is

perhaps the best vehicle of the nation, it will not be an additional burden it is asked by itself to girdle more tightly and strive harder in the higher interests. It is a national obligation.

The armies in India, before the advent of the British, barring those of Ashoka, Vikramaditya, Akbar, Krishnadevaraya and Shivaji, were regional. Narrow in outlook, limited in utility and parochial in purpose they only served a large number of Indian kings, princes and satraps. Their contribution to nationalism is negligible, if also doubtful, except that they passed on their undying tradition of gallantry and patriotism. The British crushed the Indian mentally and spiritually as perhaps no other invader did. However it must be said to their credit that, while so doing, they also brought a brilliant new horizon of the art of war to the Indians' doorstep. Gobbling all the best that the British offered, the Indian was also ensnared in the rest that was British. Thus enamoured of much that was foreign to him, out of his soil, he somewhat loosened his own moorings. The postindependence period was one of attempting to rehabilitate. With the last four wars that we have fought in this period, with the awareness of our role in and contribution to a world influenced by many a nation, ideology and social and spiritual value, not predominantly British as they once were not very long ago, we have now to take stock, more as robust indigenous products than as easy fanciful and hence fragile imitations.

### AIM AND SCOPE

An attempt has been made here, despite its slippery slopes, to examine how national an army we are and how we can better ourselves in that expedient direction.

To my mind a national army must fulfill the following requirements :—

- (a) It should be fully representative.
- (b) It should have a genuine sense of involvement in the nation, its people and affairs and way of life.
- (c) It should have an almost overwhelming sense of dedication to its profession, national integrity, values, and heritage.
- (d) It should, apart from defending the nation, contribute to national reconstruction.
- (e) It should evolve its own indigenous traditions and genius.
- (f) It should be backed by a nation knowledgeable, enthusiastic and fully aware of military realities and problems and the business of war.

Along these nerves will the dissection proceed.

## REQUIREMENTS

## REPRESENTATION

An army becomes national only if it embodies full representation of its citizens from all States, castes and creeds. Only then can it be sustained by its corporate national attributes and draw forth the very best in its fibre. Despite substantial strides made in this persuasion even a casual glance at the composition of the army will reveal wide gaps. See the intake from States like Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Western and Northern UP and compare with Gujarat, Karnatak (Mysore), Orissa, Bengal and large parts of MP, Bihar and Assam. The former is overwhelmingly heavy while the latter is negligible. Leaving such substantial sections of citizens out of the mainstream of national military life and its incumbent obligations is neither conducive to national discipline and duty towards it nor tolerable in building up the inherent strength of the national military structure. This lop-sidedness leads to the following primary ill-effects :—

- (a) These States and sections of population do not contribute to the country's efforts, dynamic aspirations and share its hardships, sacrifices. They fail to appreciate national security problems. Their adventurous spirit becomes callous, it atrophied. This much national potential remains unutilised, barren. At such rate these become deadweights, liabilities.
- (b) The void created by non-participation of the above States and sections imposes increasing demand and burden on the remaining States and sections, resulting in wide imbalance in contribution-demand and participation-sacrifice. The hidden anxiety and consequences of this situation cannot be comprehended in short wars as those we have fought since '47. If the future war lasts over a year and incurs heavy casualties and sacrifices will the present imbalances still to tolerable ?
- (c) Such imbalances further accentuate compartmentalisation and strengthen codification of "types", which is very akin to "caste". Thus we have "martial races" like the Sikhs, Rajputs and Marathas (to cite a few), "technical hands" like Madrasis (a wide sweep covering almost a third of the country !) and "doctors" in Bengalis. There emerges yet another class, painfully conspicuous by its glaring absence from the military spectrum, the Gujaratis, Karnataks and Oriyes.
- (d) The process of regeneration of national spirit, its mind and values and breaking away from the ills and cobwebs of past impositions are severely impaired.

"Martial race" bogey was created by the British as it suited their convenience. This tradition-twister stands no historical scrutiny. Gujarat nourished such great empires as those of Gautamiputra Satakarni and Rudradaman in the medieval period. Karnatak threw up such mighty ones as Chalukyas, Rashtrakutas, Hoysalas and Vijayanagara. Orissa had its Kalingas, Kharavela and then Gangas. Bengal had its Shenass and Palas and Assam its Ahoms. Ruled by their genius and destiny a people inexorably go through their historical ebbs and troughs. But military traditions of these so called non-martial races have not died. None-the-less they have become militarily less even unenthusiastic, seemingly unreliable and martially unfit by a sudden irony of fate and due to lack of awareness, opportunity, adventure and encouragement. Unless these sections are coaxed, cajoled, persuaded and even somewhat forced to contribute militarily they will not do so. And therefore their burden has to be shared by other sections, which is neither fair for them nor conducive to national identity and integration. Perhaps the best means of promoting national identity and integration is the full participation and sacrifice by all sections in that most violent, destructive and dangerous human phenomenon-war.

The few that do venture into this field from the thus-far-non-representative sections have to be integrated with more care and thought than seems adequate in other causes. Examples of some such chance-volunteers being made cooks or educated ones (a few of them matriculates) enrolled as non-combatants are not at all rare. All this without their knowledge and to their greatest horror! One can only imagine the effect it has on such sections of wary volunteers! Woefully inadequate recruitment propaganda in all parts of these States, in the interior especially, is a painful drawback. There is an urgent and very strong need for the recruiting machinery to function with far greater understanding and enthusiasm and much more frequently deep in the interior.

Language, say what we may, is another less encouraging factor. Gregarious that we are, our languages do have a great attraction for us. Gujaratis find little of theirs in, say, Grenadier or Rajput or Maratha Regiment. Karnatakis have difficulty with Maratha or Madras Regiment. Oriyas and Bengalis have to seek solace in Bihar, Assam or Rajput Regiments. Only infantry regiments are shown as examples because this arm forms the biggest chunk in our army. A very welcome step in this direction is the raising of the Naga Regiment. It is high time that similar wisdom was applied in raising regiments from the so-called non-martial but better-known neglected areas mentioned above. An appeal to their sense of history, tradition and venturesome spirit, coupled with waking them to the compulsive realities of their obligations and duty to the nation's defence and integrity will undoubtedly evoke spontaneous response. An Indian throughout his history has known,



heard of and fought wars. He will never fail to respond to the business of war. Only a galvanising power, appeal and machinery is needed.

#### SENSE OF INVOLVEMENT

The army must have a genuine, intense sense of involvement in the social, spiritual, political, intellectual, economic and cultural life of the nation. A mere detached "guardian" attitude is insufficient, because it does not draw from spiritual requisites like sentiment, attachment, love and feeling, all of which are epitomized in patriotism, pride and zest for life as we want to live it.

Professional exclusivism not only arrogates undesirable complexes to the soldiery but also alienates the civilian brethren. Keeping abreast in politics, the soldier's horror, does not necessarily mean dabbling in it. In the modern life of any nation social trends, political thoughts, economic compulsions, spiritual values, material comforts, cultural developments and industrial advancement cannot be separated completely. Each is dependent on the other directly or indirectly. With this at the back of our mind it needs no further effort to realise the truth behind the statement "we are citizens first and soldiers next". A soldier in our army today has to come out of his professional seclusion to breathe the open air, fresh and foul, of the nation's confident march across variegated terrain, made of different compounds, complexes, textures, grains and moulds. Unless we experience the joys and sorrows of all these we will never develop that love and respect for "our" nation, "our" people, "our" values and "our" system. The various strikes, unrest, social reforms, political changes, economic manipulations, famine, national calamities and the soldier's role in all this turmoil and turbulence have to be seen in this light, so that we are always ready to do our bidding in the most exemplary manner.

In this context it is prudent to remember what happened to the German Army early in this century. One commentary runs like this ".....the tragedy of the German Army might be summed up in the victory of a narrow, self-sufficient, mechanical outlook, a self-righteous pseudo-patriotism incapable of grasping the subtle complexity in the coexistence of national and international factors (and therefore destroying what it believes to serve) over a balanced appreciation of the relationship between the vital interests of the nation and the duties of its military establishment, in short, the victory of a purely technical mastery of the art of war over a profound appreciation of the subtle inter-connection of war and politics". Hans Speidel has this to say ".....there were, in 1933 and later, too many officers who insisted that they were only soldiers who knew nothing about politics, and who implied by their dogged iteration of that statement that they felt responsibility only for

the execution of the orders issued to them.....the beneficiary of this attitude was Adolf Hitler”.

The old “*Namak Khaya hai*” attitude today depicts only the horribly desiccated mercenery. We belong to our own country, our own people. We serve them not out of the dreadfully dry sense of duty, a fatalistic stance in itself, but out of warm fellow-feeling, genuine love and pride, a sense of belonging. It is only this sense of involvement, love, pride and belief in our nation, our people, our joys and sorrows that will bring the best out of the Army, that last extra ounce. Hear the Russian opinion : “.....The personnel of the armed forces are imbued with a high level of political consciousness, a great love for their Motherland, a sanctified hatred of the enemy, boundless devotion to the people, selflessness in fulfilling their military obligations, genuine humanity and comradeship in their relation with one another and in their dealings with civilians, a high sense of military discipline and courage, and respect for human dignity and the rights and customs of the people.....”. This really succinct description of the nationalness” of their armed forces can, with certain modifications suiting our genius and characteristics easily be adopted by our army.

#### DEDICATION

The army must dedicate itself not merely to its profession, for that will limit its potential, but also to the nation, its values, heritage and integrity. The British who ruled us on the strength of an army they built predominantly out of us (a marvellous feat of leadership, organisation and grit with few parallels indeed) understandably based dedication on the lower, although quite practical, planes of “*Kaum*” “*Paltan*” and “*Martial class*”. Obviously they couldn’t have raised this motivation and dedication to national and patriotic levels. With the exit of foreign rule this limited horizon should have broken into its larger expanse of national dimensions. It is queer to see the majority placing “*Paltan*” and “*Kaum*” first and through them giving incidental benefits to the wider demands at national scale. It is well past time that we dedicated to the nation, its people, values and way of life first and, in so doing realised the smaller but vital goals of “*Paltan*” and “*Kaum*”. It is naive to persist in the blind old fixation that the Jawan cannot be trusted to think so high or that he cannot understand such distantly lofty ideals.

Today the demand on dedication in a spirit of self-abnegation, sacrifice and with determination is far greater. Like many good points in the way of life and governance our nation has chosen for itself there are a few bad ones too. Many sections of our population are exploiting these tender spots and taking undue advantage of certain liberties we have permitted ourselves in pursuance of high ideals. The stresses and strains

of the formative period of a new chapter in our national history can have telling effects on the army too. These ill-effects can only be controlled and overcome by overwhelming dedication to our profession, nation, people and values. It is in this light and spirit that the army has to stake for or react to such important aspects as pay increase, additional service privileges, more benefits and so on. There is no point in doting over or hankering after these.

#### CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

Alongside its involvement with, devotion to and awareness of national spirit, social life and political thoughts the army must identify itself with and fully contribute to the national reconstruction. Here is a well trained, organised, disciplined, motivated body, equally well provided and with tremendous potential, unrivalled by any other institution or organisation in the country. Inescapably its primary business is defence-readiness and war. Recruiting, training, administering and studies obviously claim the lion's share of its time, resources and energy. Nonetheless a critical analysis of all these requirements and activities vis-a-vis their judicious and economical utilisation cannot help revealing the availability of spare time and lean periods. The gospel "economy of effort" so sanctimoniously applied in war could easily and without detriment to its efficiency be extended during peace to the other equally important calling nation-building.

I am fully aware of the treacherous ground I am covering while examining this aspect. I am also aware of the gasp of horror forced by my view that the army should participate in the nation's creative activities like construction work, agriculture and animal husbandry, to quote a few. This is an old controversy in our country, with points and counter-points. It raised itself for a while in the Russian army decades ago. It is still strife in the Chinese army. It is forcefully argued that the diversion of the army's efforts towards such activities will deprive it of its keen professional edge or deny it training opportunities and weaken its combat readiness. Perhaps true, but only under conditions where diversions are disproportionate in terms of time, energy and resources. On the other hand look at the marvellously forged body, with tremendous potential, merely remaining an exclusive unconcerned onlooker while the nation is heaving and gasping in its strides towards progress! How wasteful! A small effort out of its spare time and lean periods directed to execute in its businesslike manner the moderate share of its nation-building will produce most encouraging and satisfying results. There are large tracts of land in all cantonments and unit areas. A number of low medical category personnel, sick and less busy men are always available. Moreover for an hour or two a day for two or three days in a week if entire units are employed in agricultural activities in their areas no harm

attaches to their professional schedule. Units can grow their requirements of vegetables, condiments and even food grains in some measure. The vast dumps of exhibitivite silver in the masses and rich regimental funds of units can be put to better and more productive use in partnership with Government agencies. Implements and other requisities can be owned collectively on station basis and the produce so shared.

The result of this effort will manifest in the following :—

- (a) The army will have the tremendous satisfaction of contributing to nation-building.
- (b) The civil population will have a far better appreciation of and rapport with the army.
- (c) The soldier will enjoy the creative and contributive pleasure. Incidentally this is the only creativity that he will perhaps indulge in, as he is surrounded by an over whelmingly destructive atmosphere all his life in uniform.
- (d) The nation will be that much richer economically while the soldier will gain the dignity of labour.

The Israeli para-military forces practise this combination. The Chinese in the 50s declared—"The armed forces of the Chinese Peoples' Republic shall, during peacetime, systematically take part in agricultural and industrial production to assist in the work of national construction, on the condition that the military tasks are not affected." A Western author says, "The Chinese Red Army is both a defender and a builder, and manual work plays a big part in its curriculum, for both the officer and the men. During the summer whole formations move out to help with the harvest ..... In the field of constructional work, on flood prevention measures and on building and repairing canals, roads and railways, all soldiers have to do their full share." I see no reason why our army should not follow the Israeli and Chinese pragmatism and wisdom. Of course we will have to modify their concepts and evolve our own as suit us.

#### INDIGENOUS TRADITION

A national army has to have its own national traditions, born out of its indigenous philosophy, thoughts, spirit, culture, temper and content. There is an old fable describing how a foolish and arrogant aspirant, trying to better a doll-maker, stuck an elephant's head to a human form and made it a monkey ! Infatuation, fancy and aping produce such funny, worthless, alien traditions. History records events, actions and their interrelation. Tradition is what we glean from history as important, enduring, emulative and unifying. Orthodoxy is the step-

brother of tradition, forcing tradition on us despite its incongruity, unsuitability, harm and falsity. The Army today is the most orthodox, traditionalist of our national institutions. The British influence is everywhere to see—in our messes, social snobbery, attitude to men, sartorial tendencies, class compositions of our regiments, quota system of promotions and appointments in units of mixed class composition and in a hundred other places. Our cantonments and their rules are another relic. Battle honours are yet another point of contention. Without meaning any disrespect to those most gallant deeds and the units which performed them during British rule (some of these celebrate the British victory over our own countrymen), such remembrances, instead of being celebrated in a free new-born India, should be consigned to the archives of history and not belaboured as traditions. It is a new nation, new army and hence the need for new traditions, based on indigenous national events. Undoubtedly those gallant deeds were performed by some of our present army units, but for a foreigner's benefit and against ourselves. To dote over them would amount to sinking in professional fetish and seclusion. It hardly reflects a national outlook.

We are at the crossroads today. We know we can no longer wallow in old outmoded traditions, but we do not quite clearly know new ones we should follow. Before following they have to be evolved, created. Clinging to old, meaningless traditions only shows inability to create new, dynamic and worthy ones. It is a challenge to the army leadership, its vision, national feeling and spirit.

The nation and its citizens also have certain obligations to the army. They have to develop a deep understanding of its purpose, organisation, equipping, administration and employment. War is no more the monopoly of "Khshatriyas" or kings or the headache of the army and its generals. Knowledge of war, or as Gen Cariappa says "military-mindedness", in all important echelons of our society, governing bodies, be they public or private, and institutions of learning is inescapable. Ignorance, callousness, "someone else's baby" attitude of the citizens are bigger enemies, exasperating and a pain in the neck. Though efforts are being made to close this yawning gap between the soldier and the citizen (a British legacy again), the professional and the civilian, the progress is yet slow. Unlike many industrial enterprises, this one has not even reached perhaps its take-off stage. Only a few universities have started the faculty of military science. Most others consider it outside the pale of human pursuits. A fresh, dynamic, uninhibited mind, not confined within uniform, free-thinking, has far greater potential of contributing to military thought and organisation. Example—Lawrence of Arabia. I see no reason why our professors and Post-graduates cannot bring their incisive examination and profundity of thought to military matters.

The army is usually only remembered during war and forgotten thereafter. The fuss, bombast and melodrama played out on the "saviours", "conquerors" and "heroes", if moderated and directed in more tangible channels, lasting longer, will win better acclaim from the army. Moreover this kind of indulgent enthusiasm is allright in short, less costly wars. Without deep and clear understanding of war's horrors, sacrifices and requirements will the people accord the same acclaim even if the future wars last for years and cause casualties and destruction beyond the grasp of their present day blinkered knowledge? Indians in their history mostly experienced short stiff wars. A certain amount of sympathetic consideration, even a little preferential treatment to numerous home, family and land troubles of a soldier by government officials and citizens bring him closer to the civilians emotionally, spiritually. This unfortunately is yet to take shape. Quite a number of soldiers languish in their home troubles, particularly as they have to stay away from their homes for long periods.

The peculiarly Indian penchant for melodrama is to be found in the Press. Its shallow reportage done in haste betrays its poverty in the grasp and projection of military matters. There is more of hysterical tears than cold sweat on account of hard thinking. It is a great pity that even our officers shun from projecting military matters in the Press. Their vast knowledge "disappears" without benefiting the people.

### CONCIUSION

Our army has come a substantial way in weaving itself within the national fabric. The effort is of acceptable proportions only when the army's readjustment from the British influence to the new national independence is considered. But it falls short of expectation when we consider the army as an integral part of the nation's social, spiritual, cultural, political, philosophical and economic panorama. Representation in the army, of many states and sections of the country's population is negligible, lop-sided. While leaving such sections out of the mainstream of national military life and obligations, this imbalance imposes added stresses and burden on other sections. Though a beginning in this direction has been made it is grossly inadequate. With the present strength of the army an effort to raise new regiments for militarily backward States and sections will, without affecting the efficiency and tradition of the army, go a long way.

An intense sense of involvement in the national life, social values, political thought and economic development is far more important today than at any other time. Contribution to national reconstruction is another vital matter that merits radical rethinking, as does evolution of indigenous traditions. There has to be much greater rapport with the realities and inescapability of military knowledge and understanding. The army needs legiti-

mate sympathy and intelligent appreciation not only in war but also in peace. In all these spheres it is easy to be complacent of what we have achieved so far, but quite difficult to evolve our true indigenous requirements for our own present and future, because such an effort means hard thinking, hard work and more so, that herculean task of breaking with the past, tradition, howsoever expedient it may be ! And so to sum up, our army has to come up to what an Indian author so brilliantly points out—

“.....A modern army must reflect the entire complex of the nation's activities, its general efficiency and social integration, the discipline of its political life, its scientific progress and industrial strength...In fact today the army is a nation in arms”.

We have a long long way to go yet !

**USI National Security Papers**

## **CHINA'S STRATEGIC POSTURE IN THE EIGHTIES**

by

**Major General AM Vohra**

Price : Rs. 5 (Rs. 3, for members)

**Ask for your copy from**

*The Administrative Officer*

**United Service Institution of India**

**'Kashmir House'**

**King George's Avenue, New Delhi-110011**

# INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

MAJOR BS SIROHI

## INTRODUCTION

During the post-World War II period two distinct patterns of warfare have emerged—the sharp, short and ‘limited’ Wars (Arab-Israeli wars of 1956 and 1967, Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971) and the long, protracted and ‘limited’ insurgencies (China 1927—49, Indo-China 1945-54 and 61—73, Greece 1945-50, Malaya 1948-60, Algeria 1954-62, Cuba 1957-59, Cyprus 1955-59, Tunisia 1952-55, and Morocco 1952-56). The efficacy and credibility of both types have been amply proved by their aims and achievements.

During the decade following World War II there have been ninety insurgent movements of varying intensities in different parts of the world. It is therefore essential to study insurgency in its historical perspective and evolve suitable strategy, doctrines and tactics to prevent and combat it.

The aim of this paper is to survey the historical perspectives and concepts of insurgency, study the strengths and weaknesses of insurgents in the context of contemporary insurgencies with particular reference to the following :—

- (a) Factors responsible for success of insurgency in China and Indo-China.
- (b) Strategy and tactics employed for successfully combating insurgency in Malaya.
- (c) Future trends in insurgency in the changing socio-economic climate (with particular reference to India) and suggest a possible strategy to prevent and combat it.

## CONCEPT AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

UNCONVENTIONAL wars have been fought since the dawn of history. Tsi Yao fought Emperor Huang in 360 BC, the Old Testament describes the guerrilla campaign of the Maccabees against the Syrian armies, Fabius Maximus fought Hannibal, the great Shivaji against Aurangzeb, the Spanish against Napoleon's armies



(1807-13), Francis Marion's 'The Swamp Fox' (in 1760's) in South Carolina against the British, the Russian Cossacks and the peasants in the face of Napoleon's 'Grand Armee' and again behind the Nazi lines during World War II.

Our military manuals define insurgency as an armed rebellion by a section of the population against the legally constituted government with the support or sympathy of the bulk of the local population, obtained voluntarily or by coercion.

Mao Tse-Tung's concept of revolutionary warfare is based on three non-tangible factors—space, time and the will. Insurgency is a fusion of socio-economic political, military and most important, psychological ingredients into an effective national war-waging machinery, in conjunction with or without regular forces.

To the classic Marxist concept of insurgency (revolution as a dialectical change to proletariat from the bourgeoisie) must be added the variations of the modern theory of revolution\* :—

- (a) Mao's concept of revolution as a continuing act of warfare.
- (b) Castro-Debray theory that a guerrilla situation grows of its own accord and does not have to be created.
- (c) Frantz Fanon talks of universal nature of revolution which links the whole world in a continuous struggle, in his book "Wretched of the World".

## STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF INSURGENTS

TE Lawrence has shown that the inherent strengths and weaknesses in the very concept and nature of the struggle are double-edged and can be turned either way by the parties in the struggle. Therefore, the strengths can be neutralised and weaknesses successfully exploited by either side. Some of the contemporary insurgencies have shown it so.

### STRENGTHS OF THE INSURGENTS

#### • The Formidable Assets-Mao's Three Non-Tangibles.

- (a) *Space.* Vastness of space coupled with obstacles and lack of modern communications network provide the insurgents with

---

\*Changing Patterns in the Theory and Practice of Revolution and insurgency By Leonard Schapiro, (Strategic Digest Feb. 71)

TE Lawrence in his book 'Seven Pillars of Wisdom'.

tactical and strategic fluidity. Mao Tse-Tung's famous 6000 mile 'Long March' is the most remarkable example in the history of warfare of the survival of a retreating army. On 16 Oct. 1934, Mao and Chu Teh with about 100,000 Chinese Communists and the Red Army (after a loss of 250,000 men) broke through Chiang Kai-Shek's Fifth Expedition's cordon and having travelled about 6,000 miles over some of the most difficult and rugged terrain in the world crossed into the borders of Northern Shensi with 20,000 survivors, on 20 Oct. 1935. On the other hand, restrictiveness of space (Greece) and/or developed communications net-work impose limitations on the insurgents.

- (b) *Time*. Insurgency is a protracted struggle. Insurgent's ultimate aim is a continuous struggle aimed at final victory. Mao advocated retreat in space but advance in time. Insurgents are forced into a protracted struggle, the counter-insurgents cannot afford one (the Anti-War Movement in the United States and the French withdrawal from Indo-China in 1954 and Algeria in 1962). Insurgent's inability to achieve decisive victories is turned into an asset by the counter-insurgent's inability to conduct a protracted struggle.
- (c) *Will*. If the total population can be made to resist surrender (classic case study of Vietnam), this resistance can be turned into a war of attrition which will be victorious. Today the Americans have sought a negotiated settlement in Vietnam rather than a military victory.

**The Protracted Nature of the Struggle.** Even though forced by circumstances, insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically. In China it lasted 22 years, 9 in Indo-China, (under the French and subsequently for more than a decade with US involvement, 9 in the Philippines, 8 in Algeria, 12 in Malaya and 5 years each in Indonesia and Greece. In this form of struggle it is possible to achieve political objectives without a decisive military victory (case study of Vietnam).

**The Revolutionary Nature of the Struggle.** The revolutionary nature of the struggle links the entire social structure of the society into a continuing class struggle. It is the realisation of the primacy of political penetration and conquest. Politics is an active instrument of politics and operations (China and Indo-China). The principal objective is the population and all operations are designed to win it over.

**Strategic initiative.** Insurgents alone can initiate the conflict and delay reaction. They can reach a high degree of development by

legal and peaceful means, at least in countries where political opposition is tolerated. In this aspect their main advantages are :—

- (a) *The Ideological Power of a Cause.* A cause may be political (dictatorship of Batista in Cuba), social (proletariat revolution in Russia), economic, racial or cultural. A cause is a formidable asset if :—
  - (i) It can evoke popular enthusiasm and appeal, make sacrifices worthwhile, can attract the largest number of supporters, repel minimum number of opponents and be a binding force between the hostiles and the vast disappointed majority (land reforms as the cause adopted by the Chinese Communists). Movements in Malaya and Kenya failed because the vast majority was indifferent to the insurgent cause.
  - (ii) Counter-insurgents cannot espouse it too. The Huks fought for land reforms in the Philippines. Ramon Magsaysay gave them. Communists fought for Malayan independence. The British gave Malaya independence in 1960. In both cases the insurgents failed.
  - (iii) It is lasting at least till the insurgents movement is well on its feet.
  - (iv) It is capable of tactical manipulation. In China, the Communists initially took the classic Marxist stand in favour of the workers (1921-25), then they espoused the national cause of the Kuomintang for unification of China (1925-27), advocated land reforms (1928-34), then supported a patriotic United Front against the Japanese (1927-45) and again they reversed to land reforms after the Japanese surrender (1945-49).
- (b) *Existence/Creation of a Revolutionary Situation.* All societies, to varying degrees, are prone to a revolutionary situation (Castro-Debray theory), and sufficiently determined revolutionaries can create revolutionary situations. Insurgents then are the first to pre-empt the cause and hence strategic initiative is on their side.
- (c) *Leadership and Organisation.* Insurgent leadership, by force of circumstances, is usually charismatic (Mao, Ho Chi Minh) which creates a dynamic organisation. Knowledge of the terrain, which included not only geographical aspects but, more important, the social, economic and political features of the area and the ability of the leadership and the organisation

to extract from it the maximum advantages is a pre-requisite for successful insurgency. Paradoxically none of the successful guerrilla leaders had previous military experience. Mao was a student and librarian, Ho Chi Minh a socialist agitator, Giap a French-trained teacher of history, Castro a lawyer, Ben Bella and Belkacem Karim were non-commissioned officers. Equally appalling and paradoxical is the number of unsuccessful professional soldiers in fighting insurgency (defeat of four French generals by Giap). And probably the most successful counter-insurgent leader was Magsaysay, a motor mechanic turned guerrilla turned politician. Thus we see that open insurrection starts on a sound footing while the counter-insurgent's reaction takes time and resources to build up and therefore the insurgents have an advantage at the outset.

- (d) *Insurgency is Cheap, Counter-Insurgency is Costly.* Promoting disorder is a legitimate objective for the insurgents. Moreover, disorder—the normal state of nature is easy to create and very costly to prevent. The ratio of expenses between insurgents and the counter-insurgents is high. Cost of every rebel in Malaya was calculated at more than 200,000 dollars, while in Algeria, the FLN budget at its peak period amounted to 30 or 40 million dollars a year.

**Fluidity of the Insurgents, Rigidity of the Counter-Insurgents.** The insurgent is fluid because he has neither responsibility nor concrete assets; the counter-insurgent is rigid because he has both. Guerrillas do not attempt to hold ground and their tactics consist of small-band operations of rapid engagement and disengagement and 'hit' and run' operations. Failure to maintain fluidity has often resulted in disaster (Greece and Vietnam in 1951 in Tonkin).

**Unconventional Nature of the War.** Revolutionary war never reverts to a conventional form. As long as the population remains under the insurgent control, they retain their liberty to refuse battle except at their own terms (the Nationalist offensive against the Communists in Yenan in 1945).

**Intelligence and Communication Systems.** An intelligence network in the villages, among the civilian employees of the Government and military organisations provides accurate and timely information. Every sympathetic civilian is a potential member of the guerrilla communications systems.

**Geographical Conditions.** 'A large land-locked country, shaped like a blunt-tipped star, with jungle-covered mountains along the borders and scattered swamps in the plains, in a temperate zone with a large and

dispersed rural population and a primitive society is an ideal situation for insurgency@. The larger the country, the more difficult it is for the Government to control it (China), a country easy to compartmentalise hinders insurgents (Greece), if a country is an archipelago, insurgency cannot easily spread (Philippines), contiguous lengthy borders with a sympathetic neighbour favours insurgency (Greece), Indo-China, Algeria and Mizo Hills). Rugged and difficult terrain (the hills of Kiangsi, the mountains of Greece, the swamps of the Plains of Heeds in Cochinchina the paddyfields of Tonkin and the jungles of Malaya) and scattered population favour insurgents. Attempt to regroup population could be possible in Malaya and Algeria.

#### LIMITATIONS OF THE INSURGENTS

**Limitations in the Field of Tangibles.** At the start of a revolutionary war the insurgents have formidable assets in the field of non-tangibles but serious limitations in the field of tangibles. The counter-insurgents are endowed with an established Government, diplomatic recognition, legislative, executive and judicial powers, control of administration and police, financial, industrial and agricultural resources, control of transport and communications, information and propaganda media and command of the armed forces. Continuous denial of the tangibles coupled with systematic neutralisation of the intangibles can limit and finally eliminate insurgency (Malaya, Greece and Kenya).

**Lack of Concentration.** The tactics and strategy of small-band operations inhibits them to concentrate their fighting power for any extended period to fully exploit success. They are generally compelled to accept something short of victory. Efforts to achieve concentration and eventually success by regular warfare have usually proved abortive (Giap in Vietnam and Communists in Greece). Dien Bien Phu was an exception, of course.

**Possibility of Betrayals.** Prolonged hard life and temptations offered by the Government, tend to promote traitors in the organisation (Kikuyus in Kenya).

**Lack of Training and Discipline.** During early stages lack of training and discipline limit guerrilla effectiveness. Initially Giap was forced to centralise control over all command decisions.

**Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare.** Skillful propaganda suitably directed through sophisticated modern means of mass media and psychological warfare can often dishearten and disillusion them (role of the Information Services in Malaya and Kenya through voice, planes and leaflets is an instance).

**Outside Support.** Even though no outside support is absolutely essential at the start of an insurgency, it obviously helps when available ; while its non-availability may often make the development of the insurgent military establishment an impossibility (Malaya, Philippines and Greece after the Tito-Stalin split). In Indo-China, the turning point occurred in 1950, when the Vietminh began receiving aid from China. In Algeria in 1959, the FLN forces buried their automatic weapons for lack of ammunition.

## SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCIES

Where insurgents have exploited their assets and converted their weaknesses into profitable assets, the movements have succeeded and insurgencies have failed where they could not. The case studies of China and Indo-China are classic examples of successful insurgencies.

### FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCCESS OF INSURGENCY IN CHINA

Factors responsible for success of insurgency in China are summarised below :—

- (a) Popular cause and its tactical manipulation.
- (b) Popular support and mass participation of the peasants.
- (c) Foundation of People's National Army (the Red Army) led by a centralised political organisation (the Communist Party of China) and identity of the armed forces with the masses.
- (d) Suitability of terrain (success of the 'Long March').
- (e) Leadership of Mao Tse-Tung. Chu Teh and Chou En-lai coupled with Mao's mastery of the theory and strategy of revolutionary warfare, his concept of dispersing enemy strategically and taking its advantage tactically.
- (f) Concept of strategic bases established in North China, Manchuria, Shensi, Shantung, Hanan and Shanshi, rural bases areas and encirclement of the cities from the countryside.
- (g) Unity and coordination of effort through a strong Communist Party (Liu Shao chi in a lecture in 1949).
- (h) Discipline of the party cadres and the armed forces based on the 'Three Disciplinary Rules' and the 'Eight Points of Attention' formulated by Mao in early 1928.
- (j) Creation of a strong will to resist and survive and concept of armed struggle as the main form of struggle for national liberation (the 'Long March').
- (k) Intelligence and propaganda machinery based on the masses and political nature of the People's Liberation Army, the Red Army.

- (l) Lack of outside support developed self-reliance. The PLA seized about 100,000 arms from the Japanese and the KMT Forces.
- (m) Inefficient and corrupt KMT Government alienated the masses and their involvement with the Japanese during World War II gave the much needed respite to the communists.

#### FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCCESS OF INSURGENCY IN INDO-CHINA

The continued struggle in Vietnam proves the efficacy and credibility of a protracted revolutionary struggle in the present day environment. Factors responsible for success of insurgency in Indo-China against the French from 1945-54 are as follows :—

- (a) Strategy of long-term resistance (1945-54 under the French and later against the Americans and the South Vietnamese).
- (b) Building of resistance bases and intelligence network in the countryside (creation of self-defence units, guerrilla units and militias).
- (c) Conscious discipline built upon the political consciousness (the 'Ten Pledges of Honour').
- (d) Primacy of political penetration and conquest. Natives had to be won for the revolutionary cause to the point of not merely acquiescence but active participation in the struggle.
- (e) Creation of a political army. Each soldier is a farmer, labourer and political agent.
- (f) Creation of a guerrilla army for all phases of the struggle.
- (g) Perfection of guerrilla tactics of infiltration, rapid movement (preferable at night), massive but brief attacks on the battlefield and quick disengagement from action with doubtful prospects.
- (h) Centralised control over all command decisions and activities until a trained army had been created.
- (j) Favourable terrain of operations.
- (k) Advantages of contiguous border with China provide for safe sanctuaries and material support in the form of materials, training facilities, technical and moral support, heavy equipment and artillery (success at the Dien Bien Phu siege was partly due to massive artillery).

#### ADVANTAGES OF THE COMMUNISTS OVER THE FRENCH

- (a) Mastery of infiltration tactics.
- (b) Familiarisation with country, terrain and people.
- (c) Intelligence assisted by racial characteristics provided Vietcong with perfect camouflage. French could not merge.

\* 'Struggle in Ching Kang' By Mao Tse-tung.

- (d) Scarcity of so-called strategic targets made target acquisition almost hopelessly difficult task for the French Air Force.
- (e) Communist strategy of fighting a war without fronts. French had to guard everything and tie up thousands of troops in local security.
- (f) Air photo reconnaissance hampered by heavy vegetation, mountainous terrain and frequent bad weather.
- (g) French were slow to develop counter-tactics.
- (h) French bankruptcy at home due to World War II.

### STRATEGY AND TACTICS EMPLOYED FOR SUCCESSFULLY COMBATING INSURGENCY IN MALAYA

#### BACKGROUND

The Malayan Communist movement sponsored by the Hakkas and the Hailamas, the Chinese races, began in 1924. The British supported the independence movement of the *MPAJA* (Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army) against the Japanese. After World War II the Communists organised the *MRLA* (Malayan Races Liberation Army) and in 1948 triggered a guerrilla type of war against the British. The British were quick to realise and analyse the nature of this war and subsequent British success in Malaya provides a classic case study of a successful counter-insurgency.

#### STRATEGY AND TACTICS EMPLOYED FOR COMBATING INSURGENCY IN MALAYA

The British soon realised that, "This was a war for the hearts and minds of the people," (Sir Henry Gurney).

##### *Appreciation of Sir Gerald Templer.*

- (a) The struggle in Malaya was going to be long and an arduous affair.
- (b) A first class intelligence organisation was a prerequisite.
- (c) Military forces alone would not be able to win this war. Civil administration, police and other organisations had to go it together.

**Brigg's Plan.** Lt Gen Sir Harold Briggs, the Director of Operations in Malaya in 1950, had the following three main aims of his plan :—

- (a) *Population Control.* To bring population, especially isolated sections, under effective administrative control and protection, including resettlement of 'squatter' communities,



- (b) *Security.* Concurrent expansion of police and local defence units.
- (c) *Unified Command.* Establishment of a unified civil, police and military systems of command and control for all anti-terrorist operations.

#### EXECUTION OF BRIGG'S PLAN.

- (a) *Creation of War Executive Council.* To coordinate both planning and operations 'War Executive Councils' were created at the state and district levels. It consisted of heads of civil administration, police, army and the Air Forces. Later, when Gen Sir Gerald Templer assumed appointment of both High Commissioner and Director of Military Operations in 1952, he further centralised the organisation and amalgamated the Federal Executive Council with the War Council.
- (b) *Strategic Hamlets.* About half a million Chinese squatters were moved into 600 new 'Protected Villages' before the end of emergency in 1960. The concept was aimed at :—
  - (i) Isolating the insurgents from the population.
  - (ii) Forcing the insurgents to come to well-defined areas to collect food and supplies and thus exposing to security force ambushes.
  - (iii) Raising the morale of the villagers by giving them better living conditions and protection.
  - (iv) Establishment of an intelligence organisation amongst the population.
- (e) *Building up of Police Forces and Local Defence Units.* Police strength was raised to nearly 30,000 regulars plus over 30,000 Special Constables. The police were thus able to carry out their normal functions to provide protection and to undertake semi-military operations. This enabled the Army To :—
  - (i) Concentrate on offensive tasks.
  - (ii) Know the area of operations intimately.
  - (iii) Work on the system of 'Frame work Deployment' which evolved around infantry company/battalions in a district sector.
- (d) *Organisation of Intelligence and Psychological warfare.* The 'Special Branch of Federal Police' was established at the Federal, state and district levels. There was close liaison between them and the Army by MIO (Military Intelligence Officer) who worked with the Special Branch along side,

(e) *Conduct of Operations.*

- (i) Operations were aimed at denying any form of food supplies to the insurgents.
- (ii) Art of jungle patrolling was perfected.
- (iii) Tracker dogs and Ibans (specially trained enlisted trackers from North Borneo) were used.
- (iv) Emphasis on aggressive spirit, ambushes and patrolling was laid.
- (v) Introduction of night illuminating devices and many other similar innovations like the electrically detonated flares, portable infrared devices and claymore mines.
- (vi) Trait of 'fatalism' in the oriental terrorists was exploited.
- (vii) Use of 'loud-mouth' aircraft with powerful loud-speakers for psychological warfare.
- (viii) Offers of amnesty and surrender.
- (ix) Extensive use of 'S-55' and 'Whirlwind' helicopters and the role of the RAF in the fields of air support, air transportation and in the intensive terrorist camps' bombardments.
- (x) Tactical and patrolling techniques were developed.

CAUSES OF SUCCESS IN MALAYA

- (a) An integrated command system.
- (b) Appreciation that this was a politico-military war and a slow one.
- (c) Heart and mind campaign to win the support of the people.
- (d) Evolution of a coordinated intelligence network and information services.
- (e) Well trained Security Forces teams.
- (f) Defeating the cause of the insurgents.
- (g) Denial of popular support.
- (h) Destruction of insurgent bases.
- (j) Numerical superiority of the counter-insurgent forces was achieved.
- (k) Sustained offensive action.

Emergency was eventually lifted on 31st July 1960 and Malaya was given independence. The communist insurgency came to an end after twelve years.

FUTURE TRENDS IN INSURGENCY

Previously, nationalism provided the prime fuel for insurgency. Now-a days, Communism is often the motive power. Societies in the underdeveloped and developing countries are experiencing the shock of

abrupt changes in the social, economic, political and ideological structures of societies. With so many successful insurgencies in the recent years, the temptation will always be great for a discontented group, any where, to start an insurrection movement. We have had our share of insurgencies in the Naga problem since 1953, the Mizo problem since 1966 and, of late, the Naxalite problem.

#### CHANGING SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLIMATE

The socio-economic climate in our country and around us is fast changing, setting new patterns of individual, social and national behaviours. Some prominent socio-economic changes in recent times are summarised below :—

- (a) *Effects of Partition of 1947.* Mass movement of population both in the eastern and the western wings of the country. Large floating population causing abrupt changes in economic balances.
- (b) *Rapid Industrialisation.* Creation of an organised labour class, formation of powerful trade unions, political influence and manipulation of the organised labour class by political parties resulting in labour unrest, gheraos, go-slows, work-to-rule and frequent violence Trends in 'capital-shift' in the wake of violence and uncertainties (West Bengal).
- (c) *Rapid Population Growth.* Off-setting the achievements of planning. Socio-economic problems multiplying resulting in unrest and uncertainties.
- (d) *Rapid Growth of Literacy.* Mass education but lack of commensurate job opportunities is creating a massive and unemployed educated class and a potentially revolutionary situation.
- (e) *Effects of Western Culture.* Large-scale imitation of the West in dress, customs and behaviour and not the least in violence and crimes. Development of crises of conscience, unrest, indiscipline and violence in public life and educational and cultural institutions.
- (f) *Student Unrest.* Shortage of job opportunities, effects of Western culture, subversion by Communist ideology, exploitation by the political parties, giving rise to student indiscipline, unrest and violence.
- (g) *Communal Discord.* Partition feelings, frequent communal riots, wars with Pakistan, constant Pak propaganda, all create a situation that can be exploited.
- (h) *Changing Patterns of Society.* Break-up of the family system, changing values of social conduct and behaviour are setting new patterns of individual and social behaviour.

## FUTURE PATTERNS OF INSURGENCY

In the changing socio-economic climate, insurgency could be :—

- (a) Classics Marxist pattern (the revolution of the proletariat).
- (b) Rural-based peasant revolution (Maoist style).
- (c) An urban-based movement of the Naxalite pattern in conjunction with or without the classic Marxist pattern.\*
- (d) Foreign-inspired insurgencies in the border states (Nagaland and Mizo Hills).

## SUGGESTED STRATEGY AND TACTICS TO PREVENT AND COMBAT INSURGENCY

It is cheaper to prevent insurgency than to combat it. The first prerequisite to successfully prevent an insurgency is the timely awareness of the nature and magnitude of the problem. A suggested strategy is as follows :—

- (a) Establishment of a stable and strong Central Government.
- (b) Determination of the leadership to prevent and finally to combat it.
- (c) Creation of an efficient administrative machinery with roots in the masses. The appointment of 'Administrative Reforms Commission' is a step in this direction.
- (d) Timely awareness of the danger by the Government and, most important, the people. The Government should constantly look for the danger signs.
- (e) Timely creation of a machinery to prevent it :—
  - (i) An efficient intelligence organisation and an information service, suitably coordinated and directed in the likely areas.
  - (ii) Correct assessment and prompt reporting to concerned authorities.
  - (iii) Enactment of suitable legislation to deal with it and, if necessary, declaration of state of emergency.
  - (iv) Creation of sufficient village/town self-defence units, local militias and Home Guards.
  - (v) Creation and maintenance of suitable armed forces and police forces.
  - (vi) Detection and infiltration of insurgent organisations.
- (f) Populating and density stabilisation of our borders. Creation of a pool of pioneer settlers from amongst the ex-servicemen.

\*"Originally the movement was peasant-based. Being unsuccessful in the villages, the Naxalite movement has now switched to the urban educated youth, anti-social elements and tribals in some isolated areas." (The Bengal Naxalite Predicament ; By Amritananda Dass in the China report Nov, Dec. 1970).

- (g) Establishment of a defence oriented socio-economic pattern for the border areas.
- (h) Initiation of reforms :—
  - (i) Land reforms (efforts at land ceilings).
  - (ii) Creation of employment opportunities and job guarantees.
  - (iii) Removal of economic inequalities (the 'Garibi Hatao' campaign of the Congress).
  - (iv) Removal of class distinction and privileges (Privy purse abolition and the removal of the privileges of ICS officers).
  - (v) Administration of social justice (removal of untouchability and reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Tribes and minorities).
  - (vi) Population growth control measures and planned economy.
  - (vii) Cultural stabilisation. Introduction of cultural education in the institutions.
  - (viii) Changes in education pattern and university education. Making it job oriented and encouraging student participation in the management.
- (j) Measures to curb violence through an adequate and efficient police force and intelligence organisation.

In the field of tactics, the methods and the techniques of operations employed in Malaya, Greece, Philippines, Kenya, Vietnam and elsewhere, usually provide the guidelines and much has been written on the subject in various books and military manuals. The pattern suggested are somewhat similar but what is important is a clear concept, evolution of a suitable strategy to suit local conditions, and finally, to adopt a technique to combat the menace, conforming always to the broad strategy laid at the onset.

## CONCLUSION

The credibility and efficacy of insurgency has been amply established in the present nuclear environment. Degree of vulnerability of various societies to the menace may differ but the modern concepts of revolution link the whole of human race to a continuous struggle.

Insurgency is of bigger magnitude than most people conceive it to be, both in its scope and essential ingredients. The changing socio-economic climate the world over has brought about new patterns and dimensions in insurgency.

By the very nature and concept of the struggle, the insurgents possess certain inherent strengths in the field of non-tangibles and serious limitations in the field of tangibles. The former can

be neutralised and the latter successfully exploited for counter-insurgency.

It is the timely awareness of the nature and magnitude of the problem, both by the counter-insurgent leadership and the public that will assist in preventing it and it is where steps should be taken to check it. Measures and efforts to combat it, after all may not be worth the results.

And, finally, in the atomic age, guerrilla warfare may be increasingly used and developed as a form of struggle and aggression to exploit a situation of nuclear stalemate\*.

Need for the timely awareness of the menace is NOW.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

#### BOOKS

1. Guerrilla Warfare By Mao AND Che Guevara, Translated by Brig Gen SB Griffith, USMC (Retd).
2. Red Star over China By Edgar Snow.
3. Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare—By Abdul Haris Nasution.
4. The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him—Selections from Marine Corps Gazette. Edited By Lt Col TN Greene.
5. Peoples' War Peoples' Army : By Gen VO Ynguyen Giap.
6. Victory in Malaya—By Lt Col Rowland SN MANS, MBE.
7. The Jungle is Neutral—By SPENCER CHAPMAN,
8. Guerrillas—By ARTHUR CAMPHELL.
9. CHE GUEVARA on GUERRILLA Warfare—(PRAEGER Publication).
10. Guerrillas—By CHARLES W THAYER.
11. Partisan Warfare—By OTTO HEILBURN.
12. Guerrilla Warfare and EOKAS Struggle—By Gen GRIVAS.
13. Counter-Insurgency Warfare—By DAVID GALULA.
14. Time Space, and Will—The Politico Military—View of MAO TSE TUNG By ELKATZENBACK, Jr.
15. Internal War : The New Communist Tactics—By ROGER HILSMAN.
16. Guerrilla Warfare and US Military Policy : A Study By PETER PARET and JOHN W SHY.
17. Guerrilla Warfare in Under developed Areas—By WW ROSTOW.
18. Guerrillas in the 1960's—By PETER PARET and SHY, JOHN W.
19. The Anti-bandit War—By Col J C MURRAY, USMC.
20. Red Shadow over MALAYA—By Brig HENNIKER,
21. Inside the VIETMINH—By Gen NGU YEN GIAP.
22. Shoot to Kill—By RICHARD MIERS.
23. Street Without Joy—By BERNARD B FALL.
24. The Two VIETNAMS—By BERNARD B FALL.
25. Combating Soviet Guerrillas—By ERNEST VON DOHNANYI.
26. How CASTRO won—by DICKEY CHAPBELLE.
27. Terror in CYPRUS—By Lt Col B I S GOURLAY, OBE.
28. Marines, Guerrillas and Small Wars—By Maj MICHAEL SPARK, USMC.
29. Combat Helicopters in ALGERIA—By Maj HILAIRE BETHOUART, FRENCH Army.

\* In the forward to 'Guerrilla Warfare' by Mao and Che Guevara—By Capt B H Liddell Hart.

30. Struggle in CHINGKANG Mountains—By MAO TSE TUNG.
31. On The Protracted War—By MAO TSE TUNG.
32. Small Unit Operations—Marine Corps School.
33. MALAYA : The Communist Insurgency War 1948-60—By EDGAR O'BALLANCE.
34. Seven Pillars of Wisdom—By T E LAWRENCE.
35. Selected Works of MAO TSE TUNG Vol IV.
36. Guerrilla and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare—By WILLIAM J POMEROY.
37. Communist Revolutionary Warfare—By GEORGE K TANHAM.
38. Defeating Communist Insurgency—By ROBERT THOMAS.

## ARTICLES

1. Guerrilla Warfare—By Maj M L TULI (Inf Journal Vol XII, 1961).
2. Terror in Insurgency Warfare—By JERRY M SILVERMAN and PETER M JACKSON (Mil Review, US Army Command and GS College, Oct 70).
3. FEDAYAN : PALESTINE commandos—By SELLY F LITTLE Jr (Mil Review Nov 70).
4. The Formidable Guerrillas—By Lt Col NEAL G GRIMLAND (Mil Digest Jul 62).
5. Counter-insurgency Operations—By Maj RV JATAR (USI Oct-Dec 68).
6. Counter-insurgency Theory and Practice in MIZO Hills—By Lt Col M N RAWAT (USI Apr-June 71).
7. Counter-insurgency Operations—By Brig S K SINHA (USI Jul-Sep 71).
8. Raiding Guerrillas in Urban Areas—By Lt Col M N MATHUR (USI Jul-Sep 71).
9. Strategy for NEFA in the Seventies—By P N LUTHRA (USI Oct-Dec 70).
10. Encirclement Method in Guerrilla Warfare—By MAY THONG H TAIK (Mil Digest Apr 62).
11. Tribal Tactics—By Maj V K ANAND (USI Apr-Jun 67).
12. Unconventional Warfare—By Maj B N SHARMA (USI Apr-Jun 66).
13. Populating the Borders—By Maj BS TYAGI (USI Oct-Dec 67).
14. Propaganda—A weapon of War—By Maj M N RAMAMURTHY (USI Jan-Mar 69).
15. NAGALAND the Sixteenth State—By JOE (USI Jan-Mar 69).
16. The War in the Dark—By Maj RC GHAI (USI Apr-Jun 67).
17. The Secret Weapon—Terrorism—By Maj D M R ESSON (Mil Digest Apr 60).
18. Fighting Guerrillas in Jungle Country—By Brig HARDIT SINGH (Inf Journal Apr 63).
19. Catching the Hostiles—By Lt Col R D PALSOKAR, MC (Inf Journal Apr 63).
20. NAGALAND—By Lt Col MR P VERMA (Inf Journal Apr 63).

# THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF BATTLE CASUALTIES

(Indo-Pakistan conflict 1971)

SURGEON CAPTAIN TB D'NETTO IN\*

SHRI R. KISHORE\*\*

KUM. R.K. RUGGU\*\*\*

## INTRODUCTION

IN World War I, the clinical syndrome known as 'shell shock', was first recognised as being psychogenic in origin. As many as six thousand cases were admitted annually among the British troops during the years 1914-1918. In World War II, psychiatric casualties accounted for 10 to 30 per cent of the total casualties in the different theatres of war. With the changes in the pattern and methods of modern warfare, it has been estimated that the number of psychiatric casualties would increase in future wars. The psychiatric services of the Armed Forces have been trying to keep up with those trends.

In the recent Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971, although adequate preparations were made to receive and treat a large number of psychiatric casualties, it was soon evident that the numbers of such casualties were much less than were expected. From the Eastern Front only 4 cases and from the Northern Front only 7 cases were diagnosed as suffering from psychiatric illness resulting from enemy action. This was indeed surprising, and hence a survey was conducted to find out the factors responsible for this low incidence. Another survey was conducted to find out the state of mental health among the wounded personnel received as battle casualties in the Command Hospital (CC) Lucknow. This survey was conducted during the hostilities, ie, when the casualties were first received in this hospital. A third survey was carried out on the casualties who were remaining in this hospital in October 1972 to find out if there were any changes in the psychological condition of these patients and, if so, to find out the causes for those changes to suggest remedies, if possible.

---

\*Senior Adviser (Psychiatry) Central, Western and Northern Commands, CH (CC) Lucknow

\*\*Clinical Psychologist, Command Hospital (CC) Lucknow

\*\*\*Medical Social Worker, Command Hospital (CC) Lucknow.



## PART I

## PSYCHIATRIC CASUALTIES

The first survey was to study the reason for the low incidence of the reported psychiatric casualties resulting from enemy action. It soon became evident that there was a certain amount of confusion in the minds of those concerned with reporting the casualties. Psychiatric cases were not being classified as battle casualties because of the definition of who is considered to be a battle casualty.

"Battle casualties are defined as those sustained in action against enemy forces or while repelling enemy air attacks. Casualties of this type consist of the following categories :—

- (a) Killed in action
- (b) Died of wounds or injuries (other than self-inflicted)
- (c) Wounded or injured (other than self-inflicted)
- (d) Missing.

Psychiatric cases are not considered battle casualties by this definition. They are considered as "illness" for which reports are to be made only when "such illness consists of exhaustion, neurosis or hysteria". These quotations are taken from the precis on "Administration in War" which is taught at the Senior Commanders Medical Officers' Course at the Officers Training School of the AMC Centre and School, Lucknow. (3)

Discussions with one of the Directing staff of the OTS showed that this definition of a battle casualty has been derived from the book on First Aid by the St. John's Ambulance Society. The psychological trauma of battle was not considered at all. In this enlightened era, this omission is indeed surprising, especially, when all of us are aware of the mental effects of trauma of any sort eg. a car accident. It is for consideration whether this definition of a battle casualty should not be reviewed to include mental trauma so that correct statistical data may be compiled. Also, under the present system, the psychiatric casualties are being excluded from the benefits that are being given to the physically wounded by the Central and State Governments.

Apart from this statistical defect, it was found that there were other factors responsible for the low incidence of psychiatric breakdown in this 1971 conflict. These factors have been elucidated from the second survey which will now be discussed.

## PART II

### MENTAL HEALTH OF THE BATTLE CASUALTIES

Col Kirpal Singh, (2) Senior Adviser (Psychiatry) in 1965, studied the Morale of Battle Casualties in the Indo-Pakistan Conflict of Sept 1965. It was decided to study the mental health of the battle casualties in the 1971 conflict on similar lines. A random sample of 110 battle casualties was taken out of the total that were evacuated to this hospital between 4th—16th Dec. 71. These patients were able to cooperate with tests on admission between those dates. The tests consisted of a questionnaire and a psychiatric interview by the authors. An attempt was also made to compare the data with the results obtained by Col Kirpal Singh in 1965. The 110 patients consisted of the following categories :—

Officers.....	17
JCOs.....	4
NCOs.....	25
Ors.....	64
<hr/>	
Total	110

There was only one Major. The majority of the officers were SSRC, Lieutenants, and 2nd Lieutenants.

The mental health of these 4 sub-groups was analysed and the results are shown in table I.

**TABLE—I**  
**Comparative Mental Health Score**

S.No.	Category	N	Score	S.D.	Max. Score	%	CR
A	Officers	17	27	3.73	32	84.38	A—B=1.28 insignificant
B	Jcos'	4	29	1.25	32	92.63	A—G=3.13 significant at 0.05 level
C	Ncos'	25	30	2.20	32	97	A—D=1.63 significant at 0.10 level
D	Sepoys	64	30	2.01	32	97	B—C=1.11 insignificant B—D=1.9 significant at 0.10 level C—D=0.00 insignificant

Comparisons showed that the mental health of the officer group was slightly, though significantly lower, than that of the other three groups, and that of the JCOs was also lower than that of the NCOs and ORs. This may be due to the increased mental tension and anxiety of responsibilities placed on them during the conflict. Since most of the officers in this sample were young SSRC officers, anxiety about the future was also a prominent factor. The Government policy not to invalide them helped greatly to relieve this mental stress and to improve their mental health.

Table II shows the influence of previous field service on the mental health of the battle casualty :—

TABLE—II  
Effect of Field Service  
Mental Health Score

S.No.	Category	N	Score	S.D.	%	
1	Having field service	95	30	2.06	97	CR=1.95 significant at 0.05 level
2	Having no field service	15	28	2.73	87.5	

This table shows that having previous field experience definitely had a beneficial influence on the mental health of the battle casualty. Battle inoculation and field service are therefore essential factors for preparation for War. There are some services (eg AMC) where young officers do not get enough field service for various reasons. If our basic purpose is Defence of the country, this aspect should be given due consideration.

Table III shows that marital status has no significant influence on the mental health of the battle casualty.

TABLE—III  
Marital Status and Mental Health

S.No.	Category	N	Score	%	SD	Total Score	
1	Married	80	29	92.62	2.67	32	CR=000 insignificant
2	Unmarried	30	29	92.62	2.50	32	

This finding is identical with the finding of last year's study of the psychological aspects of Paraplegic patients.

Table IV shows the relationship of Age with the Mental Health of the battle casualty.

TABLE—IV  
Age and Mental Health

S.No.	Category	N	Score	%	S.D	Total Score	CR
A	16-25	60	29	92.63	3.04	32	A&B=1.73 significant at 0.01 level
B	25.1-35	41	30	97	2.7	32	A&C=0.06 insignificant at 0.01 level
C	35.1-45	9	29	92.63	3.03	32	B&C=1.88 significant at 0.10 level

This table shows that the mental health of the casualties between the ages 25.1 to 35 yrs was significantly better than either the younger age group 16-25 years and the older age groups 35.1 to 45 yrs. This probably accounts for the finding that the JCOs, who belonged to the older age group were more anxious than the NCOs or ORs.

Table V shows the relationship between the educational status and mental health of the battle casualties :—

TABLE—V  
Educational Status and Mental Health

S.No.	Category	N	Score	%	S.D	Total Score	CR
A	Illiterate	39	30.47	95.22	2.01	32	A&B=1.11 insignificant
B	Below X class	38	29.5	92	2.38	32	A&C=2.26 significant at 0.01 level
C	Above X class	33	28.36	87.5	2.53	32	B&C=1.13 insignificant

This table shows that the illiterate group were better adjusted mentally to their injuries than the semi-educated or educated groups. The educated group eg. the officer class, was more apprehensive about the future than the ORs and NCOs, who were probably more fatalistic in their outlook, and hence did not show so much anxiety.

Table VI shows the relationship between the Mental Health scores and the family tradition of having relatives in the Armed Forces.

TABLE—VI

**Family Tradition and Mental Health**

S.N.	Category	N	Score	S.D	%	Total Score	CR
A	Relation in Army	64	29.45	2.67	92.62	32	0.00 insignificant
B	No Relation in Army	46	29.45	2.53	92.62	32	

This showed absolutely no difference between the two groups and supports the abolition of the distinction between the martial and non-martial communities.

Finally, the mental health of these battle casualties was compared with the health of the 1965 casualties. This is shown in table VII.

TABLE—VII

**Comparative Mental Health Scores**

Year	Number	Mean Morale Score	CR
1965	69	73%	7.46 significant at 0.01 level
1971	110	93%	

This table showed that the mental health of the battle casualties in this recent conflict was significantly higher than in 1965.

Analysis of the data showed that there were several reasons for this. The most important factors were :—

- (a) One hundred per cent of the casualties were convinced that our Forces were much better equipped than in 1965 and that they were definitely superior to the Pakistan Army.
- (b) One hundred per cent of the casualties were of the opinion that the welfare of their families would be adequately looked after by their units, even if they were killed/wounded in action. This indicated a very high state of morale of the troops and much better organisation and preparedness for the conflict.
- (c) There was much better inspiration from the military and political leaders, which strengthened the individual ego of even the weaker personalities, so that they did not break down.
- (d) The short duration of the conflict (only 14 days) with no cumulative effects of exhaustion and so on.
- (e) The fact that victory was being achieved very quickly on the Eastern Front.

### PART III

#### MENTAL HEALTH OF CASUALTIES REMAINING IN HOSPITAL

There were 38 battle casualties remaining in the Command Hospital Lucknow in October 1972. These casualties consisted of the following :—

Traumatic Paraplegia...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7
For RSC (Reconstructed Plastic Surgery)...	...	...	...	...	...	...	11
Neuro Surgical Ward...	...	...	...	...	...	...	7
Eye & ENT...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2
Surgical...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8
Officer & JCO...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3 (2+1)
Total							38

It was decided to study the mental health of these long-term cases, believing that they would be a representative sample of those remaining in other hospitals also. These patients were again interviewed by the authors and their attitudes and problems were analysed with regard to the following :—

- (a) Service (unit etc)
- (b) Hospital facilities
- (c) The family of the wounded patient

(d) Society in general

(e) Welfare activities

The following table shows the results of this survey :—

TABLE VIII

S. No.	Factor	Attitude		
		% positive (good)	% Negative (bad)	% Uncertain
1	Service	90%	5%	5%
2	The hospital	90%	10%	Nil
3	The Family	85%	5%	10%
4	Society in general	5%	30%	65%
5	Welfare activities	5%	50%	45%

This analysis showed that there is a lowering of morale and deterioration of the mental health of these long-term battle casualties. However, this deterioration is not significantly increased by the first three factors shown in the table i.e. service, hospital and the family. These soldiers believe that the service, hospital and their families are still treating them well. There are a few grouses and complaints which are probably due to prolonged hospitalisation and frustration about the future. This was also brought out in our paper at the Symposium on Paraplegia held at the last AFMRC Meeting in 1972.

The two main factors which appear to account significantly for the deterioration are the welfare activities and the reaction of society now that the war is over. Most of these long term casualties have lost faith in the society which had been so active and enthusiastic during the war. This reaction is only to be expected considering the great enthusiasm shown in those days by large numbers of visiting VIPs, associations and organisations, compared to the conditions existing today. It is probable that if such enthusiasm had been more restrained and correctly channelised, this "let down" feeling would have been less acutely felt by these unfortunate individuals. 65% of those long term cases are uncertain about the future and how society in general will receive them after they have been discharged from hospital. 30% already have formed negative or bad opinions, some resulting from actual experiences. A casualty, returning from sick leave, requested a railway station official to help him secure a berth in a train. He was rebuffed with the reply that there were thousands of such casualties and no one could bother about them now. He returned to hospital in a most depressed state.

Another officer, unable to adjust to the job he has been given because of his defective vision, having lost one eye in Bangla Desh, had started drinking alcohol excessively in an attempt to forget his frustrations and disappointments.

The tempo of welfare activities has also declined considerably and this has adversely affected the mental health of the long-term battle casualties. As long as the soldier is in hospital, he continues to get his pay and hence no acute financial distress is present now. But there is considerable anxiety about what will happen after he is invalided out, as then the financial problems will become more intense. Some feel that some of the welfare schemes are impractical. For example, four of these soldiers have been offered facilities to open Coca Cola/Gold Spot or Tea stalls. Three of these are in places where such stalls are valueless e.g. in the cold hilly regions or in villages where such things are not being brought. They are therefore despondent about the future. There appear to be inadequate coordination between the Rehabilitation organisations and the hospitals.

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971 produced a such smaller number of psychiatric casualties than was expected. One of the causes may have been the defect in reporting of battle casualties, ie, the definition of a battle casualty which excludes mental trauma. It is recommended that the definition of a battle casualty should be reviewed to include mental traumas, not only for correct statistics but also so that these individuals may benefit from the rehabilitation schemes.

2. The mental health of the battle casualties was much better than in the 1965 conflict. Several reasons have been discussed.

3. The mental health of the long-term battle casualties has slightly deteriorated. The two important factors are the neglect by society and the slowing of the tempo of welfare activities. The initial enthusiasm of society during the war needs to be restrained and channelised if this "let down" is to be avoided. Also there should be closer cooperation between the hospitals and the Rehabilitation Organisations.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank Col. HS Seth, Commanding Officer of the Command Hospital (CC), Lucknow, for permission to carry out this work, and to the patients and staff for their help and cooperation.

### REFERENCES

1. D'netto TB, et al—"Psychological Aspects of Paraplegia" AFMJ (I) July 72
2. Kirpal Singh—"Morale of Battle Casualties (Indo-Pakistan Conflict) Sep. 65" Ind. J. PSY 1967, 9 (I) 95—107.
3. Precis On "Administration In War" Scmo.  
Course—12 OTS, AMC Centre and School, Lucknow.



# INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE GREAT POWERS

(A Review Article)

P.K. MISHRA

THE South Asian region has drawn the major attention of the major powers only in the latter half of the century. Before that Great Britain alone as a colonial power had preponderant influence in the region. The major areas of conflict in the global context were located far away from the subcontinent. Rather under British hegemony, it was comparatively a zone of peace. But the situation drastically changed after the partition of British India into two successor states based on the superficial disparity between the Hindus and the Muslims. Whatever may be the genesis of partition, there is no doubt about the fear that mutual distrust and animosity between India and Pakistan was only a natural byproduct. Just a simple glance at the mutual dealings between these two countries during the last twenty-five years makes one feel so. From a zone of peace, the subcontinent has gradually become one of the trouble spots in the world. And obviously all the major powers, who were competing for a unique role in international politics, were drawn into the regional conflicts between the two major actors in South Asia. Therefore during the last decade a growing amount of literature on the comparative role of the major powers in the subcontinent has been found from the Western scholars, especially from the United States. William J. Barnd's book<sup>1</sup> is certainly one of the few objective interpretation in this field. Among the major powers, he has picked up the United States, Soviet Union and China, for obvious reasons. It has not been as he himself concedes a more chronological study of the external policies of the major powers towards India and Pakistan. Rather he has taken certain basic issues confronting this region and has thrown light on the interaction of all these powers. Sometimes he has noticed points of convergence amongst some of the major powers and at other times the divergent approaches taken by them.

At the outset he throws light on the domestic pressures and problems confronting India and Pakistan. South Asian history has given him a deep insight into the foundation of Pakistan and India's foreign policies. In his own words it is "a study of South Asian Political environment in the years when Hindus and Muslims were contending with each other and the British for control of the subcontinent" (Preface, p. xi) and this

---

1. India, Pakistan and the Great Powers by William J. Barnds, Pall Mall, London, 1972 pp388 Price-£ 4.25.

mutual animosity has "created and articulated" the foreign policies of both India and Pakistan.

In his introductory chapter he focuses attention on the comparative perception of great powers' interest in the subcontinent, which constituted 18 per cent of the world's population and the two major actors within this subsystem being locked in unyielding hostility that erupted into war thrice. The United States, which was only a peripheral power to this region, became seriously involved in the affairs of the subcontinent after the Korean War. It was period which "marked the beginning of the end of colonialism". The motive behind the U S involvement as interpreted by the author was to see that India and Pakistan became secure both politically and economically so as to cooperate with the West and to hold the Communists at arm's length. So the US role in South Asia was a natural byproduct of its overall global policy. But it is rather too simplistic an explanation. What is possibly overlooked is that the US, which emerged as a Super Power after World War II wanted to fill the vacuum created by the exit of major European nations from the Indian Ocean areas. On the other hand the USSR and China are in geographical proximity to the subcontinent. The former is a "mature Marxist society" and the latter a "young revolutionary Marxist state". Both were once close allies but are now pursuing sharply contrasting policies towards the affairs in the subcontinent. The Soviet Union tried to demonstrate to the new nations of Asia and Middle East that they had nothing to fear if they decided to remain non-aligned. China wanted to demonstrate to the world that if the underdeveloped countries became Communist, they would succeed in their task of modernization. Moreover as the author rightly feels, the intraregional interaction in the subcontinent greatly influenced the foreign policy motivations and perceptions of the great powers. In his opinion "international political relations in South Asia are so closely intertwined that a change in one nation's policy almost invariably leads to a shift-sometime subtle, sometimes dramatic—in the policies of other nations."

The other thing which is clear in the South Asian scene is that all the great powers without proper knowledge of the area and the people are likely to be enmeshed in any regional conflicts, whenever they decide to exploit for their own advantages. Moreover India and Pakistan, in the opinion of the author, are prime examples of weak countries "exploiting great power rivalries", by virtue of "skillful leadership" for their own benefit.

In the first part of his treatise, he diagnoses the basis of partition and its aftermath. India which directly succeeded the former British India luckily inherited a well-trained bureaucracy, a tradition of parliamentary democracy and all the resources which could make a nation both economically and politically viable. But Pakistan was less fortunate from the

beginning, although it got a substantial share in the divisions of the assets of the predecessor state. As a matter of fact its political elites were less disciplined and more prone to nepotism and corruption. Pakistan as a nation could survive in the initial stage mainly because of a strong bureaucracy and a well-disciplined army. Nehru who used to speak on New India's international image even before independence, was instrumental in shaping the foundations of India's foreign policy. Pakistan had to run through a political crisis immediately after its birth, with the death of a charismatic personality like Jinnah and the assassination of his lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan.

One basic observation of the author in the chapter on "Independence, Partition and Conflict" is that Hindu-Muslim communalism, the historic curse of the subcontinent, had led step by step to an unyielding hostility that imprisoned the leadership and peoples of India and Pakistan". This point has already been emphasized earlier. Another significant observation in this part is that certain amount of "artificiality" existed in the foreign policy issues of India and Pakistan. Rather both were major factors in deciding each other's foreign policy. India's non-alignment policy, in his observation, was more or less dictated by its internal weaknesses and the pressing need for economic, social and political development rather than ambition to play any special role in global politics. But he concedes that this policy along with anti-colonialism heightened the image of India in Third World countries. Although he has all through maintained a sympathetic attitude towards Pakistan, he feels that Pakistan's determination to capture Kashmir from India was an extremely ambitious goal. Moreover "although Indo-Pakistani relationship was the central issue for both the countries, for Pakistan it assumed transcendent importance". Again he strongly feels that Pakistan drifting towards the Western alliance system was more dictated by its internal needs and the ambition to fight India from a position of strength.

The United States, as a reaction to Nehru's non-alignment policy, decided to cultivate Pakistan as a close ally. While analysing its gradual involvement in the affairs of the subcontinent, the author derives certain interesting conclusions. For instance, although the entry of China into the Korean War, forced the United States and India to come closer, it brought to limelight their divergent approaches about policies towards the communist nations. Another interesting observation about the basic reason for the United States allying with Pakistan was that "it said less, spoke less moralistically and what it did say was not as widely reported". His explicit view that the U.S. was generally associated with the weaker party is not substantiated by its stand on the West Asian crisis. Although the Soviet Union and India have gradually come closer, it is interpreted that their friendship is more superficial than real. The Soviet Union had to balance its ideological considerations on the one hand and its national

interest and power on the other. When India was involved in territorial disputes with both China and Pakistan, the author suggests that it should have sought a compromise with either one so as to be better able to face the other. But the basic problem was wheather India could compromise its self-respect so as to fight from a position of strength.

When South Asia was engulfed in inter-regional and intraregional conflicts during the last decade it is interesting to study the comparative attitude of the great powers. During the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962 the U.S. took a sympathetic attitude towards India and even went to the extent of giving some arms support much against the annoyance of Pakistani ruling elites, Although the Sino-Soviet rift was increasing, the Soviet Union was still trapped in the dilemma of a friend and an ally. During the Indo-Pak war of 1965 the U.S. and China clearly stood behind Pakistan, while the Soviet Union was silently observing the developments. The Soviet Union gave equivocal support to India during the latter's conflict with Pakistan in 1971. One basic observation of the author about Pakistan's cultivation of friendship, with China was that Chinese praise of Pakistan's unremitting struggles' against foreign pressure were distinct assets for a nation seeking status in the Afro-Asian world. He also clearly admits that the Soviet Union "has firmly entrenched" as the major power in South Asia. Commenting upon American policy towards the subcontinent during the last decade he strongly feels that "a greater emphasis on economic development and a more flexible and more modest arms supply programme would have served U.S. interests—as well as those of India and Pakistan-somewhat better than the policies actually pursued."

The author devotes one full part on America's role in South Asia. In his opinion a rather unique aspect of US foreign policy perception is "its lack of involvement except when confronted with acute threst to its security". Even some Americans have raised their voice against increasing foreign aid on the ground that the ruling elites thereby postpone drastic social or economic reforms. But the author cautions the policy makers in Pentagon against equating India and Pakistan in terms of foreign aid. Moreover he is also critical about continuance of the U.S. alliance with Pakistan on the ground that it perpetuates "an anachronistic and meaningless relationship." After the set backs in Vietnam there is increasing realization in the United States against any sort of "international responsibility." As regards the two basic problems of South Asia i.e. Indo-Pak conflict and Sino-Indian hostility, US policy-makers are convinced about their limited ability to play any significant role. The U.S. is not in a position even to determine what these countries regard as their vital national interests. The author strongly emphasises the necessity of economic growth in South Asia and the special role that the U.S. can play to safeguard its own interest. In his opinion China and Russia

are not in a position to play any significant role because of their internal limitations. The author has also some doubts about any possibility of Sino-India detents because of "Peking's suspicions that New Delhi is a tool of US and Soviet efforts to encircle China and Indian worries that Peking is committed to fomenting revolution in India." Even as regards better Indo-Pakistan relations he is quite sceptical, especially when the book was written at a time when the Bangladesh crisis was acute and the two major countries in South-Asia were on the verge of war. However many of his predictions have not come true. After the last war the leaders of both Pakistan and India have taken certain pragmatic steps for creating an atmosphere of peace and tranquility in the subcontinent. Even contrary to his expectation the Nixon Administration has stepped up its military aid to Pakistan. Indo-American relations even now continue to remain at a low pitch. The United States recent moves on South Asia are not in anyway conducive to a healthy atmosphere in the region. Although there is an increasing concern among Americans about the failure of their present government at the home front, the policy-makers at the Pentagon would not like to shed their responsibility as of "an international peace maker". Although the author has maintained certain bias towards Pakistan, this work is more or less an objective assessment of the major power's role in the subcontinent. Especially it has thrown some new challenges to the American policy-makers.

# ARMS AND STRATEGY : AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF MODERN DEFENCE

(A Review Article)

MAJOR GENERAL TNR NAYAR, PVSM

MAN has always wanted to get hold of the Absolute Weapon. In modern times Absolute Activity is directed towards this, motivated by fear of fellow men. In the process, a pageantry of weapons has appeared on the scene. In the ever changing technological context, more and more human resources and emotions are being dedicated towards this. The Super powers who have surpassed their satiety for nuclear armaments are now indulged in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. A number of agreements have also been reached, though the basic problems have yet to be tackled. If they use even a fraction of their weapons, our civilization will be pushed back to the dark ages. Robert McNamara once stated that the US had the ability to kill 74 Million Russians and wipe out 76% industrial capacity. Assuredly, the Russians have a similar capacity. Preventing such disasters has become a live problem; for a coterie of ill-balanced people could gain power and do inestimable damage. The danger is on the increase as cheaper nuclear weapons are becoming available. The hijackers have demonstrated to what extent human depravity could proceed. The desideratum of faith is universal.

*"Arms and Strategy"* \* by Laurence Martin gives briefly, but in a graphic manner the evolution of armament since the Second World War. His revelation in Central Nuclear Balance is thought provoking, for historically the balance of power policy has failed to preserve peace. The strategic application of nuclear power will end the known human civilization, and as such the detente between the Super powers must be welcomed by all. Let us hope that it will not gather momentum to disrupt the herculean attempts being made by the developing countries to meet the basic human wants of their peoples.

The future Great Wars, if they occur, will be fought with weapons in

---

\*Arms and Strategy: An International Survey of Modern Defence by Laurence Martin, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973. pp 320 Price-£ 4.75.

the armoury. Escalation will be rapid, and there will be no time to rectify even unintentional mistakes. Conventional battles will be three-dimensional, with missiles gradually taking the lead. No longer will the tested team of Panzers, artillery, and aircraft be able to rule the battlefield. Anti-tank and air defence weapon systems have staged a comeback, and because of their comparatively low cost could be procured in much larger numbers. Their efficacy was demonstrated during the fourth Arab-Israeli War. In the more sophisticated wars, armored helicopters and sky cavalry may be expected to participate. In other theatres, the tanks and assault aircraft are still left with imagination. A very high degree of training and control will be necessary. Night fighting capability and vertical envelopment are on the increase. Generally, the defensive has the upper hand, though surprise continues to be the most potent weapon and by exploiting it the attacker could produce results. The cost of weapons has increased very many fold. To quote one example, depending on the weapons employed, a modern helicopter may cost as much as \$8,00,000.

The pattern of future air battle has been altered by avionics, electronics and missiles. The cost of aircraft has perhaps increased more than that of any thing else. Compared to a Spitfire, an F5 is about 200 times more expensive, the costs being 10,000 pounds and \$ 1,600,000 respectively. The rapidity with which such expensive equipment becomes outdated is alarmingly fast. In this field, even marginal superiority could prove to be decisive. The training of men, and the maintenance of equipment are also proving to be extremely expensive. The VTOL, and the pilotless aircraft have yet to be introduced in large numbers.

Nuclear submarines and nuclear missiles have changed the naval battle. Perhaps in the sea, tactical nuclear weapons could be used with lesser risk of escalation. Costs are again fantastic; the new US aircraft carrier *Dwight Eisenhower* is expected to cost about \$ 500,000,000. Ship to ship action may not recur. Small, missile carrying boats have great future, in the battles of lesser developed countries. The big difficulty advanced naval powers are experiencing is in the timely location of submarines.

Even a casual survey will reveal that our globe is divided into very many segments of varying layers. Politically and militarily there are many pacts like NATO and Warsaw Pact. Economically, the division is even more confused. The EEC, Japan, Soviet Russia and USA have all competitive interests. Ideologically and nationally there are quite a few other fences like the Chinese, the Arabs and so on. Perhaps the most serious one is the border and national disputes between the USSR

# ARMS AND STRATEGY : AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF MODERN DEFENCE

(A Review Article)

MAJOR GENERAL TNR NAYAR, PVSM

MAN has always wanted to get hold of the Absolute Weapon. In modern times Absolute Activity is directed towards this, motivated by fear of fellow men. In the process, a pageantry of weapons has appeared on the scene. In the ever changing technological context, more and more human resources and emotions are being dedicated towards this. The Super powers who have surpassed their satiety for nuclear armaments are now indulged in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. A number of agreements have also have reached, though the basic problems have yet to be tackled. If they use even a fraction of their weapons, our civilization will be pushed back to the dark ages. Robert McNamara once stated that the US had the ability to kill 74 Million Russians and wipe out 76% industrial capacity. Assuredly, the Russians have a similar capacity. Preventing such disasters has become a live problem; for a coterie of ill-balanced people could gain power and do inestimable damage. The danger is on the increase as cheaper nuclear weapons are becoming available. The hijackers have demonstrated to what extent human depravity could proceed. The desideratum of faith is universal.

*"Arms and Strategy"* \* by Laurence Martin gives briefly, but in a graphic manner the evolution of armament since the Second World War. His revelation in Central Nuclear Balance is thought provoking, for historically the balance of power policy has failed to preserve peace. The strategic application of nuclear power will end the known human civilization, and as such the detente between the Super powers must be welcomed by all. Let us hope that it will not gather momentum to disrupt the herculian attempts being made by the developing countries to meet the basic human wants of their peoples.

The future Great Wars, if they occur, will be fought with weapons in

---

\*Arms and Strategy: An International Survey of Modern Defence by Laurence Martin, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973. pp 320 Price-£ 4.75.



the armoury. Escalation will be rapid, and there will be no time to rectify even unintentional mistakes. Conventional battles will be three-dimensional, with missiles gradually taking the lead. No longer will the tested team of Panzers, artillery, and aircraft be able to rule the battlefield. Anti-tank and air defence weapon systems have staged a comeback, and because of their comparatively low cost could be procured in much larger numbers. Their efficacy was demonstrated during the fourth Arab-Israeli War. In the more sophisticated wars, armored helicopters and sky cavalry may be expected to participate. In other theatres, the tanks and assault aircraft are still left with imagination. A very high degree of training and control will be necessary. Night fighting capability and vertical envelopment are on the increase. Generally, the defensive has the upper hand, though surprise continues to be the most potent weapon and by exploiting it the attacker could produce results. The cost of weapons has increased very many fold. To quote one example, depending on the weapons employed, a modern helicopter may cost as much as \$8,00,000.

The pattern of future air battle has been altered by avionics, electronics and missiles. The cost of aircraft has perhaps increased more than that of any thing else. Compared to a Spitfire, an F5 is about 200 times more expensive, the costs being 10,000 pounds and \$ 1,600,000 respectively. The rapidity with which such expensive equipment becomes outdated is alarmingly fast. In this field, even marginal superiority could prove to be decisive. The training of men, and the maintenance of equipment are also proving to be extremely expensive. The VTOL, and the pilotless aircraft have yet to be introduced in large numbers.

Nuclear submarines and nuclear missiles have changed the naval battle. Perhaps in the sea, tactical nuclear weapons could be used with lesser risk of escalation. Costs are again fantastic ; the new US aircraft carrier *Dwight Eisenhower* is expected to cost about \$ 500,000,000. Ship to ship action may not recur. Small, missile carrying boats have great future, in the battles of lesser developed countries. The big difficulty advanced naval powers are experiencing is in the timely location of submarines.

Even a casual survey will reveal that our globe is divided into very many segments of varying layers. Politically and militarily there are many pacts like NATO and Warsaw Pact. Economically, the division is even more confused. The EEC, Japan, Soviet Russia and USA have all competitive interests. Ideologically and nationally there are quite a few other fences like the Chinese, the Arabs and so on. Perhaps the most serious one is the border and national disputes between the USSR

and the Chinese. Today, the most powerful troop concentrations backed up with nuclear weapons are here. The developing countries have their own regional problems. Consequent to all these, arms trade with the Third World has reached alarming proportions. Non-communist powers has projections to sell about \$ 35 billion worth of equipment between 64-75. Diplomatic alignments and profit motives pervade in these deals. It is also an opportunity to pass on to other countries the extremely heavy cost of modern Research and Development, in the form of equipment which are generally one generation behind.

To live upto the old dictum 'eternal vigilance is the price of liberty', modern nations are spending astronomical amounts on defence, at the cost of nation building activities. In terms of GNP, both the US and the USSR are spending about 10%. In real terms, this would amount to about 78 and 60 billion dollars. But true costs cannot be found out as very many defence activities are hidden under various other projects. For example, in Aerospace Industries alone 1,400,000 persons are employed in the US. Critical resources in finance, manpower, and technology of the developing countries are tied up in defence. Such is the force of mutual fear of human beings in this century.

The United Nations is a mute and powerless spectator in the midst of all these arisings. While the concept of One World is known and accepted by all, the powerful countries are showing an astonishing reluctance to part with even a fraction of their prosperity for the good of the rest of the mankind. If these countries can ensure peace, and divert even two per cent of their GNP, the lot of the developing countries would change rapidly. Perhaps the detente which has been established between the Super-powers will grow stronger and spread, for the benefit of all. One lesson which stands out in the progress of man is that 'fear will never conquer fear'. A re-examination of the very certitudes of our civilization, brick by brick is necessary to find out the cause for fear, and to take remedial actions. Until this is achieved, countries big and small have no option but to continue as they are now doing. Laurence Martin's book makes it clear beyond doubt as to where this approach will lead them to. Lately there have been signs of world statesmen realizing that there is a severe limitation to the resources available, and also that man must exercise restraint while tampering with nature's balance. But until such realization bring out practical benefits, regretfully every man must admit that 'Of All This I am A Part'.

## BOOK REVIEWS

NELSON THE COMMANDER

by Geoffrey Bennett

(Published by B.T. Batsford, London, 1972) pp 322 Price £ 3.90

**H**ORATIO Nelson remains a father figure in the annals of the Royal Navy. As an officer he combined in himself the quality of tactfulness, devotion to duty and farsightedness. All these rare qualities in him has inspired Captain Geoffrey Bennet, a sailor turned historian, to write a stimulating biography.

Bennet begins his story by projecting in the eye of the readers the divergent characterisation of Nelson as a man and as a commander. His personal treatment to his wife and emotional attachment with Emma (Lady Hamilton) is not looked with favour by many. But then his professional achievements in the Royal Navy far outweighs the minor blemishes in his personal life. The author forcefully presents him as a master strategist, a skilled tactician, a shrewd diplomat. The star-quality in him also made him a great naval officer.

Nelson was born in a staunch protestant house-hold in the country of Norfolk in 1758 and was deprived of his mother's love and sympathy because of her untimely death. But he inculcated from her the feeling of hatred for the French. He was soon attracted to a career in the Navy. From 1776, when he was appointed acting-lieutenant, until 1805 when as Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean he destroyed the combined fleets in the battle fought off Cape Trafalgar, he displayed enormous courage and leadership in battle operation. Sometimes he even didn't hesitate to act contrary to the order given by his superior Commander and naturally his victory for England at the battles of Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar was historic.

The author, while reflecting on the legacy left by Nelson not only to the British Navy but to the Fleets of all nations, writes : "Nelson's pursuit of Brueys, his urge to press on to Reval, his chase after Villeneuve, and his blockades of Toulon and of Cadiz both designed to encourage the enemy to sortie and so be brought to action plus the importance he attached to annihilating the enemy, all these are abundant evidence of an exceptional understanding of naval strategy (p. 293). He has narrated the life history of a great man in such a lucid style that it makes pleasant reading. With an historian's insight he has given at the end of each chapter a chronological account of Nelson's life and related events.

—PKM

ROBERT BLAKE : GENERAL-AT-SEA

by J.R. Powell

(Published by Collins, London, 1972) pp 352—Price £ 5.00

**I**N the military history of a nation, there were some who got recognition because they deserved it, there were some on whom recognition was thrust upon by sheer chance, but there were still others who never

got recognition even if they deserved it. Robert Blake fits into the third category when one looks at the history of the English Navy in the seventeenth century. He was like the backbone behind Cromwell in fighting against the Royalist forces.

J.R. Powell, the biographer, has spent a number of years to research and assemble the broken threads and to finally project a lively image of Robert Blake, General-at-Sea. Being born in a noble and respectable family of England, Blake had enough of opportunities to rise. He was given the best possible education at King Jame's School and at Wadham College, Oxford. Despatches about his early life also project him as a "man of action accustomed to go straight to the heart of the matter". (p. 14) He was deeply religious from his very childhood and was a Presbyterian by belief. Beginning with a career in the mercantile navy, he finally emerged as an outstanding commander in naval warfare. Commenting upon his towering personality and outstanding military skill, the author writes, "The vigour of his defence, which allowed the enemy no time to consolidate, which answered bombardment with cannon fire, attack with sortie, all bear the marks of Blake's military genius." (p. 39). It was he who first asserted the supremacy of British naval power in the mediterranean and overpowered the great admirals of his day like Tromp, De-Ruyter and De With. In the opinion of the author he was "never personally ambitious and his refusal to hitch his wagon to the rising star of Cromwell simply sprang from his desire to serve the Commonwealth as best as he could". (p. 85)

Judging by the standards of warfare in the seventeenth century, Blake displayed enough skill in waging a tactical war against the enemy vessels. The author is full of admiration for him when he writes, "Blakes confidence in the strength of his ships, the superior weight of their gunfire with the cool and collected way with which his men had served them, 'never shooting in a hurry', with the high morale of all the ranks, had been justified even in the critical moments". (p. 216). His was an example of naval courage and bold and responsible achievements. Although he died the death of an obscure general, his life and achievements in the opinion of the author should be reevaluated by historians. This biography should be an asset to any institution on military research.

—PKM

#### THEORIES OF PEACE AND SECURITY

ed. by John Garnet

(Published by Macmillan, London, 1970) pp 272 Price £ 1.00

**T**HE problem of peace has been attracting the attention of scholars over the decades for understanding which one has necessarily to gain an insight into international politics through the analyses of international conflicts and wars. A knowledge of modern strategies thus becomes useful and that is why in spite of initial opposition, strategic studies have been included in the curricula of a number of universities. Strategy, in the words of Andre Beaufre, is "the art of dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute" (*An Introduction to Strategy*, p. 22).

The question of peace is intimately related to that of strategy & there are four theories to it. First comes the theory of deterrence meaning the promotion of peace and security when the potential enemies are deterred from attacking each other for fear of heavy retaliation. The second theory is that of disarmament which aims at the reduction and abolition of the means of war. Thirdly, we have the theory of arms control that goes for the skilful management of arms policies. Finally, the theory of limited war, much in vogue, that strives for the control and limiting the amount of military force to international conflicts.

Apart from the first three articles, those compiled in the present volume have been grouped round these four theories which are interrelated. Though the editor's professed aim here is to make the present volume useful for undergraduate students, actually it is helpful to the experts inasmuch as the articles have been completed by eminent scholars in the field. In the opening article of Part II titled "Military Power and International Order" Michael Howard observes that military power has become an inseparable part of the international order, without which international relations can hardly be carried on. This cue has been taken on by Klaus Knorr who says that though territorial aggrandizement brings fewer advantages to the victor than it used to, there remains plenty of other goals the achievement of which is dependent on military strength. A slightly different point of view has been focussed by Thomas Schelling, according to whom military strength offers a kind of leverage which can easily be exploited by vicious diplomacy. Whether or not one agrees with the above propositions, it has got to be admitted that these three articles by way of general introduction, help in subsequent analysis and reasoning.

Part III of the book deals with the theory of deterrence and Bernard Brodie's article "The Anatomy of Deterrence" gives a sound theoretical treatment of the meaning and implication of nuclear deterrence. It is one of the best pieces on the topic. The concept 'of credibility' and the logic of deterrence has been examined by Glenn Snyder, which also serves as a good background for further probe into the subject. The issue of ballistic missile defence has been ably analysed by Laurence Martin who relates it with the overall strategic balance as well as the 'balance of terror' whose impact in international politics may sometimes be crucial.

Part IV dealing with the theory of disarmament starts with an extract from Inis Claude's masterpiece *Swords into Ploughshares*. Here the main contention of Mr. Claude is that the obstacles to disarmament are chiefly political rather than technical. Hedley Bull, in his penetrating article "Disarmament and International System" brings out the negative aspect of the problem and questions the practicability of disarmament, because, he says, it would merely destroy the existing set-up of international relations. In his stand against disarmament, he may be taken as an advocate of the present arms race and a champion for Super Power 'bossism', and there are a number of thinkers who do not see eye to eye with him. In his inimitable article "Tensions, Political Settlement and Disarmament" David Singer studies the interrelationship between armaments and political tension and he says that so long as 'threat perception' remains between the potential rivals, disarmament may not be achieved.

Though the objective of the theory of arms control is much more modest than that of disarmament, Robert Bowie in his "Basic Requirements of Arms Control" reminds his readers that it may not be so easily achieved and in the same vein Wayland Young in the concluding essay in section V hints at the inherent difficulty of verifying statements made about the adherence to any arms control measure. Thomas Schelling, whose article on "Surprise Attack and Disarmament" comes in between these two, explains that the concept of deterrence may help the arms control policy of the states.

The final part, is concerned with the issue of limited war, and begins with an extract from Bernard Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age*. With the inevitable efflux of time, much of the discussion is a bit outdated, yet his ideas on the theory and meaning of limited war retains much of its usefulness. Morton Halperin analyses some of the restraints that may prevent escalation, whereas Herman Kahn has elaborately dealt with the question of escalation which in modern times has become a deliberate instrument of state policy.

This book thus considers the role of military force in international politics and tries to point out very pithily how it can be manipulated to promote a peaceful and secure world. In the introductory part the editor ably epitomises the trends of thought contained in the articles collected here and a select bibliography adds to the value of the book all the more.

ARB

#### PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR

By SYDNEY D. BAILEY

(Published by Oxford University Press, London, 1972) pp 194 Price £1.00

A major controversy in the international law of war is how to determine if a particular armed conflict between two nations is just or not. Again it is difficult to indicate a dividing line between international war and internal war. Has international morality developed sufficiently so as to enforce the necessary restraints in warfare amongst nations? Here is an objective attempt by a British scholar to find answers to these basic questions.

Sydney D. Bailey has divided his treatise into five parts. Initially he has a searching look at the code of ethics for just war as enunciated by Christian fathers, both Catholic and Protestant. Beginning from St. Ambrose and St. Augustine to Luther and Calvin, the majority of them represented the non-pacifist school. According to them the monarch who enjoyed sovereign power was perfectly justified to wage an offensive or defensive war but he was to observe certain conditions like protection of innocent people, defending the just cause and having a rightful intention to fight out evil. A typical example can be found in St. Augustine accordidg to whom "war's only purpose is to secure peace". But obviously this sounds a little paradoxical in the modern time. There also exists a pacifist minority within the Christian community, who are opposed to any sort of war whatsoever.

Then the author clarifies the real position from the existing international law, especially from the writings of Hugo Grotius. Grotius justifies "limited war in selfdefence" for the enforcement of rights and seek reparation for injury. The modern war, as the author rightly thinks, is a total war where the entire population is mobilized is the war effort. However there are international regulations for crimes against humanity and crimes against peace.

He highlights the pioneering role played by the International Red Cross in the enforcement of just war. In his opinion that philanthropic organisation "combats war by making it more humane". (p. 69) While discussing the protection of human rights in armed conflicts the author throws light on the number of international conferences and resolutions. The International Conference on Human Rights at Teheran in 1968 raised concern at the frequent violation of human rights by racist or colonial regimes. He argues strongly that the distinction between combatants and civilians is threatened by advances in military technology. (p. 95). In his concluding chapter he examines the provisions enunciated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and the N.P.T. Conference held in Geneva in 1968 as regards the control and regulation of chemical bacteriological and nuclear weapons. The author unconvincingly propagates the view that N.P.T. is conducive to the national interests of the Third World countries. In the epilogue he advocates a combined effort by the pacifists and non-pacifists to protect the innocent and avoid unnecessary suffering in armed conflicts. His stand that the principle of noncombatant immunity should be renounced is rather unsound.

—PKM

### THE DEADLY STROKE

By WARREN TUTE

(Published by Collins, London, 1973) pp 221—Price £ 3.00

When France fell in 1940, her ally Britain, left to fight on alone, was gravely worried that the powerful French fleet would fall into German and Italian hands and be used against her.

At the time, some French naval units were in British ports or in ports abroad which were under British control. Their transfer to the enemy could be prevented. But there were others lying in metropolitan French or North African ports, with a very powerful concentration at Oran, where four battleships and several destroyers were assembled.

The British Government ordered Admiral Somerville to take a strong naval force to Oran and to persuade the French warships to either join them or sail with reduced crews to a French port in the West Indies, where they could be demilitarised and perhaps entrusted to the U.S.A. for safe custody till the end of the war. If persuasion failed, force was to be used to prevent the ships from being used by the enemy. Admiral Somerville's units included an aircraft-carrier and battleships.

Warren Tute describes the protracted parleys between the British and French Naval Officers, the intervening hours of suspense and anguish and the final tragic bombardment in which the French fleet, placed in a tactically disadvantageous position, took heavy punishment. Apart from ships lost, 47 officers, 196 petty officers and 1054 ratings were killed and over 300 wounded in a few minutes of combat. The British ships were unscathed and only a few carrier aircraft were lost. Some French units, including one battleship, managed to break out of harbour, evade the British forces and reach France.

The author builds up his story to a poignant, emotion-drenched climax, endeavouring all the time to emphasise the reluctance of the British naval officers to fight the Frenchmen, who were their allies only a few days ago.

The German terms for an armistice with France included a provision for the non-use of the French fleet by the Axis Powers, except for some minesweeping and coastguard units; but the British Government had no faith in German promises and treaties. Admiral Gensoul, the C-in-C of the French naval forces in Oran, was aware of the armistice provisions. He was a proud and sensitive officer and the British ultimatum confronted him with a galling, nerve-wrecking dilemma. In the final analysis, both sides in the naval situation were tools of their Governments, instruments of decisions made by men far removed from the scene of action. Furthermore, there were unfortunate and untimely communications problems and contradictions arising out of misjudgments.

Churchill aptly described the affair as a "Greek tragedy" in which events moved relentlessly towards disaster, despite the efforts of the protagonists to avoid it. The story itself may not carry many profound lessons, though it may recur in history; but the need for tackling such situations with flexible minds and a sensitive understanding of the attitudes, sensibilities and compulsions of the other side is underscored in this dismal tale.

—VEB

## GUERRILLA WARFARE

by Che Guevara

(Published by Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969) pp 142 Price 20 Pence

**G**UERRILLA Warfare may be regarded as something second-rate and degrading by professional officers, but Mao Tse-tung in China and Castro in Cuba have shown the effectiveness of this method of waging war. It therefore deserves attention and this book is a simple and clear analysis of the strategy, tactics and employment of guerilla bands. The author introduces the subject by giving the essentials before such warfare can be waged successfully against an organised army.

The guerilla army has all the characteristics of a bandit gang with one difference. The guerilla fighter has the full support of the people which is missing in bandit gangs, who are hated by the people. For a



guerilla fighter help of inhabitants of the area is an indispensable condition and success depends on the capacity of the people to free themselves from a government that opposes them. These conditions existed in Cuba under Batista and the background is of the mountains and valleys of this tropical island. The two essentials for success emphasised are, a perfect knowledge of the ground and absolute cooperation of the people. This necessitates a study of the zones of operation and explaining the motives of the revolution to the people.

Inflicting of losses on the enemy, without suffering losses, depending on the enemy as a source of arms and ammunition and mobility are some of the fundamental characteristics of this type of warfare. The author compares mobility to a minuet, and this analogy with the dance is interesting. Warfare on favourable and unfavourable ground is followed by a section on suburban warfare in which nocturnal guerilla bands can carry out sabotage and disruption of water supply, sewers, railways and telephones.

The Chapters on Guerilla Band and organisation of the guerilla front have intrinsic military value and could be read with advantage by those whose tasks it is to raise, train or combat such forces. The guerilla soldier should be an ascetic, a sort of guiding angel, helping the poor and bothering the rich as little as possible in the first phases of a war. He must provide an example in his own life and act as a social reformer. In destroying an unjust order emphasis is laid on the moral conduct of guerilla soldiers, on the distribution of excess land, livestock and wealth amongst the people. Audacity, adaptability, inventiveness, surprise and cunning are qualities that are required.

The guerilla fighter should be close-mouthed, adaptable, and, if possible, an inhabitant of the zone. The ideal age for a guerilla soldier, the treatment of prisoners, the equipment and clothing required, and never leaving the wounded companion at the mercy of the enemy have been considered by the author which makes the book rich in content and interesting reading.

On the human side, the fraternity created by the nomadic hard life and the dangerous rivalries that might develop between groups have received attention. Intelligence, training, propaganda, indoctrination and the many facets of war are adequately covered. The role of woman, the jobs she can perform from cook to combatant, the importance of teaching men and women to avoid all kinds of misbehaviour shows the wide ground traversed in the book. There are sketches of a shelter against mortar fire, a rifle adapted to fire a Molotov cocktail and of a hammock. The last chapter which gives an analysis of the Cuban situation may not be of any direct interest but it throws light on Che Guevara himself. Intensely practical, it is a clear analysis of Guerilla warfare.

—VNM

## THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHINESE EARTH

by Keith Buchanan

(Published by G. Bell, London, 1970) pp. 336 Price 65S.

**D**R. Buchanan is a professor of geography in Victoria University, New Zealand. To write this book, he visited the People's Republic of China thrice (in 1958, 1964 and 1966). This is, therefore, no or-

dinary book on China. It is written by a scholar with first-hand knowledge. However, this merit is almost offset by Dr. Buchanan's transparent adoration of China. In fact, he quite flatly states: "I believe that today academic objectivity (regarding China) is impossible.....It will be abundantly evident from what I have written that I lay no claim to this sort of 'academic objectivity'".

Such an abdication is a pity because Dr Buchanan has assembled an impressive set of data and source material. Being a geographer, he has arranged these data to focus the importance of land development in the Chinese scheme of things. The first 100 pages of the book deal mainly with soil and temperature conditions in China. In these pages, the author shows how the Western conception of China as poorly endowed in natural resources has to be drastically altered. In the next hundred pages, Dr. Buchanan discusses the Chinese agricultural regional organisations, especially the way communes are structured. The remaining 130 odd pages deal with miscellaneous topics such as the industrial sector, population growth, and China's intellectual resources. In these pages Dr. Buchanan is clearly ill-informed and relies heavily for his conclusions on other works.

In sum, I would recommend this book only to the China specialist who may be able to benefit after a critical study of the matter contained in the 336 pages.

—SS

#### INDIAN ARMED FORCES YEARBOOK 1971-72

ed. by Jaswant Singh,

(Published by Jaswant Singh, Bombay, 1971) pp 608, Price Rs. 25.00

**I**N modern times warfare is no longer a business of military generals and their army only. With the pervasive expansion of scientific knowledge, it has been attracting the attention of politicians, statesmen, theoreticians as well as international lawyers. Not only this; military studies have been included in the course of studies of several universities, and scholars are actively engaged in carrying on researches on this discipline of study. In this context, it is a very welcome venture on the part of the publishers to bring out a yearbook on the armed forces. Though the title of the present volume is *Indian Armed Forces Yearbook, 1971-72*, in actuality it encompasses much more. For all practical purposes, it has become a compendium volume covering within a well-arranged span all the relevant aspects of military science. The book is divided into fifteen chapters of which chapters I to XI deal with the general theories and practices, while chapters XII to XV discuss Indian Armed Forces specifically.

The subject-matter for the first eleven chapters are modern wars, principles of war, strategy and tactics, command and decision, intelligence, guerrilla warfare, air power, sea power and push-button wars. These chapters present a connected story of how warfare has entered its present phase and simultaneously it also quotes a number of authorities on

different problems of war. The only shortcoming in this section is that it does not give anything regarding the military prowess of either Israel or Iran which are fast becoming very powerful states in West Asia.

The second part (i.e. chapters XII to XV) is concerned with the Indian Armed Forces along with the history of their development since the Second World War and in this connection mention has also been made of the British propaganda against the Indian National Army built by Subhas Chandra Bose. This section also includes the history of India's confrontation with Pakistan, which can be immensely helpful to scholars who are studying Indo-Pak relationship in depth. Chapter XIV gives an exhaustive list of military award winners, while the final chapter is devoted to the defence production, organisation and administration of the Indian Armed Forces.

But unfortunately, this volume is silent on the state and progress of military studies in India, nor does it say anything regarding the achievements of retired military officers like Thimayya, J.N. Chaudhuri or S. Mukherjee. I do hope that in the next edition, something on these points would be added. But these minor shortcomings apart, this book is very useful for general readers, scholars as well as professionals in the field. It is not only exhaustive in its treatment, but very stimulating as well.

—ARB

#### AN ASSEMBLAGE OF INDIAN ARMY SOLDIERS AND UNIFORMS

ed by Michael Glover

(Published by Perpetua Press, London, 1973) pp 103 Price—£4.75

“**I**N Assemblage of Indian Army Soldiers & Uniforms” is a picturesque collection of the portraits of the colourful and valient warriors of the King Emperor in a bygone era. The Perpetua Press, whose imprimatur it bears, has displayed allround efficiency and artistic taste. There could be little doubt amongst fighting soldiers that their uniform has significance far above its utilitarian value. Just like a regimental standard, a uniform acts as a rallying point, with its colour, regimental tradition, and sentiments. Its usefulness, specially during the days of peace, when the stock of the military forces tends to be low, is very significant. With what pride does the soldier adorn it. It is a pity that in the wake of successive economy drives and hastily conceived notions of safety, the colour and glamour of the fighting services have been allowed to fade away. In their place camouflage and dullness have crept in. One cannot, but wonder as to what is in store for the future, when infra-red equipment and doppler radars would become more plentiful.

The Editor, Michael Glover, has padded in for good measure many useful anecdotes. Inevitably, the reader will come across the Mutiny of 1857, when the grey uniforms underwent a change for the khaki. There are other sparkling bits of information too. It is not astonishing to learn as to how much regiments cherished their peculiarities in uniforms. After-

all every Colonel Commandant takes pride in protecting these from the scissors of the unscrupulous Master General of the Ordnance !

Many a battle lost by the General has been won back by the men, thanks to their regimental spirit. The late Chater Paul Chater deserves to be remembered with admiration and gratitude for immortalising a gallant and colourful age of chivalry through his splendid paintings. This book will be a useful addition to all reference libraries.

—TNRN

#### JUDO AND SELF-DEFENCE FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS

by Pat Butler and Karen Butler

(Published by Faber & Faber, London, 1968) pp 180 Price—42 S.

OF late there has been an increasing number of eve teasing cases particularly by university students in Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi. These young men have been described by some papers as University Lotharios and "repressed Romeos" with a zest for bottom-pinching. In fact such deeds of derring-do have become so common that the girl students of Delhi are reported to have organised themselves to join the battle of the sexes earnestly. Special judo classes to train women in the art of keeping the repressed Romeos at bay have been started and are becoming quite popular. Henceforth a bottom-pincher boy is likely to receive an elbow-punch in his solar plexus while a male trying to fondle a girl will be met with a wrist-lock followed by a chop in the neck.

The book under review deals comprehensively with the subject of how women and girls can defend themselves, not only against minor eve teasing offences but also against more serious attacks. Floating-drop, cross-strangle, arm-lock, ankle-throw, hip-throw, shutto and all other techniques are explained with the help of photographs. Thus this book written by a Judo expert, Pat Butler (Senior Coach and General Secretary of the Amateur Judo Association in Britain) and his wife Karen, fulfills a great need and should prove immensely useful to students as well as instructors of Judo in India and other countries. The book has over 400 illustrations printed on art paper. Considering this and the nice get-up the price of 42 shillings seems very reasonable.

In the chapter on Self-Defence, which describes the techniques to be employed against serious physical or sexual assaults, the authors say : "If you are to fight back you must be prepared to hurt your attacker.... In such cases the weakest points of the man must be attacked such as his groin, eyes and throat if you have to escape. Personally we think anyone who attacks a girl or a woman deserves all that he gets."

—PNK

# SECRETARY'S NOTES

## ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

I would like to thank all those members who paid their subscription so promptly at the begining of the year. To those of you who have not yet paid, may I remind you that your subscription was due three months ago on the 1st Jan. Would you please, therefore, put a cheque in the post TODAY. There are some members who have also to pay their subscription for 1973. They are requested to make the payment for both the years to avoid unnecessary reminders.

## ADDRESSES

Members are requested to notify changes of addresses immediately to this office. When Journals and correspondence are returned undelivered by the post office we have to write to the Service Headquarter concerned and it takes some time before we get the new address.

## SUGGESTIONS FOR THE JOURNAL

The USI Journal is in its ninety-ninth year of publication. As you will, no doubt appreciate, the Institution spends a great deal of its funds on producing this publication. We would like to have your comments, criticism and suggestion so that we may improve this publication to meet your requirement.

## NEW MEMBERS

From 1st January 1974 to 30th March 1974, the following members joined the Institution :—

ABDUL KADAR, Captain  
ADESEH, Flt. Lt. V.  
AGGARWAL, Major S. P.  
AHLAWAT, Major B.S.  
AHLUWALIA, 2/Lt S.S.  
AJIT DATTA, Major  
AJIT SINGH RIAR, Fg. Offr.  
ALEXIS PEREIRA, Major  
ALOK KUMAR MUKHERJEE, Major  
AMRIK SINGH, Captain

ABDUL KHADAR RAZAK, Captain  
AGARWAL, Major D.S.  
AGARWAL, Major V.K.  
AHLUWALIA, Captain M.S.  
AJIT BHUSHAN SINGH, Sqn. Ldr.  
AJIT KUMAR DEWAN, Major  
ALLAVALI, Captain F.B.  
ALLDHI BHARI SINGH, Captain  
AMAR SINGH RANA, Captain  
ANIL KUMAR, Captain

ANIL KUMAR KHANNA, Captain	ANSARI, Captain N.A.
ANUP SINGH DHARINI, Major	ARJAN SINGH HANDA, Captain
ARSHAD HUSSAIN, Major	ARUN DINSHAW NARGOLWALA, Major
ASHINANDAN SHARMA, Captain	ASHOK KUMAR, Major
AVTAR SINGH, Major	BAGGA, Captain M.S.
BAHL, Comdr. K.N.	BAINS, Captain P.S.
BAJPAI, Plt. Offr. V.S.	BALDEV KRISHAN BHAMBRI, Flt. Lt.
BALI, Captain V.K.	BAMA, Flg. Offr. S.K.
BANERJEE, Captain C.S.	BASU, Major V.N.
BASSI, Captain A.C.	BATH, Flg. Offr. R.S.
BHALLA, Captain S.C.	BHANOT, Captain S.C.
BHARAT BHUSHAN GHAI, Major	BHARAT SINGH, Captain
BHARGAWA, Captain N.K.	BHARGAVA KUMAR BISWAS, Lt.
BHASKAR BOSE, Flt. Lt.	BRAGANZA, Major C.G.M.
BRIJENDRA KUMAR SHARMA	BRIJMOHAN BAKSHI, Captain
Captain	CHADHA, Captain O.P.
BUBBER, Sqn. Ldr. I.C.	CHAKARBORTY, Captain M.
CHADHA, Captain P.N.	CHANDRA SEKHAR, Captain K.
CHAMANLAL LAKHAN PAL, Major	CHATURVEDI, Major H.P.
CHANDRA SEKARAN, Major R.	CHAUHAN, Captain P.C.
CHAUDHARY, Captain S.R.	CHEEMA, Captain A.S.
CHAUHAN, Major S.S.	CHIBBER, Sqn. Ldr M.K.
CHHAWAL, Captain S.S.	CHIMA, Major C.S.
CHOUDHURI, Flt. Lt. S.	CHOUDEHY, Major S.
CHOWLA, Captain T.R.	DALJIT SINGH, Major
DALVI, Captain V.B.	DAS, Captain K.K.
DASS, Major P.K.	DEEPAK DAS, Major
DEEPAK SURI, Captain	DESH PANDE, Major V.R.
DEVDAAT KAKRA, Fg. Offr.	DEVIAH NIGESIAN, Captain J.N.
DHAKA, Major B.S.	DHARWADKAR, Major S.R.
DHILLON, Major B.S.	DHILLON, Major D.D.
DHINGRA, Major R.K.	DIGAMBAR VASU DEO KULKARNI, Major
DISHIT, Flt. Lt. M.	DHOUNDIYA, Captain
DOGRA, Captain B.D.	DUBE, Major J.K.
EDWARD S HAYNES, Mr.	GANESH PRASAD DEENDYAL,
GANPATHI MUTHIAH, Major	GARCHA, Major S.P.S.
GHOSH, Flt. Lt. C.N.	GHOSH, Flt. Lt. P.K.
GILL, Captain A.S.	GILL, Flt. Lt. D.S.
GOPALKRISHNA MANUCHA, Major	GOPAL, Major K.V.
GOPAL KRISHAN TRIVEDI, Major	GOPAL SHARMA Flt. Lt.
GOSAIN, Major S.M.	GUNWANT SUHAI BAJAJ, Major
GUPTA, Flt. Lt. B.R.	GUPTA, Lt. H.K.
GURBACHAN SINGH SOHI, Major	GURCHARAN SINGH KANG, Flt. Lt.
GURDIP SINGH, Flt. Lt.	GURDEV SINGH TATI, Captain
GURMUKH SINGH, Flt. Lt.	GREWAL, Captain B.S.

HANS, Captain B.S.  
 HARBANS SINGH, Major  
 HARISH Plt. Offr. J.M.  
 HEMCHAND SINGH, Flt. Lt. A.  
 INAMDAR, Captain P.R.  
 IQBAL SINGH, Captain  
 JAGANNATHAN, Major S.  
 JAGDISH CHANDER, Major  
 JAIN, Wg Comdr, V.C.  
 JAKHAR, Major A.S.  
 JAMIT RAI JAGGA, Captain  
 JHINGAN, Captain N.K.  
 JOHN PETER, Flt Lt G.P.  
 KAMAT, Flt Lt N.V.  
 KARUR, Flt Lt M.L.  
 KAUSHAL, Captain R.K.  
 KELKAR, Major M.N.  
 KOPPIKAR, Flt Lt S.A.  
 KUMAR, Captain S.  
 LAKSHMIPATHY, Major  
 LAWATE, Captain A.M.  
 MADHAVAN NAIR, Major  
 MADAPPA, Major M.B.  
 MAHESAN, Captain C.  
 MALIK, Captain Y.K.  
 MANKOTIA, Major S.S. MVC  
 MANN, Major J.S.  
 MANJIT SINGH SANDHU, Major  
 MEHLA, Captain S.P.  
 MEHTA, Flt. Lt SBL  
 MOHAN DAS THARAMAL, Major  
 MOHAN SUDHIR, Major  
 MASSEY, Flt Lt R.A. Vn. C.  
 MUKHEDAR, Flt Lt P.M.  
 NAGESAN, Fg Offr  
 NAIR, Captain P.S.C.  
 NARANG, Major H.S.  
 NATARAJAN, Major V.S.  
 NAYAR, Captain N.R.K.  
 NEGI, Major G.S.  
 OM PRAKASH, Lt Col  
 PALIWAL, Sqn Ldr R.K.  
 PARAMJIT SINGH, Captain  
 PARASNIS, Flt Lt S.N.  
 PARMANANDAN, Captain M.

HANSRAJ CHOWTHRY, Flt. Lt.  
 HARI KISHAN SINGH, RAWAT Major  
 HASSAN, Major S.S.  
 HUNDAL, Fg. Offr. K.S.  
 ISRAEL, Captain D.R.  
 JACOB, Captain B.P.  
 JAGDEEP SINGH JATHWAL, Fg. Offr.  
 JAGDMBA PRASAD KOTNALA, Lt Col  
 JAI NARAIN, Major  
 JAM BUSAR WALLA, Captain R.S.  
 JASWANT SINGH PANG, Captain  
 JITENDRA NATH KAZRIKA,  
 KAHLON, Major J.S.  
 KANWAR, Captain H.S.  
 KAUL DEEPAK Major  
 KEHRI SINGH, Captain  
 KELKAR, Flt Lt., P.C.  
 KOSHY, Flt Lt, A.  
 KULDIP SINGH JAMWAL, Captain  
 LALIT MALHOTRA, Captain  
 LORENZO CROMWELL, Captain  
 MADHAVAN NAIR, FJR Lt R.  
 MAHAJAN, Captain P.  
 MALHOTRA, Captain V.K.  
 MANKOTIA, Major R.S.  
 MANER, Major K.S.  
 MANBIR SINGH, Sqn Ldr  
 MASCARENAS, Sqn Ldr A.  
 MEHTA, Major P.K.  
 MOHINDER KUMAR RAJPUT, Flt Lt  
 MOHAN SINGH, Captain  
 MUDAPPA, Captain M.A.  
 MUSHTAQ ALI BAIG, Captain  
 NAIR, Sqn Ldr V.V.  
 NAMA DEVAN, Sqn Ldr M.  
 NARINDER SINGH, MANGAT, Flt Lt  
 NAYAN RANJAN, Major  
 NEB, Flt Lt U.K.  
 NEHRA, Major A.K.  
 OM PRAKASH BHATIA, Major  
 PANDE, Captain S.K.  
 PRABJIT SINGH, Major  
 PARDAMAN SINGH, Major  
 PARMAR, Major S.S.

PARSURAM, Captain A.R.	PARTHASARTHY, Flt Lt V.
PAWAR, Major D.M.	PAWAR, Captain V.P.
PEN JOE, Captain	PEERUMAL, Major K.
PHILIP MATHAI, Plt Offr	PILLAI, Sqn Ldr M.K.
PRABHAT CHANDRA TIWARI, Captain	PRABIR KUMAR DATTA, Flt Lt
PRAKASH MURLIDHAR PANT, Flt Lt	PRADEEP KUMAR HANDA, Captain
PRASAD, Major P.M.	PRASAYTA KUMAR, Sqn Ldr
PRAVIN PARKASH KAPAH, Major	PRATAP, Fg Offr R
PRESENJIT SINGH BARUVA, Major	PREM KUMAR, Captain
PURI, Captain M.	PRAMOD CHANDRA SHARMA, Flg Offr
RAGHAVENDRA RAO, Captain	PUNDOL NOSHIR MINCCHER, Captain
RAHEJA, Plt Offr C.R.	RAJAN, Captain R.I.D.
RAJBIR SINGH TEOTA	RAJBIR SINGH BIJI, Captain
RAJENDRA KISHORE AGARWAL, Flt Lt	RAJENDRA KUMAR, Major
RAJENDRA SINGH, Flt Lt	RAJENDRA PRATAP
RAMAKRISHNAN BALA SUBRAMANIAM, Major	RAJESHWAR SINGH, Major
RAMAN, Captain S.P.	RAMAKRISHNAN, Fg Offr. V.
RAM SARUP DATTA, Captain	RAMESH KUMAR SURI, Major
RANDHIR SINGH, Major S.M.	RANDHAVA, Sqn Ldr P.S.
RANI KANT DEV SHENA, Captain	RAO, Major B.S.
RAO, Flt Lt K.N.	RAO, Sqn Ldr M.V.N.
RATHOR, Captain J.S.	RAO, Major K.P.
RAVINDER SINGH, Flt Lt	RATTANJIT SINGH, Captain
RAWLA, Major S.C.	RAVI DUTTA, Captain
ROY TARAN NATH, Captain	RAVINDAR NATH CHOWDHRY, Captain R.
SACHIDANAND RATH, Flt. Lt	ROBERT CHARLES LOBO, Captain
SAMANDAR SINGH GILL, Major	SACHDEV, Major H.S.
SANDHU, Major A.S.	SAHAI, Flt Lt A.
SARDUL SINGH, Major K	SAMARJIT DAS GUPTA, Flt Lt
SATISH KUMAR BAKRI, Lt Col	SANDHU, Captain G.S.
SAWHNEY, Captain M.M.	SARIT SINGH, Captain
SHAH NIWAZ ANSARI, Plt Offr	SATISH KUMAR KALSY, Captain
SHARMA, Major O.D.	SEWA SINGH, Major
SHARMA, Captain B.N.	SHANKAR, Major T.G.
SHARMA, Major V.P.	SHARMA, Major R.N.
SHASHI KANT GANPAT RAO DALVI, Lt	SHARMA, Captain P.K.
SHOME, Major A.N.	SHAROTRI, Captain K.L.
SHRIKHANDP, Captain M.G.	SHIVRAIN, Captain R.S.
SIDHU, Major M.S.	SHUKLA, Captain M.
SINGH, Plt Offr., B.P.	SIDDIQUI, Fg Offr M.F.
SINGH, Major H.B.	SINDHI, Flt Lt N.K.
	SINGH, Sqn Ldr M.P.
	SINGH, Captain D.P.



SINGH, Captain R.P.	SINGH, Sqn Ldr V.V.
SINGH, Captain D.P.	SINGH JANDU, Flt Lt A.B.
SITA RAM, Flt Lt S.K.S.	SODHI, Major S.
SODHI, Flg Offr S.S.	SOM, Flt Lt K.K.
SOMANNA BERI, Flt Lt	SUBRAMANIAM BALA CHANDRAN, Major
SUBRAMANIAM, Major A.R.	SUNIL KRISHNA CHAUDHRY, Sqn. Ldr.
SUKHBIR SINGH SETHI, Major	SURJIT SINGH GILL, Major
SRISHTI KUMAR, Major	SURENDER SINGH, Air Cdr
TAKLE, Captain A.K.S.	TAWATIA, Major L.C.
TEJA, Captain S.S.	TEMBE, Captain C.N.
TEWARI, Captain C.M.	THAKARAN, Captain A.S.
THAKUR, Captain A.S.	THOJAR, Flt Lt A.A.
THOMAS VERGHEESE, Plt Offr	TONIKA SINGH, Major
TOOR, Major C.S.	TRILOK NATH SHREEVASTAVA, Major
TRIPATHI, Major I.N.	UDAI SINGH, Major
UNNI, Captain R.K.	VAID, Major L.B.
VAID, Major R.C.	VERMA, Flt Lt S.C.
VICTOR, Flt Lt P.J.	VIJAY KUMAR, Captain
VIJAY KUMAR SRIVASTAWA, Captain	VIJAY CHADHA, Captain
VIJAY KAPOOR, Major	VIJAY PRAKASH PREENTA, Captain
VIJAY LALL, Major	VIKRAMADITYA SINGH, Lt
VISHWANATH, Flt Lt P.R.	VISHWAS LALASAHEB NIGDE,
VINOD KUMAR GUPTA, Major	VINOD KUMAR, Flg Offr.
VINOD KUMAR RATRA, Lt	VYAS, Major P.K.
VISWAS B KALE, Major	WADEHRA, Captain R.N.
WAM BARJEE, Major	YADAV, Captain M.R.
YADAV, Major R.R.	YADAV, Flt Lt S.S.
YOGENDRA MOHAN AGGARWAL, 2/Lt	

## AN APPEAL

USI JOURNAL

JAN-MAR 72

& JAN-MAR 73

The above issues of the USI Journal have unfortunately gone out of print but are in frequent demand from subscriber members/unit libraries to complete their volumes. Members are therefore requested to donate one or both the issues for the benefit of such libraries if they no longer require these issues of the Journal.

# ADDITIONS TO THE USI LIBRARY

<i>Book No.</i>	<i>Author</i>	<i>Title</i>
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS		
327.5305694	Kurzman, Dan	Genesis 1948 : The first Arab-Israeli War 1972
327.5305694	Narayan, B.K.	The Fourth Arab-Israeli War, 1974
327.54	Brown, Norman W.	The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 1972
327.54047	Driberg, Trevor and others	Towards closer Indo-Soviet Cooperation, 1974
327.54051	Lamb, Alastair	The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh, 1973
327.5405426	Jha, Braj Kishore	Indo-Nepalese Relations (1951-1972), 1973
327.540547	Kulkarni, V.B.	India and Pakistan : A Historical Survey of Hindu-Muslim Relations, 1973
327.540581	Tripathi, G.P.	Indo-Afghan Relations 1882-1907, 1973

## MILITARY SCIENCE

355	Bidwell, Shelford	Modern Warfare, 1973
355	Dupuy, R. Ernest and Dupuy, Trevor N.	The Encyclopedia of Military History, 1970
355.05	Kaul, Ravi ed.	The Chankya Defence Annual 1973-74
355.05	Moulton, J.L. ed.	Brassey's Annual 1973
355.05	Singh, Jaswant. ed.	Indian Armed Forces Year Book, 1971
355.134	Carter, Thomas and Long, W.H.	War Medals of the British Army 1650-1891, 1972
355.4	Fair, Charles	From the Jaws of Victory, 1971
355.48	Falls, Cyril. ed.	Great Military Battles, 1972

358.1	Hughes, B.P.	The Bengal Horse Artillery 1800-1861, 1971
358.18	Bradford, George and Morgan, Len	50 Famous Tanks, 1968
358.18	Foss, Christopher F	Armoured Fighting Vehicles of the World, 1971
623.438	Chamberlain, Peter and Ellis, Chris.	Pictorial History of Tanks of the World 1915-45, 1972
623.444	Carter, J. Anthony	Allied Bayonets of World War II, 1969
623.440947	Barker, A.J. and Walter, John	Russian Infantry Weapons of World War II, 1971
629.133	Taylor, John W.R. and Munson, Kenneth	History of Aviation, 1972
629.13334	Taylor, John W.R.	Civil Aircraft Markings, 1973

#### ESPIONAGE AND INTELLIGENCE

355.343	Huminik, John	Double Agent, 1968
345.343	Lockhart, Robin Bruce	Ace of Spies, 1967
355.343	Lotz, Wolfgang	The Champagne Spy, 1972
355.343	Watt, George	China Spy, 1972
355.3430973	Smith, Harris	OSS : The Secret. History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, 1972

#### MANAGEMENT

658	Batten, J.D.	Tough-Minded Management, 1969
658	Heyel, Carl	Management for Modern Supervisors, 1962
658	Kellogg, Marion	What to do about performance appraisal, 1965
658	Siders, R.A. and others	Computer Graphics, 1966

#### BIOGRAPHIES AND MEMOIRS

923.242	Moon, Penderel. ed.	Wavell : The Viceroy's Journal, 1973
---------	---------------------	---

- |         |  |   |
|---------|--|---|
| 923.254 | Chattopadhyay, Gautam                        | Subhas Chandra Bose and Indian Communist Movement, 1973 |
| 923.254 | Durga Das ed.                                | Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50 V.6 and V.7, 1973 |
| 923.254 | Gopal, S.ed.                                 | Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, V.4 1973            |
| 923.254 | INDIA. Information and Broadcasting (Min of- | The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. 51 1972     |
| 923.254 | Iyer, Raghavan N.                            | The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, 1973 |
| 923.254 | Mangat Rai, E.N.                             | Commitment my style                                     |
| 923.254 | Vasudev, Uma                                 | Indira Gandhi : Revolution in Restraint, 1974           |
| 923.543 | Evans, Geoffrey                              | Slim : as Military Commander, 1969                      |
| 923.543 | Lee, Asher                                   | Goring : Air Leader, 1972                               |
| 923.544 | Crozier, Brian                               | De Gaulle : The Warrior, 1973                           |

## WORLD WAR II 1939-1945

- |          |                  |  |
|----------|------------------|--|
| 940.5425 | Allen, Louis     | Sittang the last Battle, 1973  |
| 940.5442 | Wright, Robert   | Dowding and the Battle of Britain, 1969                              |
| 940.5451 | Waddington, C.H. | O.R. in World War 2 : Operational Research against the U. Boat, 1973 |
| 940.5473 | Adams, Geoffrey  | No time for Geishas, 1973  |
|          | Pharaoh          |  |
| 940.5485 | Mains, Tony      | The Retreat from Burma, 1973   |

## CHINA

- |        |                   |                                      |
|--------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 327.51 | Liu, Leo Yueh-Yun | China as a nuclear power, 1972       |
| 951.05 | Domes, Jurgen     | The Internal Politics of China, 1973 |
| 651.05 | Gernet Jacques    | Ancient China, 1968                  |

- |        |                |  |
|--------|----------------|--|
| 951.05 | Tan, Chester C | Chinese Political Thought<br>in the twentieth century,<br>1972 |
|--------|----------------|--|

## INDIA

- |         |  |  |
|---------|--|--|
| 058.054 | Sham Lal, ed.                                | The Times of India directory and year book including who's who, 1973 |
| 320.954 | Gupta, Bhabani Sen                           | Communism in Indian Politics, 1972                                   |
| 327.54  | Madan Gopal                                  | India as a World Power, 1974   |
| 338.954 | Bhagwati, Jagdish N and Desai, Padma         | India : Planning for Industrialization, 1970                         |
| 808.3   | Farrell, J.G.                                | The Siege of Krishnapur, 1973  |
| 954     | Beveridge, Henry                             | A Comprehensive History of India. 2 Vols, 1974                       |
| 954.03  | Edwarde, Michael                             | A Season in Hell   |
| 954.03  | Metcalf, Charles Theophilus tr.              | Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi, 1974                   |
| 954.035 | Singh, Shailendra Dhari                      | Novels on the Indian Mutiny, 1973                                    |
| 954.036 | Appadorai, A                                 | Documents on Political Thought in Modern India Vol. I, 1973          |
| 954.05  | INDIA. Information and Broadcasting (Min of- | India 1973, 1973   |

## BANGLADESH

- |         |                         |                               |
|---------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 954.145 | Chatterjee, Basant      | Inside Bangladesh today, 1973 |
| 954.145 | Chen, Lincoln C ed.     | Disaster in Bangladesh, 1973  |
| 954.145 | Dutt, Kalyan and others | Bangladesh Economy, 1973      |

# USI GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITIONS

1 9 7 4

## SUBJECTS

### (A) FOR ALL OFFICERS IRRESPECTIVE OF RANK

In the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War ; West Asian Nations with oil reserves have been able to exploit the global requirement of oil and to a large measure, have succeeded in dictating terms to the big powers. The rise in the price of oil has resulted in the acquisition of vast surplus funds by these Nations. A substantial proportion of these funds is being channelised to the purchase of sophisticated military hardware and armament.

Oil is as vital in the actual conduct of modern warfare as in the maintenance and development of industrial and economic strength of a nation, which in turn contribute to her military preparedness. Pakistan's continued hostility towards India on the one hand, and her increasingly closer relations with some of the oil producing west Asian countries on the other, make it imperative for us to study the inherent political and military implications.

Keeping in view our stated foreign policy and our present and potential economic strength, discuss the short term and long term measures we should adopt to ensure that our national security is not jeopardised and that we retain the minimum required military capability.

### (B) FOR CAPTAINS AND MAJORS WITH NOT MORE THAN 10 YEARS SERVICE AND THEIR EQUIVALENTS IN NAVY AND AIR FORCE

Despite many improvements in service conditions it would appear that the armed forces have failed to draw the best of the youth of the country, at least the best educated and most physically fit. Even the 'glamour' surrounding the forces after the 1971 war has failed to evoke enthusiasm to the extent of effecting recruitment (to all ranks) favourably. Again in spite of increases in their emoluments, and the present unemployment in the country, the services still remain an unattractive career. Unfortunately, this is even more so with sons of services officers. Our present economy will not justify any substantial increase in the services emoluments in the near future. This being the case, what do you consider to be the reasons and what further steps are necessary to attract the very best to the armed forces ?

## RULES

1. Competition (A) is open to all Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces of India, the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries, officers of the Territorial Army and the Senior Division of National Cadet Corps and Gazetted Officers of the Civil administration in India.

2. Competition (B) is restricted to Captains and Majors with not more than 10 years services and the officers of equivalent rank in Navy and Air Force.

3. Essays may vary in length between 4,000 and 8,000 words. Should any authority be quoted in essay, the title of the works referred to should be given.

4. Essays should be typed on one side of the paper (double spacing) and submitted in triplicate.

5. Entries will be strictly anonymous. Each essay must have a motto at the top instead of the author's name and must be accompanied by a sealed envelope with the motto outside and with the name and address of the competitor inside. These envelopes will be opened by the Chairman of the Executive Committee at the Council meeting, after the judges have given their decision.

6. The judges will have two criteria in mind :—

- (a) the extent to which the contribution throws fresh light on the subject, and
- (b) whether in whole or in large parts it is in a form suitable for publication.

7. Three judges chosen by the Council will adjudicate. They may recommend the Gold Medal to the winner and/or a cash prize, as well as a cash prize to the runner-up (subject to the sanctioned limit of Rs. 700/- in all, for prize) and will submit their recommendations to the Council. The name of the successful candidate will be published in January-March 1975 issue of Journal.

8. The Institution reserve the right not to make an award if none of the essays submitted reaches standard which the judges consider adequate.

9. The award of the judges appointed by the Council of the Institution is final.

10. Copyright of all essays submitted will be reserved by the Council of the United Services Institution of India.

11. All essays should be sent to the Secretary, United Services Institution of India, Kashmir House, New Delhi-110011, to be received not later than 31 January 1975. The envelope should be marked as follows :—

- (a) Open to all "ESSAY COMPETITION (A)"
- (b) Open to Captain/  
Major and equivalent rank "ESSAY COMPETITION (B)"

# CAN A STEEL CITY ALSO BE A GREEN CITY?



Jamshedpur, the steel city of India, was planned to be a model of its kind.

"Be sure," wrote Jamsetji Tata to his son Dorab, "to lay out wide streets planted with shady trees, every other one of a quick growing variety. Be sure that there is plenty of space for lawns and gardens"

And that's what Jamshedpur is today; as much a city of gardens as of steel. Housing colonies have been planned and are being expanded, keeping in mind Jamsetji's wishes voiced over seventy years ago!



YOU CAN'T SEE  
THE PLANT FOR  
THE TREES



## TATA STEEL